Realtek SDK SIP ALG Vulnerability: A Big Deal, but not much you can do about it. CVE 2022-27255, (Sun, Aug 14th)

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On Friday, Octavio Gianatiempo & Octavio Galland released details about a vulnerability in Realtek's eCos SDK. The release came as part of their talk at Defcon. Realtek patched the vulnerability they spoke about in March. But this patch may not do you much good. The vulnerability affects Realtek's SDK. Various vendors use this SDK as part of the equipment that uses Realtek's RTL819x SoCs. Affected vendors need to release patched firmware to mitigate this vulnerability. Many affected vendors have not yet released updates.

Phishing HTML Attachment as Voicemail Audio Transcription, (Sat, Aug 13th)

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I have been seeing this form of phishing in Microsoft Office 365 for several weeks. The email comes in as an attachment like this with a phone icon preceding it:

I saved a copy of the file to examine its content in CyberChef which decoded the top part of the HTML file showing the target email address (I replaced it) with the URL the HTML will open to:

 

 

The URL actually has an error where d!irty (where the exclamation mark is an i) is actually dirty. I moved the code up in the Input to decode the base64 content and the decoded text has error checking for empty or to short password: "Your account password cannot be empty. If you don't remember your password reset it now"

 

 

Analysis of the file if opened would look like this:

 

 

Indicator

netaccelaration[.]com/zips/dirty.php
netaccelaration[.]com/zips/d!rty.php

 

[1] https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/

———–
Guy Bruneau IPSS Inc.
My Handler Page
Twitter: GuyBruneau
gbruneau at isc dot sans dot edu

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.

Monster Libra (TA551/Shathak) pushes IcedID (Bokbot) with Dark VNC and Cobalt Strike, (Fri, Aug 12th)

This post was originally published on this site

Introduction

Since 2019, threat actor Monster Libra (also known as TA551 or Shathak) has pushed different families of malware.  During the past few months, Monster Libra has primarily pushed SVCready or IcedID.  Today's diary reviews an example of Monster Libra pushing IcedID on Thursday 2022-08-11, and that IcedID infection led to Dark VNC activity and Cobalt Strike.
 


Shown above:  Chain of events for IcedID infection distributed through Monster Libra.
 

Images From the Infection
 


Shown above:  Screenshot of a Monster Libra email.
 


Shown above:  Screenshot of the attached Word document.
 


Shown above:  Files that appeared after enabling macros
 


Shown above:  Scheduled task for persistent IcedID infection.
 


Shown above:  Traffic from an infection filtered in Wireshark (image 1 of 2).
 


Shown above:  Traffic from an infection filtered in Wireshark (image 2 of 2).
 

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
 

20 Word docs found on VT:
 

  • 2,316,894 bytes – [name removed] doc 08.11.2022.doc
  • 2,343,230 bytes – [name removed] doc 08.11.2022.doc
  • 2,349,822 bytes – [name removed] doc 08.11.doc
  • 2,316,250 bytes – [name removed] file 08.11.2022.doc
  • 2,365,937 bytes – [name removed] file 08.11.22.doc
  • 2,298,962 bytes – [name removed] invoice 08.11.22.doc
  • 2,343,139 bytes – [name removed],doc,08.11.22.doc
  • 2,365,983 bytes – [name removed],document,08.11.22.doc
  • 2,298,458 bytes – [name removed],file,08.11.2022.doc
  • 2,298,562 bytes – [name removed],file,08.11.22.doc
  • 2,297,841 bytes – [name removed]-doc-08.11.2022.doc
  • 2,350,727 bytes – [name removed]-invoice-08.11.22.doc
  • 2,315,700 bytes – [name removed].doc.08.11.22.doc
  • 2,316,502 bytes – [name removed].document.08.11.2022.doc
  • 2,316,883 bytes – [name removed].document.08.11.2022.doc
  • 2,316,402 bytes – [name removed].invoice.08.11.2022.doc
  • 2,351,271 bytes – [name removed]doc08.11.doc
  • 2,366,716 bytes – [name removed]document08.11.22.doc
  • 2,298,836 bytes – [name removed]document08.11.doc
  • 2,349,614 bytes – [name removed]file08.11.22.doc

SHA256 hashes of the 20 Word docs:
 

Files from an infected Windows host:

SHA256 hash: 6cbe0e1f046b13b29bfa26f8b368281d2dda7eb9b718651d5856f22cc3e02910

  • File size: 61,440 bytes
  • File location: C:WindowsSysWOW64rundll32.exe
  • File location: C:Users[username]AppDataLocalTempr2FB9.tmp.exe
  • File description: Copy of legitimate Microsoft system file rundll32.exe.  This is not inherently malicious.

