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The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), National Security Agency (NSA), and Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) (hereafter referred to as the “authoring organizations”) are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) to warn network defenders about malicious use of legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) software. In October 2022, CISA identified a widespread cyber campaign involving the malicious use of legitimate RMM software. Specifically, cyber criminal actors sent phishing emails that led to the download of legitimate RMM software—ScreenConnect (now ConnectWise Control) and AnyDesk—which the actors used in a refund scam to steal money from victim bank accounts.
Although this campaign appears financially motivated, the authoring organizations assess it could lead to additional types of malicious activity. For example, the actors could sell victim account access to other cyber criminal or advanced persistent threat (APT) actors. This campaign highlights the threat of malicious cyber activity associated with legitimate RMM software: after gaining access to the target network via phishing or other techniques, malicious cyber actors—from cybercriminals to nation-state sponsored APTs—are known to use legitimate RMM software as a backdoor for persistence and/or command and control (C2).
Using portable executables of RMM software provides a way for actors to establish local user access without the need for administrative privilege and full software installation—effectively bypassing common software controls and risk management assumptions.
The authoring organizations strongly encourage network defenders to review the Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) and Mitigations sections in this CSA and apply the recommendations to protect against malicious use of legitimate RMM software.
Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 608 kb.
In October 2022, CISA used trusted third-party reporting, to conduct retrospective analysis of EINSTEIN—a federal civilian executive branch (FCEB)-wide intrusion detection system (IDS) operated and monitored by CISA—and identified suspected malicious activity on two FCEB networks:
In mid-June 2022, malicious actors sent a phishing email containing a phone number to an FCEB employee’s government email address. The employee called the number, which led them to visit the malicious domain, myhelpcare[.]online.
In mid-September 2022, there was bi-directional traffic between an FCEB network and myhelpcare[.]cc.
The authoring organizations assess that since at least June 2022, cyber criminal actors have sent help desk-themed phishing emails to FCEB federal staff’s personal, and government email addresses. The emails either contain a link to a “first-stage” malicious domain or prompt the recipients to call the cybercriminals, who then try to convince the recipients to visit the first-stage malicious domain. See figure 1 for an example phishing email obtained from an FCEB network.
Figure 1: Help desk–themed phishing email example
The recipient visiting the first-stage malicious domain triggers the download of an executable. The executable then connects to a “second-stage” malicious domain, from which it downloads additional RMM software.
CISA noted that the actors did not install downloaded RMM clients on the compromised host. Instead, the actors downloaded AnyDesk and ScreenConnect as self-contained, portable executables configured to connect to the actor’s RMM server.
Note: Portable executables launch within the user’s context without installation. Because portable executables do not require administrator privileges, they can allow execution of unapproved software even if a risk management control may be in place to audit or block the same software’s installation on the network. Threat actors can leverage a portable executable with local user rights to attack other vulnerable machines within the local intranet or establish long term persistent access as a local user service.
CISA has observed that multiple first-stage domain names follow naming patterns used for IT help/support themed social-engineering, e.g., hservice[.]live, gscare[.]live, nhelpcare[.]info, deskcareme[.]live, nhelpcare[.]cc). According to Silent Push, some of these malicious domains impersonate known brands such as, Norton, GeekSupport, Geek Squad, Amazon, Microsoft, McAfee, and PayPal.[1] CISA has also observed that the first-stage malicious domain linked in the initial phishing email periodically redirects to other sites for additional redirects and downloads of RMM software.
Use of Remote Monitoring and Management Tools
In this campaign, after downloading the RMM software, the actors used the software to initiate a refund scam. They first connected to the recipient’s system and enticed the recipient to log into their bank account while remaining connected to the system. The actors then used their access through the RMM software to modify the recipient’s bank account summary. The falsely modified bank account summary showed the recipient was mistakenly refunded an excess amount of money. The actors then instructed the recipient to “refund” this excess amount to the scam operator.
Although this specific activity appears to be financially motivated and targets individuals, the access could lead to additional malicious activity against the recipient’s organization—from both other cybercriminals and APT actors. Network defenders should be aware that:
Although the cybercriminal actors in this campaign used ScreenConnect and AnyDesk, threat actors can maliciously leverage any legitimate RMM software.
Because threat actors can download legitimate RMM software as self-contained, portable executables, they can bypass both administrative privilege requirements and software management control policies.
The use of RMM software generally does not trigger antivirus or antimalware defenses.
Malicious cyber actors are known to leverage legitimate RMM and remote desktop software as backdoors for persistence and for C2.[2],[3],[4],[5],[6],[7],[8]
RMM software allows cyber threat actors to avoid using custom malware.
Threat actors often target legitimate users of RMM software. Targets can include managed service providers (MSPs) and IT help desks, who regularly use legitimate RMM software for technical and security end-user support, network management, endpoint monitoring, and to interact remotely with hosts for IT-support functions. These threat actors can exploit trust relationships in MSP networks and gain access to a large number of the victim MSP’s customers. MSP compromises can introduce significant risk—such as ransomware and cyber espionage—to the MSP’s customers.
The authoring organizations strongly encourage network defenders to apply the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to protect against malicious use of legitimate RMM software.
INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE
See table 1 for IOCs associated with the campaign detailed in this CSA.
Table 1: Malicious Domains and IP addresses observed by CISA
Domain
Description
Date(s) Observed
win03[.]xyz
Suspected first-stage malware domain
June 1, 2022
July 19, 2022
myhelpcare[.]online
Suspected first-stage malware domain
June 14, 2022
win01[.]xyz
Suspected first-stage malware domain
August 3, 2022
August 18, 2022
myhelpcare[.]cc
Suspected first-stage malware domain
September 14, 2022
247secure[.]us
Second-stage malicious domain
October 19, 2022
November 10, 2022
Additional resources to detect possible exploitation or compromise:
Application controls should prevent both installation and execution of portable versions of unauthorized RMM software.
