Microsoft today released patches for 204 vulnerabilities. 38 of these vulnerabilities are considered critical, and three have been disclosed before today. Six of the vulnerabilities affect Microsoft cloud solutions and do not require any user action. In addition, Microsoft incorporated 360 different vulnerabilities affecting Chromium into its Edge browser.
Category Archives: Security
TeamPCP Supply Chain Campaign: Activity Through 2026-06-07, (Mon, Jun 8th)
This diary continues the Internet Storm Center's tracking of the TeamPCP supply chain campaign, first documented in the SANS white paper When the Security Scanner Became the Weapon and most recently in the handler diary Activity Through 2026-05-24. Since that update, the story moved into two new places: the United States government, which formally caught up to the campaign, and the wider population of attackers now wielding the Mini Shai-Hulud framework that TeamPCP open-sourced last month.
The Evil MSI Background is Back!, (Fri, Jun 5th)
A few months ago, I wrote a diary about a payload that was embedded into a JPEG picture. It was a MSI-branded background[1]. Yesterday, I spotted another one! It seems that the technic is getting more and more popular. This time, it started with a mail containing a WeTransfer link.
Microsoft's Coreutils for Windows, (Thu, Jun 4th)
Continuing Scans for swagger.json, (Wed, Jun 3rd)
Enterprise applications often still use complex standards like SOAP for web services. The big advantage of SOAP is its tight and extensive standards, which enable interoperability across an enterprise governed by web services. The disadvantage of SOAP: First, while it is de facto usually used over HTTP, it does not leverage HTTP, leading to unnecessary complexity. Secondly, kids don't RTFM, and developers these days tend not to appreciate the art of careful system design; they rather throw code at an IDE to see what sticks, if they don't vibe code it anyway.
New Wave Of Phishing Emails with SVG Files, (Tue, Jun 2nd)
For a few days, my SANS ISC mailbox is flooded with emails that delivers SVG files. An SVG ("Scalable Vector Graphic") is a web-friendly vector file format used for graphics and icons. No URL in the body, just “an image”, that’s the perfect way to deliver some malicious content. This isn’t the first time that we see this technique used by threat actors[1].
Analysis of a Year of Files Uploaded to DShield Sensors, (Wed, May 27th)
Using the data collected over the past year and using Kibana these two ES|QL query to summarize the data, this shows the list of the most uploaded threat to two DShield sensors (local and cloud) over the past year. I have sorted the activity by months that shows the evolution of files uploaded to the sensors each month. The activity peaked during the winter months (Dec 2025 – Feb 2026) and started decreasing in March 2026 for each sensor.
Reconstructing an Akira Ransomware Kill Chain from Perimeter and Endpoint Logs, (Wed, May 27th)
Most Akira write-ups focus on the ransom note or the encryption routine. By the time those show up the interesting forensic work is over. The questions that matter to defenders sit earlier. How did they get in. When did they get domain admin. What did they touch before the binary fired. Those answers live in the days before impact. They sit in two log sources that almost never get joined. The perimeter firewall and the Windows event channel.
An Example of Stack String in High Level Language, (Sat, May 23rd)
This week, I’m attending the SEC670[1] training (“Red Teaming Tools – Developing Windows Implants, Shellcode, Command and Control”). From my point of view, this training fits perfectly with FOR610 or FOR710 (malware analysis) because it addresses malware from the opposite: Instead of performing reverse engineering, you write malicious code! Always interesting to have another point of view.
Cross-Platform NPM Stealer, (Fri, May 22nd)
I found a Node.js stealer that looked pretty well obfuscated. The file was not running out-of-the-box because it was uploaded on VT as “extracted-decoded.js” (and reformated). The SHA256 is 049300aa5dd774d6c984779a0570f59610399c71864b5d5c2605906db46ddeb9[1]. It did not run properly in a sandbox so only a static analysis was performed.