SHA256 hash: 8cd135e5b49d16aceb7665b6316cd4df2e132ef503ff0af51c080bad7010efd6

  • File size: 360,448 bytes
  • File location: hxxp://45.8.146[.]139/fhfty/6VGPA_LVJVCA8YKG3HF2E1-VHCR4UDER/-f
  • File location: C:Users[username]AppDataLocalTempy2D56.tmp.dll
  • File description: 64-bit DLL to install IcedID retrieved by Word macro
  • Run method: rundll32.exe [filename],#1

SHA256 hash: 5af2d2e245b36447fffff463b66164807f505dc9efcbe7fadfe4d450b1715c46

  • File size: 688,572 bytes
  • File location: hxxp://alexbionka[.]com/
  • File description: gzip from alexbionka[.]com, used to create license.dat and persistent IcedID DLL

SHA256 hash: 1de8b101cf9f0fabc9f086bddb662c89d92c903c5db107910b3898537d4aa8e7

  • File size: 342,218 bytes
  • File name: C:Users[username]AppDataRoamingLampEyebrowlicense.dat
  • File description: Data binary used to run persistent IcedID DLL

SHA256 hash: d45c78fa400b32c11443061dcd1c286d971881ddf35a47143e4d426a3ec6bffd

  • File size: 345,600 bytes
  • File name: C:Users[username]AppDataRoaming[username][username]ijexogdf64.dll
  • File description: Persistent 64-bit DLL for IcedID
  • Run method: rundll32.exe [filename],#1 –keac="[path to license.dat]"

Note: No binaries were saved to disk for DarkVNC or Cobalt Strike.

 

Traffic for IcedID installer DLL:

 

  • hxxp://45.8.146[.]139/fhfty/6VGPA_LVJVCA8YKG3HF2E1-VHCR4UDER/-f

Traffic for gzip binary:

  • 64.227.108[.]27:80 – alexbionka[.]com – GET / HTTP/1.1

IcedID C2 activity:

  • 103.208.86[.]124:443 – klareqvino[.]com – HTTPS traffic
  • 46.21.153[.]211:443 – wiandukachelly[.]com – HTTPS traffic
  • 84.32.188[.]164:443 – ultomductingbig[.]pro – HTTPS traffic

DarkVNC activity:

  • 212.114.52[.]91:8080 – encoded/encrypted TCP traffic

Cobalt Strike activity:

  • 174.139.150[.]128:8080 – projectextracted[.]com – HTTPS traffic

Final Words

IcedID continues to be an active malware in our current threat landscape.  Threat actors like Monster Libra continue to push IcedID through malspam-based campaigns as described in this diary.  We expect to find more of this activity in the coming weeks.

Brad Duncan
brad [at] malwre-traffic-analysis.net

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.

New – AWS Private 5G – Build Your Own Private Mobile Network

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Back in the mid-1990’s, I had a young family and 5 or 6 PCs in the basement. One day my son Stephen and I bought a single box that contained a bunch of 3COM network cards, a hub, some drivers, and some cables, and spent a pleasant weekend setting up our first home LAN.

Introducing AWS Private 5G
Today I would like to introduce you to AWS Private 5G, the modern, corporate version of that very powerful box of hardware and software. This cool new service lets you design and deploy your own private mobile network in a matter of days. It is easy to install, operate, and scale, and does not require any specialized expertise. You can use the network to communicate with the sensors & actuators in your smart factory, or to provide better connectivity for handheld devices, scanners, and tablets for process automation.

The private mobile network makes use of CBRS spectrum. It supports 4G LTE (Long Term Evolution) today, and will support 5G in the future, both of which give you a consistent, predictable level of throughput with ultra low latency. You get long range coverage, indoors and out, and fine-grained access control.

AWS Private 5G runs on AWS-managed infrastructure. It is self-service and API-driven, and can scale with respect to geographic coverage, device count, and overall throughput. It also works nicely with other parts of AWS, and lets you use AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) to control access to both devices and applications.

Getting Started with AWS Private 5G
To get started, I visit the AWS Private 5G Console and click Create network:

I assign a name to my network (JeffCell) and to my site (JeffSite) and click Create network:

The network and the site are created right away. Now I click Create order:

I fill in the shipping address, agree to the pricing (more on that later), and click Create order:

Then I await delivery, and click Acknowledge order to proceed:

The package includes a radio unit and ten SIM cards. The radio unit requires AC power and wired access to the public Internet, along with basic networking (IPv4 and DHCP).

When the order arrives, I click Acknowledge order and confirm that I have received the desired radio unit and SIMs. Then I engage a Certified Professional Installer (CPI) to set it up. As part of the installation process, the installer will enter the latitude, longitude, and elevation of my site.

Things to Know
Here are a couple of important things to know about AWS Private 5G:

Partners – Planning and deploying a private wireless network can be complex and not every enterprise will have the tools to do this work on their own. In addition, CBRS spectrum in the United States requires Certified Professional Installation (CPI) of radios. To address these needs, we are building an ecosystem of partners that can provide customers with radio planning, installation, CPI certification, and implementation of customer use cases. You can access these partners from the AWS Private 5G Console and work with them through the AWS Marketplace.

Deployment Options – In the demo above, I showed you the cloud–based deployment option, which is designed for testing and evaluation purposes, for time-limited deployments, and for deployments that do not use the network in latency-sensitive ways. With this option, the AWS Private 5G Mobile Core runs within a specific AWS Region. We are also working to enable on-premises hosting of the Mobile Core on a Private 5G compute appliance.

CLI and API Access – I can also use the create-network, create-network-site, and acknowledge-order-receipt commands to set up my AWS Private 5G network from the command line. I still need to use the console to place my equipment order.