Require authorized RMM solutions only be used from within your network over approved remote access solutions, such as virtual private networks (VPNs) or virtual desktop interfaces (VDIs).
Block both inbound and outbound connections on common RMM ports and protocols at the network perimeter.
Implement a user training program and phishing exercises to raise awareness among users about the risks of visiting suspicious websites, clicking on suspicious links, and opening suspicious attachments. Reinforce the appropriate user response to phishing and spearphishing emails.
U.S. Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Sector organizations may consider signing up for the NSA Cybersecurity Collaboration Center’s DIB Cybersecurity Service Offerings, including Protective Domain Name System (PDNS) services, vulnerability scanning, and threat intelligence collaboration for eligible organizations. For more information on how to enroll in these services, email dib_defense@cyber.nsa.gov.
CISA offers several Vulnerability Scanning to help organizations reduce their exposure to threats by taking a proactive approach to mitigating attack vectors. See cisa.gov/cyber-hygiene-services.
Consider participating in CISA’s Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS) to receive real-time exchange of machine-readable cyber threat indicators and defensive measures. AIS is offered at no cost to participants as part of CISA’s mission to work with our public and private sector partners to identify and help mitigate cyber threats through information sharing and provide technical assistance, upon request, that helps prevent, detect, and respond to incidents.
PURPOSE
This advisory was developed by CISA, NSA, and MS-ISAC in furtherance of their respective cybersecurity missions, including their responsibilities to develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations.
DISCLAIMER
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. CISA, NSA, and MS-ISAC do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring.
Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.
The FBI and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are releasing this joint CSA to disseminate known Cuba ransomware IOCs and TTPs associated with Cuba ransomware actors identified through FBI investigations, third-party reporting, and open-source reporting. This advisory updates the December 2021 FBI Flash: Indicators of Compromise Associated with Cuba Ransomware.
Note: While this ransomware is known by industry as “Cuba ransomware,” there is no indication Cuba ransomware actors have any connection or affiliation with the Republic of Cuba.
Since the release of the December 2021 FBI Flash, the number of U.S. entities compromised by Cuba ransomware has doubled, with ransoms demanded and paid on the increase.
This year, Cuba ransomware actors have added to their TTPs, and third-party and open-source reports have identified a possible link between Cuba ransomware actors, RomCom Remote Access Trojan (RAT) actors, and Industrial Spy ransomware actors.
FBI and CISA encourage organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood and impact of Cuba ransomware and other ransomware operations.
Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 649 kb.
(Updated December 12, 2022)AA22-335A-2.stix (STIX, 67 kb). (End of Update.)
Technical Details
Overview
Since the December 2021 release of FBI Flash: Indicators of Compromise Associated with Cuba Ransomware, FBI has observed Cuba ransomware actors continuing to target U.S. entities in the following five critical infrastructure sectors: Financial Services, Government Facilities, Healthcare and Public Health, Critical Manufacturing, and Information Technology. As of August 2022, FBI has identified that Cuba ransomware actors have:
Compromised 101 entities, 65 in the United States and 36 outside the United States.
Demanded 145 million U.S. Dollars (USD) and received 60 million USD in ransom payments.
Cuba Ransomware Actors’ Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
As previously reported by FBI, Cuba ransomware actors have leveraged the following techniques to gain initial access into dozens of entities in multiple critical infrastructure sectors:
Known vulnerabilities in commercial software [T1190]
After gaining initial access, the actors distributed Cuba ransomware on compromised systems through Hancitor—a loader known for dropping or executing stealers, such as Remote Access Trojans (RATs) and other types of ransomware, onto victims’ networks.
Since spring 2022, Cuba ransomware actors have modified their TTPs and tools to interact with compromised networks and extort payments from victims.[1],[2]
Cuba ransomware actors have exploited known vulnerabilities and weaknesses and have used tools to elevate privileges on compromised systems. According to Palo Alto Networks Unit 42,[2] Cuba ransomware actors have:
Exploited CVE-2022-24521 in the Windows Common Log File System (CLFS) driver to steal system tokens and elevate privileges.
Used a PowerShell script to identify and target service accounts for their associated Active Directory Kerberos ticket. The actors then collected and cracked the Kerberos tickets offline via Kerberoasting [T1558.003].
Used a tool, called KerberCache, to extract cached Kerberos tickets from a host’s Local Security Authority Server Service (LSASS) memory [T1003.001].
Used a tool to exploit CVE-2020-1472 (also known as “ZeroLogon”) to gain Domain Administrative privileges [T1068]. This tool and its intrusion attempts have been reportedly related to Hancitor and Qbot.
According to Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, Cuba ransomware actors use tools to evade detection while moving laterally through compromised environments before executing Cuba ransomware. Specifically, the actors, “leveraged a dropper that writes a kernel driver to the file system called ApcHelper.sys. This targets and terminates security products. The dropper was not signed; however, the kernel driver was signed using the certificate found in the LAPSUS NVIDIA leak.” [T1562.001].[2]
In addition to deploying ransomware, the actors have used “double extortion” techniques, in which they exfiltrate victim data, and (1) demand a ransom payment to decrypt it and, (2) threaten to publicly release it if a ransom payment is not made.[2]
Cuba Ransomware Link to RomCom and Industrial Spy Marketplace
Since spring 2022, third-party and open-source reports have identified an apparent link between Cuba ransomware actors, RomCom RAT actors, and Industrial Spy ransomware actors:
According to Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, Cuba ransomware actors began using RomCom malware, a custom RAT, for command and control (C2).[2]
Cuba ransomware actors may also be leveraging Industrial Spy ransomware. According to third-party reporting, suspected Cuba ransomware actors compromised a foreign healthcare company. The threat actors deployed Industrial Spy ransomware, which shares distinct similarities in configuration to Cuba ransomware. Before deploying the ransomware, the actors moved laterally using Impacket and deployed the RomCom RAT and Meterpreter Reverse Shell HTTP/HTTPS proxy via a C2 server [T1090].
Cuba ransomware actors initially used their leak site to sell stolen data; however, around May 2022, the actors began selling their data on Industrial Spy’s online market for selling stolen data.[2]
RomCom actors have targeted foreign military organizations, IT companies, food brokers and manufacturers.[3][4] The actors copied legitimate HTML code from public-facing webpages, modified the code, and then incorporated it in spoofed domains [T1584.001], which allowed the RomCom actors to:
Host counterfeit Trojanized applications for
SolarWinds Network Performance Monitor (NPM),
KeePass password manager,
PDF Reader Pro, (by PDF Technologies, Inc., not an Adobe Acrobat or Reader product), and
Advanced IP Scanner software;
Deploy the RomCom RAT as the final stage.
INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE
See tables 1 through 5 for Cuba ransomware IOCs that FBI obtained during threat response investigations as of late August 2022. In addition to these tables, see the publications in the References section below for aid in detecting possible exploitation or compromise.
Table 3: Cuba Ransomware Associated Jabber Address, as of Late August 2022
cuba_support@exploit[.]im
Table 4: IP Addresses Associated with Cuba Ransomware, as of Late August 2022
Note: Some of these observed IP addresses are more than a year old. FBI and CISA recommend vetting or investigating these IP addresses prior to taking forward-looking action such as blocking.
193.23.244[.]244
144.172.83[.]13
216.45.55[.]30
94.103.9[.]79
149.255.35[.]131
217.79.43[.]148
192.137.101[.]46
154.35.175[.]225
222.252.53[.]33
92.222.172[.]39
159.203.70[.]39
23.227.198[.]246
92.222.172[.]172
171.25.193[.]9
31.184.192[.]44
10.13.102[.]1
185.153.199[.]169
37.120.247[.]39
10.13.102[.]58
192.137.100[.]96
37.44.253[.]21
10.133.78[.]41
192.137.100[.]98
38.108.119[.]121
10.14.100[.]20
192.137.101[.]205
45.164.21[.]13
103.114.163[.]197
193.34.167[.]17
45.32.229[.]66
103.27.203[.]197
194.109.206[.]212
45.86.162[.]34
104.217.8[.]100
195.54.160[.]149
45.91.83[.]176
107.189.10[.]143
199.58.81[.]140
64.52.169[.]174
108.170.31[.]115
204.13.164[.]118
64.235.39[.]82
128.31.0[.]34
209.76.253[.]84
79.141.169[.]220
128.31.0[.]39
212.192.241[.]230
84.17.52[.]135
131.188.40[.]189
213.32.39[.]43
86.59.21[.]38
141.98.87[.]124
216.45.55[.]3
Table 5: Cuba Bitcoin Wallets Receiving Payments, as of Late August 2022
bc1q4vr25xkth35qslenqwd7aw020w85qrvlrhv7hc
bc1q5uc0fdnz0ve5pg4nl4upa9ly586t6wmnghfe7x
bc1q6rsj3cn37dngypu5kad9gdw5ykhctpwhjvun3z
bc1q6zkemtyyrre2mkk23g93zyq98ygrygvx7z2q0t
bc1q9cj0n9k2m282x0nzj6lhqjvhkkd4h95sewek83
bc1qaselp9nhejc3safcq3vn5wautx6w33x0llk7dl
bc1qc48q628t93xwzljtvurpqhcvahvesadpwqtsza
bc1qgsuf5m9tgxuv4ylxcmx8eeqn3wmlmu7f49zkus
bc1qhpepeeh7hlz5jvrp50uhkz59lhakcfvme0w9qh
bc1qjep0vx2lap93455p7h29unruvr05cs242mrcah
bc1qr9l0gcl0nvmngap6ueyy5gqdwvm34kdmtevjyx
bc1qs3lv77udkap2enxv928x59yuact5df4t95rsqr
bc1qyd05q2m5qt3nwpd3gcqkyer0gspqx5p6evcf7h
bc1qzz7xweq8ee2j35tq6r5m687kctq9huskt50edv
bc1qvpk8ksl3my6kjezjss9p28cqj4dmpmmjx5yl3y
bc1qhtwfcysclc7pck2y3vmjtpzkaezhcm6perc99x
bc1qft3s53ur5uq5ru6sl3zyr247dpr55mnggwucd3
bc1qp7h9fszlqxjwyfhv0upparnsgx56x7v7wfx4x7
bc1q4vr25xkth35qslenqwd7aw020w85qrvlrhv7hc
bc1q5uc0fdnz0ve5pg4nl4upa9ly586t6wmnghfe7x
bc1q6rsj3cn37dngypu5kad9gdw5ykhctpwhjvun3z
bc1q6zkemtyyrre2mkk23g93zyq98ygrygvx7z2q0t
bc1q9cj0n9k2m282x0nzj6lhqjvhkkd4h95sewek83
bc1qaselp9nhejc3safcq3vn5wautx6w33x0llk7dl
bc1qc48q628t93xwzljtvurpqhcvahvesadpwqtsza
bc1qgsuf5m9tgxuv4ylxcmx8eeqn3wmlmu7f49zkus
bc1qhpepeeh7hlz5jvrp50uhkz59lhakcfvme0w9qh
bc1qjep0vx2lap93455p7h29unruvr05cs242mrcah
bc1qr9l0gcl0nvmngap6ueyy5gqdwvm34kdmtevjyx
bc1qs3lv77udkap2enxv928x59yuact5df4t95rsqr
bc1qyd05q2m5qt3nwpd3gcqkyer0gspqx5p6evcf7h
bc1qzz7xweq8ee2j35tq6r5m687kctq9huskt50edv
See figure 1 for an example of a Cuba ransomware note.