Scaling and Expansion – Each network supports one radio unit that can provide up to 150 Mbps of throughput spread across up to 100 SIMs. We are working to add support for multiple radio units and greater number of SIM cards per network.

Regions and Locations – We are launching AWS Private 5G in the US East (Ohio), US East (N. Virginia), and US West (Oregon) Regions, and are working to make the service available outside of the United States in the near future.

Pricing – Each radio unit is billed at $10 per hour, with a 60 day minimum.

To learn more, read about AWS Private 5G.

Jeff;

AA22-223A: #StopRansomware: Zeppelin Ransomware

This post was originally published on this site

Original release date: August 11, 2022

Summary

Actions to take today to mitigate cyber threats from ransomware:

• Prioritize remediating known exploited vulnerabilities.
• Train users to recognize and report phishing attempts.
• Enable and enforce multifactor authentication.

Note: this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are releasing this joint CSA to disseminate known Zeppelin ransomware IOCs and TTPs associated with ransomware variants identified through FBI investigations as recently as 21 June 2022.

The FBI and CISA encourage organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood and impact of ransomware incidents.

Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 999 kb

Download the YARA signature for Zeppelin: YARA Signature, .yar 125 kb

Technical Details

Note: this advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 11. See MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise for all referenced tactics and techniques.

Zeppelin ransomware is a derivative of the Delphi-based Vega malware family and functions as a Ransomware as a Service (RaaS). From 2019 through at least June 2022, actors have used this malware to target a wide range of businesses and critical infrastructure organizations, including defense contractors, educational institutions, manufacturers, technology companies, and especially organizations in the healthcare and medical industries. Zeppelin actors have been known to request ransom payments in Bitcoin, with initial amounts ranging from several thousand dollars to over a million dollars.

Zeppelin actors gain access to victim networks via RDP exploitation [T1133], exploiting SonicWall firewall vulnerabilities [T1190], and phishing campaigns [T1566]. Prior to deploying Zeppelin ransomware, actors spend one to two weeks mapping or enumerating the victim network to identify data enclaves, including cloud storage and network backups [TA0007]. Zeppelin actors can deploy Zeppelin ransomware as a .dll or .exe file or contained within a PowerShell loader. [1

Prior to encryption, Zeppelin actors exfiltrate [TA0010] sensitive company data files to sell or publish in the event the victim refuses to pay the ransom. Once the ransomware is executed, a randomized nine-digit hexadecimal number is appended to each encrypted file as a file extension, e.g., file.txt.txt.C59-E0C-929 [T1486]. A note file with a ransom note is left on compromised systems, frequently on the desktop (see figure 1 below).

 

"Figure 1: This is an illustration of a note file with a ransom note is left on compromised systems, frequently on the desktop."

 

The FBI has observed instances where Zeppelin actors executed their malware multiple times within a victim’s network, resulting in the creation of different IDs or file extensions, for each instance of an attack; this results in the victim needing several unique decryption keys.

 

Indicators of Compromise (IOC)

See table 1 below for IOCs as of June 2022 obtained from FBI incident response investigations.