Figure 1: Sample Cuba Ransom Note 2, as of late August 2022
Greetings! Unfortunately we have to report that your company were
compromised. All your files were
encrypted and you can’t restore them without our private key. Trying
to restore it without our help may
cause complete loss of your data. Also we researched whole your
corporate network and downloaded all
your sensitive data to our servers. If we will not get any contact
Industrial Spy ransomware actors use HTTP/HTTPS proxy via a C2 server to direct traffic to avoid direct connection. [2]
Mitigations
FBI and CISA recommend network defenders apply the following mitigations to limit potential adversarial use of common system and network discovery techniques and to reduce the risk of compromise by Cuba ransomware:
Implement a recovery plan to maintain and retain multiple copies of sensitive or proprietary data and servers in a physically separate, segmented, and secure location (i.e., hard drive, storage device, the cloud).
Refrain from requiring password changes more frequently than once per year.
Note: NIST guidance suggests favoring longer passwords instead of requiring regular and frequent password resets. Frequent password resets are more likely to result in users developing password “patterns” cyber criminals can easily decipher.
Require administrator credentials to install software.
Require multifactor authentication for all services to the extent possible, particularly for webmail, virtual private networks, and accounts that access critical systems.
Keep all operating systems, software, and firmware up to date. Timely patching is one of the most efficient and cost-effective steps an organization can take to minimize its exposure to cybersecurity threats. Prioritize patching SonicWall firewall vulnerabilities and known exploited vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems. Note: SonicWall maintains a vulnerability list that includes Advisory ID, CVE, and mitigation. Their list can be found at psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-list.
Segment networks to prevent the spread of ransomware. Network segmentation can help prevent the spread of ransomware by controlling traffic flows between—and access to—various subnetworks and by restricting adversary lateral movement.
Identify, detect, and investigate abnormal activity and potential traversal of the indicated ransomware with a networking monitoring tool. To aid in detecting the ransomware, implement a tool that logs and reports all network traffic, including lateral movement activity on a network. Endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools are particularly useful for detecting lateral connections as they have insight into common and uncommon network connections for each host.
Install, regularly update, and enable real time detection for antivirus software on all hosts.
Review domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories for new and/or unrecognized accounts.
Audit user accounts with administrative privileges and configure access controls according to the principle of least privilege.
Disable unused ports.
Consider adding an email banner to emails received from outside your organization.
Disable hyperlinks in received emails.
Implement time-based access for accounts set at the admin level and higher. For example, the Just-in-Time (JIT) access method provisions privileged access when needed and can support enforcement of the principle of least privilege (as well as the Zero Trust model). JIT sets a network-wide policy in place to automatically disable admin accounts at the Active Directory level when the account is not in direct need. Individual users may submit their requests through an automated process that grants them access to a specified system for a set timeframe when they need to support the completion of a certain task.
Disable command-line and scripting activities and permissions. Privilege escalation and lateral movement often depend on software utilities running from the command line. If threat actors are not able to run these tools, they will have difficulty escalating privileges and/or moving laterally.
Maintain offline backups of data, and regularly maintain backup and restoration. By instituting this practice, the organization ensures they will not be severely interrupted, and/or only have irretrievable data.
Ensure all backup data is encrypted, immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted), and covers the entire organization’s data infrastructure.
RESOURCES
Stopransomware.gov is a whole-of-government approach that gives one central location for ransomware resources and alerts.
FBI is seeking any information that can be shared, to include boundary logs showing communication to and from foreign IP addresses, a sample ransom note, communications with ransomware actors, Bitcoin wallet information, decryptor files, and/or a benign sample of an encrypted file.
FBI and CISA do not encourage paying ransom as payment does not guarantee victim files will be recovered. Furthermore, payment may also embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. Regardless of whether you or your organization have decided to pay the ransom, FBI and CISA urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents immediately. Report to a local FBI Field Office, or CISA at us-cert.cisa.gov/report.
DISCLAIMER
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. FBI and CISA do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by FBI or CISA.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
FBI and CISA would like to thank BlackBerry, ESET, The National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance (NCFTA), Palo Alto Networks, and PRODAFT for their contributions to this CSA.
Actions to Take Today to Mitigate Cyber Threats from Ransomware:
• Prioritize remediating known exploited vulnerabilities.
• Enable and enforce multifactor authentication with strong passwords
• Close unused ports and remove any application not deemed necessary for day-to-day operations.
Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) are releasing this joint CSA to disseminate known Hive IOCs and TTPs identified through FBI investigations as recently as November 2022.
FBI, CISA, and HHS encourage organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood and impact of ransomware incidents. Victims of ransomware operations should report the incident to their local FBI field office or CISA.
Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 852.9 kb.
For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see AA22-321A.stix (STIX, 43.6 kb).
Technical Details
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 12. See MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise for all referenced tactics and techniques.
As of November 2022, Hive ransomware actors have victimized over 1,300 companies worldwide, receiving approximately US$100 million in ransom payments, according to FBI information. Hive ransomware follows the ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model in which developers create, maintain, and update the malware, and affiliates conduct the ransomware attacks. From June 2021 through at least November 2022, threat actors have used Hive ransomware to target a wide range of businesses and critical infrastructure sectors, including Government Facilities, Communications, Critical Manufacturing, Information Technology, and especially Healthcare and Public Health (HPH).