MD5

SHA1

 SHA256

981526650af8d6f8f20177a26abb513a

4fee2cb5c98abbe556e9c7ccfebe9df4f8cde53f

001938ed01bfde6b100927ff8199c65d1bff30381b80b846f2e3fe5a0d2df21d

c25d45e9bbfea29cb6d9ee0d9bf2864d

eaeff8d315cca71e997063a2baec5cc73fad9453

a42185d506e08160cb96c81801fbe173fb071f4a2f284830580541e057f4423b

183b6b0c90c1e0276a2015752344a4cf

1cb5e8132302b420af9b1e5f333c507d8b2a2441

aa7e2d63fc991990958dfb795a0aed254149f185f403231eaebe35147f4b5ebe

9349e1cc3de7c7f6893a21bd6c3c4a6b

db398e38ee6221df7e4aa49d8f96799cca4d87e1

a2a9385cbbcfacc2d541f5bd92c38b0376b15002901b2fd1cc62859e161a8037

c8f75487d0d496a3746e6c81a5ecc6dc

4b91a91a98a2f0128c80f8ceeef0f5d293adf0cd

54d567812eca7fc5f2ff566e7fb8a93618b6d2357ce71776238e0b94d55172b1

477eedb422041385e59a4fff72cb97c1

9892cc90e6712d3548e45f34f14f362bccedf0be

fb59f163a2372d09cd0fc75341d3972fdd3087d2d507961303656b1d791b17c6

5841ef35aaff08bb03d25e5afe3856a2

ffd228b0d7afe7cab4e9734f7093e7ba01c5a06e

1e3c5a0aa079f8dfcc49cdca82891ab78d016a919d9810120b79c5deb332f388

d6c4b253ab1d169cf312fec12cc9a28f

0f47c279fea1423c7a0e7bc967d9ff3fae7a0de8

347f14497df4df73bc414f4e852c5490b12db991a4b3811712bac7476a3f1bc9

fba7180ad49d6a7f3c60c890e2784704

f561f9e3c949fe87f12dbfa166ffb2eb85712419

7d8c4c742689c097ac861fcbf7734709fd7dcab1f7ef2ceffb4b0b7dec109f55

bc6c991941d9afbd522fa0a2a248a97a

a243ce234fc8294e2e2e526418b4eaadc2d6c84f

37c320983ae4c1fd0897736a53e5b0481edb1d1d91b366f047aa024b0fc0a86e

f3490951ae51922cb360a3d76a670159

e2cb60be111716e32db7ca2365ad6e73c30f0e21

894b03ed203cfa712a28ec472efec0ca9a55d6058115970fe7d1697a3ddb0072

e4f1f05c2e6c3fc2f3336a8c8799ffb4

dbd9fcf2b05e703d34181c46f4c22392b9fcc1da

307877881957a297e41d75c84e9a965f1cd07ac9d026314dcaff55c4da23d03e

aa2048271f0aef3383480ce4a7c93b52

512b16ea74027fa4d0055831de5e51278812c8de

bafd3434f3ba5bb9685e239762281d4c7504de7e0cfd9d6394e4a85b4882ff5d

f66b738e1bfe1f8aab510abed850c424

571f50fee0acad1da39fe06c75116461800cc719

faa79c796c27b11c4f007023e50509662eac4bca99a71b26a9122c260abfb3c6

bb30f050546f5d6e61fafc59eaf097c3

ee44179f64918f72a8d2e88a5074d89efab3d81b

e48cf17caffc40815efb907e522475722f059990afc19ac516592231a783e878

78621f1e196497d440afb57f4609fcf9

eed7c3bb3fc5181b88abeed2204997f350324022

4a4be110d587421ad50d2b1a38b108fa05f314631066a2e96a1c85cc05814080

f4e0ee0200de397691748a2cdcd7e34a

bd3f6b878284a63c72e8354e877e3f48d6fca53c

9ef90ec912543cc24e18e73299296f14cb2c931a5d633d4c097efa372ae59846

cf5a358a22326f09fd55983bb812b7d8

1addcffae4fd4211ea24202783c2ffad6771aa34

dd89d939c941a53d6188232288a3bd73ba9baf0b4ca6bf6ccca697d9ee42533f

7afe492a38ca6f27e24028aab68406b5

5870a3adbce9737319f3c9461586d5f2afbc7adb

79d6e498e7789aaccd8caa610e8c15836267c6a668c322111708cf80bc38286c

1da1c0115caca5ebf064380eb7490041

5edb8b651c7013ebaba2eb81c87df76a1e0724d6

b22b3625bcce7b010c0ee621434878c5f8d7691c2a101ae248dd221a70668ac0

8c3c663ffcf363d087f4e114a79945ca

905726d178962dd1d7fe87504d051aca440740b8

961fbc7641f04f9fed8391c387f01d64435dda6af1164be58c4cb808b08cc910

17c5cae3bce5832dd42986fe612517d9

6f70e73c53d7622d8c4808ae7849133df1343484

d618c1ccd24d29e911cd3e899a4df2625155297e80f4c5c1354bc2e79f70768c

bfe7f54f1f0640936dd7a3384608b1f6

9436ccee41c01ca3cb4db55c10884615aba76d19

8170612574f914eec9e66902767b834432a75b1d6ae510f77546af2a291a48a2

f28af04ef0370addfebfdd31f1ec25ed

cfcfa995c15d9f33de21d0dd88d3b95d0f91d6bc

5326f52bd9a7a52759fe2fde3407dc28e8c2caa33abf1c09c47b192a1c004c12

f3bcad5358f89df1eb0294ef53f54437

eb036759beb28f86ee981bdca4fad24152b82d8c

6bafc7e2c7edc2167db187f50106e57b49d4a0e1b9269f1d8a40f824f2ccb42b

b1f6370582fbaf5c51e826fecef53cd7

4b2d0127699f708a8116bff8f25c9d6140033197

f7af51f1b2b98b482885b702508bd65d310108a506e6d8cef3986e69f972c67d

de785ed922d4e737dc0fa0bb30a4de8b

4d280105e724db851f03de8fc76409ef4057ff2c

bc214c74bdf6f6781f0de994750ba3c50c0e10d9db3483183bd47f5cef154509

7a296f7c1ac4aeee18d4c23476735be7

c13542310f7a4e50a78247fc7334096ca09c5d7f

ed1548744db512a5502474116828f75737aec8bb11133d5e4ad44be16aa3666b

37f18b38e1af6533d93bbb3f2ddb86dc

d3929331d9bc278dea5607aec1574012a08de861