The method of initial intrusion will depend on which affiliate targets the network. Hive actors have gained initial access to victim networks by using single factor logins via Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), virtual private networks (VPNs), and other remote network connection protocols [T1133]. In some cases, Hive actors have bypassed multifactor authentication (MFA) and gained access to FortiOS servers by exploiting Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) CVE-2020-12812. This vulnerability enables a malicious cyber actor to log in without a prompt for the user’s second authentication factor (FortiToken) when the actor changes the case of the username.
Hive actors have also gained initial access to victim networks by distributing phishing emails with malicious attachments [T1566.001] and by exploiting the following vulnerabilities against Microsoft Exchange servers [T1190]:
CVE-2021-31207 – Microsoft Exchange Server Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability
CVE-2021-34473 – Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
CVE-2021-34523 – Microsoft Exchange Server Privilege Escalation Vulnerability
After gaining access, Hive ransomware attempts to evade detention by executing processes to:
Identify processes related to backups, antivirus/anti-spyware, and file copying and then terminating those processes to facilitate file encryption [T1562].
Stop the volume shadow copy services and remove all existing shadow copies via vssadmin on command line or via PowerShell [T1059] [T1490].
Delete Windows event logs, specifically the System, Security and Application logs [T1070].
Prior to encryption, Hive ransomware removes virus definitions and disables all portions of Windows Defender and other common antivirus programs in the system registry [T1112].
Hive actors exfiltrate data likely using a combination of Rclone and the cloud storage service Mega.nz [T1537]. In addition to its capabilities against the Microsoft Windows operating system, Hive ransomware has known variants for Linux, VMware ESXi, and FreeBSD.
During the encryption process, a file named *.key (previously *.key.*) is created in the root directory (C: or /root/). Required for decryption, this key file only exists on the machine where it was created and cannot be reproduced. The ransom note, HOW_TO_DECRYPT.txt is dropped into each affected directory and states the *.key file cannot be modified, renamed, or deleted, otherwise the encrypted files cannot be recovered [T1486]. The ransom note contains a “sales department” .onion link accessible through a TOR browser, enabling victim organizations to contact the actors through a live chat panel to discuss payment for their files. However, some victims reported receiving phone calls or emails from Hive actors directly to discuss payment.
The ransom note also threatens victims that a public disclosure or leak site accessible on the TOR site, “HiveLeaks”, contains data exfiltrated from victim organizations who do not pay the ransom demand (see figure 1 below). Additionally, Hive actors have used anonymous file sharing sites to disclose exfiltrated data (see table 1 below).
Figure 1: Sample Hive Ransom Note
Table 1: Anonymous File Sharing Sites Used to Disclose Data
Once the victim organization contacts Hive actors on the live chat panel, Hive actors communicate the ransom amount and the payment deadline. Hive actors negotiate ransom demands in U.S. dollars, with initial amounts ranging from several thousand to millions of dollars. Hive actors demand payment in Bitcoin.
Hive actors have been known to reinfect—with either Hive ransomware or another ransomware variant—the networks of victim organizations who have restored their network without making a ransom payment.
Indicators of Compromise
Threat actors have leveraged the following IOCs during Hive ransomware compromises. Note: Some of these indicators are legitimate applications that Hive threat actors used to aid in further malicious exploitation. FBI, CISA, and HHS recommend removing any application not deemed necessary for day-to-day operations. See tables 2–3 below for IOCs obtained from FBI threat response investigations as recently as November 2022.
Table 2: Known IOCs as of November 2022
Known IOCs – Files
HOW_TO_DECRYPT.txt typically in directories with encrypted files
*.key typically in the root directory, i.e., C: or /root
hive.bat
shadow.bat
asq.r77vh0[.]pw – Server hosted malicious HTA file
asq.d6shiiwz[.]pw – Server referenced in malicious regsvr32 execution
asq.swhw71un[.]pw – Server hosted malicious HTA file
asd.s7610rir[.]pw – Server hosted malicious HTA file
Windows_x64_encrypt.dll
Windows_x64_encrypt.exe
Windows_x32_encrypt.dll
Windows_x32_encrypt.exe
Linux_encrypt
Esxi_encrypt
Known IOCs – Events
System, Security and Application Windows event logs wiped
Microsoft Windows Defender AntiSpyware Protection disabled
Microsoft Windows Defender AntiVirus Protection disabled
Table 3: Potential IOC IP Addresses as of November 2022
Note: Some of these observed IP addresses are more than a year old. FBI and CISA recommend vetting or investigating these IP addresses prior to taking forward-looking action like blocking.
Hive actors gain access to victim network by exploiting the following Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities: CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207, CVE-2021-42321.
Hive actors deploy a ransom note HOW_TO_DECRYPT.txt into each affected directory which states the *.key file cannot be modified, renamed, or deleted, otherwise the encrypted files cannot be recovered.
Hive actors looks to stop the volume shadow copy services and remove all existing shadow copies via vssadmin via command line or PowerShell.
Mitigations
FBI, CISA, and HHS recommend organizations, particularly in the HPH sector, implement the following to limit potential adversarial use of common system and network discovery techniques and to reduce the risk of compromise by Hive ransomware:
Verify Hive actors no longer have access to the network.
Install updates for operating systems, software, and firmware as soon as they are released. Prioritize patching VPN servers, remote access software, virtual machine software, and known exploited vulnerabilities. Consider leveraging a centralized patch management system to automate and expedite the process.
Require phishing-resistant MFA for as many services as possible—particularly for webmail, VPNs, accounts that access critical systems, and privileged accounts that manage backups.
If used, secure and monitor RDP.
Limit access to resources over internal networks, especially by restricting RDP and using virtual desktop infrastructure.
After assessing risks, if you deem RDP operationally necessary, restrict the originating sources and require MFA to mitigate credential theft and reuse.
If RDP must be available externally, use a VPN, virtual desktop infrastructure, or other means to authenticate and secure the connection before allowing RDP to connect to internal devices.
Monitor remote access/RDP logs, enforce account lockouts after a specified number of attempts to block brute force campaigns, log RDP login attempts, and disable unused remote access/RDP ports.
Be sure to properly configure devices and enable security features.
Disable ports and protocols not used for business purposes, such as RDP Port 3389/TCP.
Maintain offline backups of data, and regularly maintain backup and restoration. By instituting this practice, the organization ensures they will not be severely interrupted, and/or only have irretrievable data.
Ensure all backup data is encrypted, immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted), and covers the entire organization’s data infrastructure. Ensure your backup data is not already infected.,
Monitor cyber threat reporting regarding the publication of compromised VPN login credentials and change passwords/settings if applicable.
Install and regularly update anti-virus or anti-malware software on all hosts.
Enable PowerShell Logging including module logging, script block logging and transcription.
Install an enhanced monitoring tool such as Sysmon from Microsoft for increased logging.
Review the following additional resources.
The joint advisory from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States on Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity provides additional guidance when hunting or investigating a network and common mistakes to avoid in incident handling.
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency-Multi-State Information Sharing & Analysis Center Joint Ransomware Guide covers additional best practices and ways to prevent, protect, and respond to a ransomware attack.
StopRansomware.gov is the U.S. Government’s official one-stop location for resources to tackle ransomware more effectively.
If your organization is impacted by a ransomware incident, FBI, CISA, and HHS recommend the following actions.
Isolate the infected system. Remove the infected system from all networks, and disable the computer’s wireless, Bluetooth, and any other potential networking capabilities. Ensure all shared and networked drives are disconnected.
Turn off other computers and devices. Power-off and segregate (i.e., remove from the network) the infected computer(s). Power-off and segregate any other computers or devices that share a network with the infected computer(s) that have not been fully encrypted by ransomware. If possible, collect and secure all infected and potentially infected computers and devices in a central location, making sure to clearly label any computers that have been encrypted. Powering-off and segregating infected computers and computers that have not been fully encrypted may allow for the recovery of partially encrypted files by specialists.
Secure your backups. Ensure that your backup data is offline and secure. If possible, scan your backup data with an antivirus program to check that it is free of malware.
In addition, FBI, CISA, and HHS urge all organizations to apply the following recommendations to prepare for, mitigate/prevent, and respond to ransomware incidents.
Preparing for Cyber Incidents
Review the security posture of third-party vendors and those interconnected with your organization. Ensure all connections between third-party vendors and outside software or hardware are monitored and reviewed for suspicious activity.
Implement listing policies for applications and remote access that only allow systems to execute known and permitted programs under an established security policy.
Document and monitor external remote connections. Organizations should document approved solutions for remote management and maintenance, and immediately investigate if an unapproved solution is installed on a workstation.
Implement a recovery plan to maintain and retain multiple copies of sensitive or proprietary data and servers in a physically separate, segmented, and secure location (i.e., hard drive, storage device, the cloud).
Refrain from requiring password changes more frequently than once per year unless a password is known or suspected to be compromised.
Note: NIST guidance suggests favoring longer passwords instead of requiring regular and frequent password resets. Frequent password resets are more likely to result in users developing password “patterns” cyber criminals can easily decipher.
Require administrator credentials to install software.
Require phishing-resistant multifactor authentication for all services to the extent possible, particularly for webmail, virtual private networks, and accounts that access critical systems.
Review domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories for new and/or unrecognized accounts.
Audit user accounts with administrative privileges and configure access controls according to the principle of least privilege.
Implement time-based access for accounts set at the admin level and higher. For example, the Just-in-Time (JIT) access method provisions privileged access when needed and can support enforcement of the principle of least privilege (as well as the Zero Trust model). This is a process where a network-wide policy is set in place to automatically disable admin accounts at the Active Directory level when the account is not in direct need. Individual users may submit their requests through an automated process that grants them access to a specified system for a set timeframe when they need to support the completion of a certain task.
Protective Controls and Architecture
Segment networks to prevent the spread of ransomware. Network segmentation can help prevent the spread of ransomware by controlling traffic flows between—and access to—various subnetworks and by restricting adversary lateral movement.
Identify, detect, and investigate abnormal activity and potential traversal of the indicated ransomware with a networking monitoring tool. To aid in detecting the ransomware, implement a tool that logs and reports all network traffic, including lateral movement activity on a network. Endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools are particularly useful for detecting lateral connections as they have insight into common and uncommon network connections for each host.
Install, regularly update, and enable real time detection for antivirus software on all hosts.
Vulnerability and Configuration Management
Consider adding an email banner to emails received from outside your organization.
Disable command-line and scripting activities and permissions. Privilege escalation and lateral movement often depend on software utilities running from the command line. If threat actors are not able to run these tools, they will have difficulty escalating privileges and/or moving laterally.
Ensure devices are properly configured and that security features are enabled.
Restrict Server Message Block (SMB) Protocol within the network to only access necessary servers and remove or disable outdated versions of SMB (i.e., SMB version 1). Threat actors use SMB to propagate malware across organizations.
REFERENCES
Stopransomware.gov is a whole-of-government approach that gives one central location for ransomware resources and alerts.
The FBI, CISA, and HHS do not encourage paying a ransom to criminal actors. Paying a ransom may embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. Paying the ransom also does not guarantee that a victim’s files will be recovered. However, the FBI, CISA, and HHS understand that when businesses are faced with an inability to function, executives will evaluate all options to protect their shareholders, employees, and customers. Regardless of whether you or your organization decide to pay the ransom, the FBI, CISA, and HHS urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents to your local FBI field office, or to CISA at report@cisa.gov or (888) 282-0870. Doing so provides investigators with the critical information they need to track ransomware attackers, hold them accountable under US law, and prevent future attacks.