cf9b6dda84cbf2dbfc6edd7a740f50bddc128842565c590d8126e5d93c024ff2

291de974e5cbe5e3d47e3d17487e027f

def93f18aaf146fe8f3c4f9a257364f181197608

21807d9fcaa91a0945e80d92778760e7856268883d36139a1ad29ab91f9d983d

99d59c862a082b207a868e409ce2d97c

908a9026d61717b5fa29959478a9bd939da9206f

0d22d3d637930e7c26a0f16513ec438243a8a01ea9c9d856acbcda61fcb7b499

d27125d534e398f1873b7f4835a79f09

1862f063c30cd02cfea6070d3dba41ac5eee2a35

6fbfc8319ed7996761b613c18c8cb6b92a1eaed1555dae6c6b8e2594ac5fa2b9

4534f2afe5f7df1d998f37ad4e35afeb

e2cc94e471509f9fa58620b8bb56d77f2cfe74b0

e8596675fef4ad8378e4220c22f4358fdb4a20531b59d7df5382c421867520a9

7ab0676262c681b8ec15bdada17d7476

2f1803d444891abb604864d476a8feac0d614f77

353e59e96cbf6ea6c16d06da5579d3815aaaeeefacabd7b35ba31f7b17207c5b

d7d3d23a5e796be844af443bda5cd67e

a9771c591f6ccc2f3419d571c64ab93228785771

85f9bf4d07bc2ac1891e367f077dd513d6ca07705bffd1b648d32a7b2dc396f5

0a1cd4efda7543cec406a6822418daf6

af4f8d889d6a2049e7a379ea197f8cd361feb074

614cb70659ef5bb2f641f09785adc4ab5873e0564a5303252d3c141a899253b2

23eda650479fc4908d0ddff713508025

b1e6527c10f68586f7f1a279ed439d46c3f12a06

fb3e0f1e6f53ffe680d66d2143f06eb6363897d374dc5dc63eb2f28188b8ad83

6607d8c1a28d7538e2a6565cf40d1260

f618879c011cde344066072949f025827feea663

594df9c402abfdc3c838d871c3395ac047f256b2ac2fd6ff66b371252978348d

caa7a669da39ffd8a3a4f3419018b363

44538b7f8f065e3cef0049089a8522a76a7fccc6

2dffe3ba5c70af51ddf0ff5a322eba0746f3bf3ae0751beb3dc0059ed3faaf3d

48b844494a746ca96c7b96d6bd90f45f

7bf83b98f798f3a8f4ce85b6d29554a435e516e3

45fba1ef399f41227ae4d14228253237b5eb464f56cab92c91a6a964dc790622

9c13ab7b79aec8dc02869999773cd4b2

4b4d865132329e0dd1d129e85fc4fa9ad0c1d206

774ef04333c3fb2a6a4407654e28c2900c62bd202ad6e5909336eb9bc180d279

450e5bf4b42691924d09267ac1a570cb

665a563157f4aa0033a15c88f55ac4fa28397b49

677035259ba8342f1a624fd09168c42017bdca9ebc0b39bf6c37852899331460

51104215a618a5f56ad9c884d6832f79

801580a46f9759ceeeebbce419d879e2ed6943fe

26ec12b63c0e4e60d839aea592c4b5dcff853589b53626e1dbf8c656f4ee6c64

73627cbe2ba139e2ec26889a4e8d6284

1116dc35993fce8118e1e5421000a70b6777433f

37efe10b04090995e2f3d9f932c3653b27a65fc76811fa583934a725d41a6b08

935f54b6609c5339001579e96dc34244

a809327d39fab61bfcfac0c97b1d4b3bfb9a2cfe

a5847867730e7849117c31cdae8bb0a25004635d49f366fbfaebce034d865d7d

ba681db97f283c2e784d9bb4969b1f5a

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908a9026d61717b5fa29959478a9bd939da9206f

0d22d3d637930e7c26a0f16513ec438243a8a01ea9c9d856acbcda61fcb7b499

 

MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUES

 Zeppelin actors use the ATT&CK techniques listed in Table 2.

Table 2: Zeppelin Actors Att&ck Techniques for Enterprise

Initial Access

Technique Title

ID

Use

Exploit External Remote Services

T1133

Zeppelin actors exploit RDP to gain access to victim networks.

Exploit

Public-Facing Application

T1190

Zeppelin actors exploit vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems to gain access to systems

Phishing

T1566

Zeppelin actors have used phishing and spear phishing to gain access to victims’ networks.

Execution

Technique Title

ID

Use

Malicious Link

T1204.001

Zeppelin actors trick users to click a malicious link to execute malicious macros.

Malicious File Attachment

T1204.002

Zeppelin actors trick users to click a malicious attachment disguised as advertisements to execute malicious macros.

Persistence

Technique Title

ID

Use

Modify System Process

T1543.003

Zeppelin actors encrypt Windows Operating functions to preserve compromised system functions.

Impact

Technique Title

ID

Use

Data Encrypted for Impact

T1486

Zeppelin actors have encrypted data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources.

 

DETECTION

Download the YARA signature for Zeppelin: YARA Signature, .yar 125 kb

Mitigations

The FBI and CISA recommend network defenders apply the following mitigations to limit potential adversarial use of common system and network discovery techniques and to reduce the risk of compromise by Zeppelin ransomware:

  • Implement a recovery plan to maintain and retain multiple copies of sensitive or proprietary data and servers in a physically separate, segmented, and secure location (i.e., hard drive, storage device, the cloud).
  • Require all accounts with password logins (e.g., service account, admin accounts, and domain admin accounts) to comply with National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) standards for developing and managing password policies.
    • Use longer passwords consisting of at least 8 characters and no more than 64 characters in length;
    • Store passwords in hashed format using industry-recognized password managers;
    • Add password user “salts” to shared login credentials;
    • Avoid reusing passwords;
    • Implement multiple failed login attempt account lockouts;
    • Disable password “hints”;
    • Refrain from requiring password changes more frequently than once per year. Note: NIST guidance suggests favoring longer passwords instead of requiring regular and frequent password resets. Frequent password resets are more likely to result in users developing password “patterns” cyber criminals can easily decipher.
    • Require administrator credentials to install software.
  • Require multifactor authentication for all services to the extent possible, particularly for webmail, virtual private networks, and accounts that access critical systems. 
  • Keep all operating systems, software, and firmware up to date. Timely patching is one of the most efficient and cost-effective steps an organization can take to minimize its exposure to cybersecurity threats. Prioritize patching SonicWall firewall vulnerabilities and known exploited vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems. Note: SonicWall maintains a vulnerability list that includes Advisory ID, CVE, and mitigation. Their list can be found at psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-list
  • Segment networks to prevent the spread of ransomware. Network segmentation can help prevent the spread of ransomware by controlling traffic flows between—and access to—various subnetworks and by restricting adversary lateral movement. 
  • Identify, detect, and investigate abnormal activity and potential traversal of the indicated ransomware with a networking monitoring tool. To aid in detecting the ransomware, implement a tool that logs and reports all network traffic, including lateral movement activity on a network. Endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools are particularly useful for detecting lateral connections as they have insight into common and uncommon network connections for each host. 
  • Install, regularly update, and enable real time detection for antivirus software on all hosts.
  • Review domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories for new and/or unrecognized accounts.
  • Audit user accounts with administrative privileges and configure access controls according to the principle of least privilege. 
  • Disable unused ports.
  • Consider adding an email banner to emails received from outside your organization.
  • Disable hyperlinks in received emails.
  • Implement time-based access for accounts set at the admin level and higher. For example, the Just-in-Time (JIT) access method provisions privileged access when needed and can support enforcement of the principle of least privilege (as well as the Zero Trust model). This is a process where a network-wide policy is set in place to automatically disable admin accounts at the Active Directory level when the account is not in direct need. Individual users may submit their requests through an automated process that grants them access to a specified system for a set timeframe when they need to support the completion of a certain task. 
  • Disable command-line and scripting activities and permissions. Privilege escalation and lateral movement often depend on software utilities running from the command line. If threat actors are not able to run these tools, they will have difficulty escalating privileges and/or moving laterally. 
  • Maintain offline backups of data, and regularly maintain backup and restoration.  By instituting this practice, the organization ensures they will not be severely interrupted, and/or only have irretrievable data. 
  • Ensure all backup data is encrypted, immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted), and covers the entire organization’s data infrastructure.

RESOURCES

REPORTING

The FBI is seeking any information that can be shared, to include boundary logs showing communication to and from foreign IP addresses, a sample ransom note, communications with Zeppelin actors, Bitcoin wallet information, decryptor files, and/or a benign sample of an encrypted file. The FBI and CISA do not encourage paying ransom as payment does not guarantee victim files will be recovered. Furthermore, payment may also embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. Regardless of whether you or your organization have decided to pay the ransom, the FBI and CISA urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents to a local FBI Field Office, CISA at us-cert.cisa.gov/report, or the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) at a USSS Field Office.

DISCLAIMER

The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. CISA and the FBI do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by CISA or the FBI.

References

Revisions

  • August 11, 2022: Initial Version

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

Archive Module 2.0 Preview 2

This post was originally published on this site

We are excited to announce that the second preview of a rewrite of Microsoft.PowerShell.Archive, the module that lets you create and extract archives, is now available on the PowerShell Gallery.

This release is the second preview release of a rewrite of the module and is not feature complete. Please note that this release is only compatible with PowerShell 7.3.0-preview5 and up. For more information on what is proposed in this rewrite, or to give feedback on the design please refer to the RFC.

Installing the module

Please note that this release will only work with PowerShell 7.3.0-preview5 and up. Find and install the latest preview version of PowerShell here.

To install the Microsoft.PowerShell.Archive 2.0 preview 2 using PowerShellGet 2.2.5 run the following command

Install-Module Microsoft.PowerShell.Archive -AllowPrerelease

To install the Microsoft.PowerShell.Archive 2.0 preview 2 using PowerShellGet 3.0 previews run the following command

Install-PSResource Microsoft.PowerShell.Archive -Prerelease

Features of the release

This release contains the rewrite of the Expand-Archive cmdlet.

This cmdlet contains two parameter sets

Expand-Archive [-Path] <string> [[-DestinationPath] <string>] [-WriteMode {Create | Update | Overwrite}] [-PassThru] [-Filter <string[]>] [-WhatIf] [-Confirm] [<CommonParameters>]

Expand-Archive [-LiteralPath <string>] [-DestinationPath] <string>]  [-WriteMode {Create | Update | Overwrite}] [-PassThru] [-Filter <string[]>] [-WhatIf] [-Confirm] [<CommonParameters>]

Some features to note of this release

  • Added -WriteMode parameter to Expand-Archive
  • Added support for zip64
  • Fixed a bug where the entry names of files in a directory would not be correct when compressing an archive

Features of the next release

The next release will focus on additional features of the module. To track the progress of this release, look at this project in our GitHub repository.

Giving Feedback and Getting support

While we hope the new implementation provides a much better user experience, there are bound to be issues. Please let us know if you run into anything.

If you encounter any issues with the module or have feature requests, the best place to get support is through our GitHub repository.

Sydney

PowerShell Team

The post Archive Module 2.0 Preview 2 appeared first on PowerShell Team.