The FBI may seek the following information that you determine you can legally share, including:
Recovered executable files
Live random access memory (RAM) capture
Images of infected systems
Malware samples
IP addresses identified as malicious or suspicious
Email addresses of the attackers
A copy of the ransom note
Ransom amount
Bitcoin wallets used by the attackers
Bitcoin wallets used to pay the ransom
Post-incident forensic reports
DISCLAIMER
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. FBI, CISA, and HHS do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by FBI, CISA, or HHS.
From mid-June through mid-July 2022, CISA conducted an incident response engagement at a Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) organization where CISA observed suspected advanced persistent threat (APT) activity. In the course of incident response activities, CISA determined that cyber threat actors exploited the Log4Shell vulnerability in an unpatched VMware Horizon server, installed XMRig crypto mining software, moved laterally to the domain controller (DC), compromised credentials, and then implanted Ngrok reverse proxies on several hosts to maintain persistence. CISA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assess that the FCEB network was compromised by Iranian government-sponsored APT actors.
CISA and FBI are releasing this Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) providing the suspected Iranian government-sponsored actors’ tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help network defenders detect and protect against related compromises.
CISA and FBI encourage all organizations with affected VMware systems that did not immediately apply available patches or workarounds to assume compromise and initiate threat hunting activities. If suspected initial access or compromise is detected based on IOCs or TTPs described in this CSA, CISA and FBI encourage organizations to assume lateral movement by threat actors, investigate connected systems (including the DC), and audit privileged accounts. All organizations, regardless of identified evidence of compromise, should apply the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA to protect against similar malicious cyber activity.
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework, version 11. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section for a table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK® tactics and techniques with corresponding mitigation and/or detection recommendations.
Overview
In April 2022, CISA conducted retrospective analysis using EINSTEIN—an FCEB-wide intrusion detection system (IDS) operated and monitored by CISA—and identified suspected APT activity on an FCEB organization’s network. CISA observed bi-directional traffic between the network and a known malicious IP address associated with exploitation of the Log4Shell vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228) in VMware Horizon servers. In coordination with the FCEB organization, CISA initiated threat hunting incident response activities; however, prior to deploying an incident response team, CISA observed additional suspected APT activity. Specifically, CISA observed HTTPS activity from IP address 51.89.181[.]64 to the organization’s VMware server. Based on trusted third-party reporting, 51.89.181[.]64 is a Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) server associated with threat actors exploiting Log4Shell. Following HTTPS activity, CISA observed a suspected LDAP callback on port 443 to this IP address. CISA also observed a DNS query for us‐nation‐ny[.]cf that resolved back to 51.89.181[.]64 when the victim server was returning this Log4Shell LDAP callback to the actors’ server.
CISA assessed that this traffic indicated a confirmed compromise based on the successful callback to the indicator and informed the organization of these findings; the organization investigated the activity and found signs of compromise. As trusted-third party reporting associated Log4Shell activity from 51.89.181[.]64 with lateral movement and targeting of DCs, CISA suspected the threat actors had moved laterally and compromised the organization’s DC.
From mid-June through mid-July 2022, CISA conducted an onsite incident response engagement and determined that the organization was compromised as early as February 2022, by likely Iranian government-sponsored APT actors who installed XMRig crypto mining software. The threat actors also moved laterally to the domain controller, compromised credentials, and implanted Ngrok reverse proxies.
Threat Actor Activity
In February 2022, the threat actors exploited Log4Shell [T1190] for initial access [TA0001] to the organization’s unpatched VMware Horizon server. As part of their initial exploitation, CISA observed a connection to known malicious IP address 182.54.217[.]2 lasting 17.6 seconds.
The actors’ exploit payload ran the following PowerShell command [T1059.001] that added an exclusion rule to Windows Defender [T1562.001]:
powershell try{Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath ‘C:’; Write-Host ‘added-exclusion’} catch {Write-Host ‘adding-exclusion-failed’ }; powershell -enc “$BASE64 encoded payload to download next stage and execute it”
The exclusion rule allowlisted the entire c:drive, enabling threat actors to download tools to the c:drive without virus scans. The exploit payload then downloaded mdeploy.text from 182.54.217[.]2/mdepoy.txt to C:userspublicmde.ps1 [T1105]. When executed, mde.ps1 downloaded file.zip from 182.54.217[.]2 and removed mde.ps1 from the disk [T1070.004].
file.zip contained XMRig cryptocurrency mining software and associated configuration files.
WinRing0x64.sys – XMRig Miner driver
wuacltservice.exe – XMRig Miner
config.json – XMRig miner configuration
RuntimeBroker.exe – Associated file. This file can create a local user account [T1136.001] and tests for internet connectivity by pinging 8.8.8.8 [T1016.001]. The exploit payload created a Scheduled Task [T1053.005] that executed RuntimeBroker.exe daily as SYSTEM. Note: By exploiting Log4Shell, the actors gained access to a VMware service account with administrator and system level access. The Scheduled Task was named RuntimeBrokerService.exe to masquerade as a legitimate Windows task.
See MAR 10387061-1.v1 for additional information, including IOCs, on these four files.
After obtaining initial access and installing XMRig on the VMWare Horizon server, the actors used RDP [T1021.001] and the built-in Windows user account DefaultAccount [T1078.001] to move laterally [TA0008] to a VMware VDI-KMS host. Once the threat actor established themselves on the VDI-KMS host, CISA observed the actors download around 30 megabytes of files from transfer[.]sh server associated with 144.76.136[.]153. The actors downloaded the following tools:
PsExec – a Microsoft signed tool for system administrators.