Welcome to AWS Storage Day 2022

This post was originally published on this site

We are on the fourth year of our annual AWS Storage Day! Do you remember our first Storage Day 2019 and the subsequent Storage Day 2020? I watched Storage Day 2021, which was streamed live from downtown Seattle. We continue to hear from our customers about how powerful the Storage Day announcements and educational sessions were. With this year’s lineup, we aim to share our insights on how to protect your data and put it to work. The free Storage Day 2022 virtual event is happening now on the AWS Twitch channel. Tune in to hear from experts about new announcements, leadership insights, and educational content related to the broad portfolio of AWS Storage services.

Our customers are looking to reduce and optimize storage costs, while building the cloud storage skills they need for themselves and for their organizations. Furthermore, our customers want to protect their data for resiliency and put their data to work. In this blog post, you will find our insights and announcements that address all these needs and more.

Let’s get into it…

Protect Your Data
Data protection has become an operational model to deliver the resiliency of applications and the data they rely on. Organizations use the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) cybersecurity framework and its Identify->Protect->Detect->Respond->Recover process to approach data protection overall. It’s necessary to consider data resiliency and recovery upfront in the Identify and Protect functions, so there is a plan in place for the later Respond and Recover functions.

AWS is making data resiliency, including malware-type recovery, table stakes for our customers. Many of our customers use Amazon Elastic Block Store (Amazon EBS) for mission-critical applications. If you already use Amazon EBS and you regularly back up EBS volumes using EBS multi-volume snapshots, I have an announcement that you will find very exciting.

Amazon EBS
Amazon EBS scales fast for the most demanding, high-performance workloads, and this is why our customers trust Amazon EBS for critical applications such as SAP, Oracle, and Microsoft. Currently, Amazon EBS enables you to back up volumes at any time using EBS Snapshots. Snapshots retain the data from all completed I/O operations, allowing you to restore the volume to its exact state at the moment before backup.

Many of our customers use snapshots in their backup and disaster recovery plans. A common use case for snapshots is to create a backup of a critical workload such as a large database or file system. You can choose to create snapshots of each EBS volume individually or choose to create multi-volume snapshots of the EBS volumes attached to a single Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) instance. Our customers love the simplicity and peace of mind that comes with regularly backing up EBS volumes attached to a single EC2 instance using EBS multi-volume snapshots, and today we’re announcing a new feature—crash consistent snapshots for a subset of EBS volumes.

Previously, when you wanted to create multi-volume snapshots of EBS volumes attached to a single Amazon EC2 instance, if you only wanted to include some—but not all—attached EBS volumes, you had to make multiple API calls to keep only the snapshots you wanted. Now, you can choose specific volumes you want to exclude in the create-snapshots process using a single API call or by using the Amazon EC2 console, resulting in significant cost savings. Crash consistent snapshots for a subset of EBS volumes is also supported by Amazon Data Lifecycle Manager policies to automate the lifecycle of your multi-volume snapshots.

This feature is now available to you at no additional cost. To learn more, please visit the EBS Snapshots user guide.

Put Your Data to Work
We give you controls and tools to get the greatest value from your data—at an organizational level down to the individual data worker and scientist. Decisions you make today will have a long-lasting impact on your ability to put your data to work. Consider your own pace of innovation and make sure you have a cloud provider that will be there for you no matter what the future brings. AWS Storage provides the best cloud for your traditional and modern applications. We support data lakes in AWS Storage, analytics, machine learning (ML), and streaming on top of that data, and we also make cloud benefits available at the edge.

Amazon File Cache (Coming Soon)
Today we are also announcing Amazon File Cache, an upcoming new service on AWS that accelerates and simplifies hybrid cloud workloads. Amazon File Cache provides a high-speed cache on AWS that makes it easier for you to process file data, regardless of where the data is stored. Amazon File Cache serves as a temporary, high-performance storage location for your data stored in on-premises file servers or in file systems or object stores in AWS.

This new service enables you to make dispersed data sets available to file-based applications on AWS with a unified view and at high speeds with sub-millisecond latencies and up to hundreds of GB/s of throughput. Amazon File Cache is designed to enable a wide variety of cloud bursting workloads and hybrid workflows, ranging from media rendering and transcoding, to electronic design automation (EDA), to big data analytics.

Amazon File Cache will be generally available later this year. If you are interested in learning more about this service, please sign up for more information.

AWS Transfer Family
During Storage Day 2020, we announced that customers could deploy AWS Transfer Family server endpoints in Amazon Virtual Private Clouds (Amazon VPCs). AWS Transfer Family helps our customers easily manage and share data with simple, secure, and scalable file transfers. With Transfer Family, you can seamlessly migrate, automate, and monitor your file transfer workflows into and out of Amazon S3 and Amazon Elastic File System (Amazon EFS) using the SFTP, FTPS, and FTP protocols. Exchanged data is natively accessible in AWS for processing, analysis, and machine learning, as well as for integrations with business applications running on AWS.

On July 26th of this year, Transfer Family launched support for the Applicability Statement 2 (AS2) protocol. Customers across verticals such as healthcare and life sciences, retail, financial services, and insurance that rely on AS2 for exchanging business-critical data can now use AWS Transfer Family’s highly available, scalable, and globally available AS2 endpoints to more cost-effectively and securely exchange transactional data with their trading partners.

With a focus on helping you work with partners of your choice, we are excited to announce the AWS Transfer Family Delivery Program as part of the AWS Partner Network (APN) Service Delivery Program (SDP). Partners that deliver cloud-native Managed File Transfer (MFT) and business-to-business (B2B) file exchange solutions using AWS Transfer Family are welcome to join the program. Partners in this program meet a high bar, with deep technical knowledge, experience, and proven success in delivering Transfer Family solutions to our customers.

Five New AWS Storage Learning Badges
Earlier I talked about how our customers are looking to add the cloud storage skills they need for themselves and for their organizations. Currently, storage administrators and practitioners don’t have an easy way of externally demonstrating their AWS storage knowledge and skills. Organizations seeking skilled talent also lack an easy way of validating these skills for prospective employees.

In February 2022, we announced digital badges aligned to Learning Plans for Block Storage and Object Storage on AWS Skill Builder. Today, we’re announcing five additional storage learning badges. Three of these digital badges align to the Skill Builder Learning Plans in English for File, Data Protection & Disaster Recovery (DPDR), and Data Migration. Two of these badges—Core and Technologist—are tiered badges that are awarded to individuals who earn a series of Learning Plan-related badges in the following progression:

Image showing badge progression. To get the Storage Core badge users must first get Block, File, and Object badges. To get the Storage Technologist Badge users must first get the Core, Data Protection & Disaster Recovery, and Data Migration badges.

To learn more, please visit the AWS Learning Badges page.

Well, That’s It!
As I’m sure you’ve picked up on the pattern already, today’s announcements focused on continuous innovation and AWS’s ongoing commitment to providing the cloud storage training that your teams are looking for. Best of all, this AWS training is free. These announcements also focused on simplifying your data migration to the cloud, protecting your data, putting your data to work, and cost-optimization.

Now Join Us Online
Register for free and join us for the AWS Storage Day 2022 virtual event on the AWS channel on Twitch. The event will be live from 9:00 AM Pacific Time (12:00 PM Eastern Time) on August 10. All sessions will be available on demand approximately 2 days after Storage Day.

We look forward to seeing you on Twitch!

– Veliswa x

And Here They Come Again: DNS Reflection Attacks, (Wed, Aug 10th)

This post was originally published on this site

I know I have written about this same attack before [see here]. But well, it just doesn't stop. There has been a continuous stream of these requests to our sensors ever since. Some of the currently preferred queries used:

ANY? peacecorps.gov. (the irony… but look at the record. It is asking for amplification. It seems like they built it to max out EDNS0)
ANY? sl.

Current targets appear to be a couple of networks in Brazil. I am not aware of any particular valuable sites being hosted by them.

But the systems they are hitting with these persistent attacks are not even acting as DNS servers anymore (and haven't been open reflectors for years). All they do with their queries is pollute the internet without effect, like throwing a candy wrapper in a stream with the candy still in it.

Either way. Let's use this to review a quick checklist on proper DNS server configuration:

1. Have Distinct Authoritative and Recursive Name Server

Authoritative name servers will answer queries from anybody for specific zones. Keep them in the cloud and forget about the details. Recursive servers will answer any query from a particular constituency. Keep them inside your network, make them forward queries to a resolver of your choice, and monitor them closely.

Having an internal recursive resolver and tightly restricting outbound DNS traffic can be an invaluable detection and response resource (e.g., Pi-Hole for home use). You may gain a bit of speed by forwarding queries to a resolver like '8.8.8.8' or similar instead of resolving it recursively. It also makes your firewall configuration easier.

2. Diversity of Your Authoritative Name Servers

I mentioned putting them into the cloud. I meant to say: At least two clouds. And come up with a secure way to manage them. Let me know what tricks you have to make this work for you.

3. Use DNSSEC at your own risk

I do not say, "do not use it." But if you do: Make sure you halfway understand how it works and what it does. I use DNSSEC on some of my domains, and due to me not understanding it well, I had some outages (for example, for dshield.org) in the past. 

4. Monitor Your Domains

Someone intentionally or not making unauthorized changes to your domain/zone can cause some interesting issues. If you like "interesting,": go for it. If you want to keep your job, get paid, and not work too much overtime: Put some monitoring in place to alert you about changes. The monitoring system can do simple periodic zone transfers and look for changes. Do not just rely on the serial number.

5. Do not overload DNS with other crap

Sometimes, people abuse DNS as a database. It is not a database and never was built to be used as one. If you insist: Use a distinct domain and infrastructure. Oh. It can be pretty, fast, and reliable. Until it is not.

6. DNS is not "set it and forget it."

DNS is pretty low maintenance in most configurations. But remember to keep things up to date and do a thorough configuration review from time to time. DNS is one of those services suffering from the death of thousand cuts: You tend to make lots of little "inconsequential" changes that pile up to something that just no longer works.

7. And finally… remember:

DNS haiku: It's not DNS There's no way it's DNS It was DNS

(Image from https://www.cyberciti.biz/humour/a-haiku-about-dns/ )

 


Johannes B. Ullrich, Ph.D. , Dean of Research, SANS.edu
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(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.