Ngrok – a reverse proxy tool for proxying an internal service out onto an Ngrok domain, which the user can then access at a randomly generated subdomain at *.ngrok[.]io. CISA has observed this tool in use by some commercial products for benign purposes; however, this process bypasses typical firewall controls and may be a potentially unwanted application in production environments. Ngrok is known to be used for malicious purposes.[1]
The threat actors then executed Mimikatz on VDI-KMS to harvest credentials and created a rogue domain administrator account [T1136.002]. Using the newly created account, the actors leveraged RDP to propagate to several hosts within the network. Upon logging into each host, the actors manually disabled Windows Defender via the Graphical User Interface (GUI) and implanted Ngrok executables and configuration files. The threat actors were able to implant Ngrok on multiple hosts to ensure Ngrok’s persistence should they lose access to a machine during a routine reboot. The actors were able to proxy [T1090] RDP sessions, which were only observable on the local network as outgoing HTTPS port 443 connections to tunnel.us.ngrok[.]com and korgn.su.lennut[.]com (the prior domain in reverse). It is possible, but was not observed, that the threat actors configured a custom domain, or used other Ngrok tunnel domains, wildcarded here as *.ngrok[.]com, *.ngrok[.]io, ngrok.*.tunnel[.]com, or korgn.*.lennut[.]com.
Once the threat actors established a deep foothold in the network and moved laterally to the domain controller, they executed the following PowerShell command on the Active Directory to obtain a list of all machines attached to the domain [T1018]:
The threat actors also changed the password for the local administrator account [T1098] on several hosts as a backup should the rogue domain administrator account get detected and terminated. Additionally, the threat actor was observed attempting to dump the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process [T1003.001] with task manager but this was stopped by additional anti-virus the FCEB organization had installed.
MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES
See table 1 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory, as well as corresponding detection and/or mitigation recommendations. For additional mitigations, see the Mitigations section.
Table 1: Cyber Threat Actors ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise
The actors exploited Log4Shell for initial access to the organization’s VMware Horizon server.
Mitigation/Detection: Use a firewall or web-application firewall and enable logging to prevent and detect potential Log4Shell exploitation attempts [M1050].
Mitigation: Perform regular vulnerability scanning to detect Log4J vulnerabilities and update Log4J software using vendor provided patches [M1016],[M1051].
The actors changed the password for the local administrator account on several hosts.
Mitigation: Use multifactor authentication for user and privileged accounts [M1032].
Detection: Monitor events for changes to account objects and/or permissions on systems and the domain, such as event IDs 4738, 4728, and 4670. Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity [DS0002].
The actors’ malware can create local user accounts.
Mitigation: Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to domain controllers and systems used to create and manage accounts.
Detection: Monitor executed commands and arguments for actions that are associated with local account creation, such as net user /add , useradd, and dscl -create [DS0017].
Detection: Enable logging for new user creation [DS0002].
The actors’ exploit payload created Scheduled Task RuntimeBrokerService.exe, which executed RuntimeBroker.exe daily as SYSTEM.
Mitigation: Configure settings for scheduled tasks to force tasks to run under the context of the authenticated account instead of allowing them to run as SYSTEM [M1028].
Detection: Monitor for newly constructed processes and/or command-lines that execute from the svchost.exe in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler taskeng.exe for older versions of Windows [DS0009]
Detection: Monitor for newly constructed scheduled jobs by enabling the Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational setting within the event logging service [DS0003].
The actors added an exclusion rule to Windows Defender. The tool allowlisted the entire c:drive, enabling the actors to bypass virus scans for tools they downloaded to the c:drive.
The actors manually disabled Windows Defender via the GUI.
Mitigation: Ensure proper user permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering with security services. [M1018].
Detection: Monitor for changes made to Windows Registry keys and/or values related to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools such as HKLM:SOFTWAREPoliciesMicrosoftWindows Defender [DS0024].
Detection: Monitor for telemetry that provides context for modification or deletion of information related to security software processes or services such as Windows Defender definition files in Windows and System log files in Linux [DS0013].
Detection: Monitor processes for unexpected termination related to security tools/services [DS0009].
The actors were observed trying to dump LSASS process.
Mitigation: With Windows 10, Microsoft implemented new protections called Credential Guard to protect the LSA secrets that can be used to obtain credentials through forms of credential dumping [M1043]
Mitigation: On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to secure LSASS and prevent credential stealing [M1040].
Mitigation: Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network [M1027].
Detection: Monitor for unexpected processes interacting with LSASS.exe. Common credential dumpers such as Mimikatz access LSASS.exe by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. [DS0009].
Detection: Monitor executed commands and arguments that may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the LSASS [DS0017].
Mitigation: Organizations may consider weighing the risk of storing credentials in password stores and web browsers. If system, software, or web browser credential disclosure is a significant concern, technical controls, policy, and user training may be used to prevent storage of credentials in improper locations [M1027].
Detection: Monitor for processes being accessed that may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials [DS0009].
Detection: Monitor executed commands and arguments that may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials [DS0017].
The actors executed a PowerShell command on the AD to obtain a list of all machines attached to the domain.
Detection: Monitor executed commands and arguments that may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for lateral movement [DS0017].
Detection: Monitor for newly constructed network connections associated with pings/scans that may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for lateral movement [DS0029].
Detection: Monitor for newly executed processes that can be used to discover remote systems, such as ping.exe and tracert.exe, especially when executed in quick succession [DS0009].
System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
The actors’ malware tests for internet connectivity by pinging 8.8.8.8.
Mitigation: Monitor executed commands, arguments [DS0017] and executed processes (e.g., tracert or ping) [DS0009] that may check for internet connectivity on compromised systems.
Mitigation: Disable the RDP service if it is unnecessary [M1042].
Mitigation: Do not leave RDP accessible from the internet. Enable firewall rules to block RDP traffic between network security zones within a network [M1030].
Mitigation: Consider removing the local Administrators group from the list of groups allowed to log in through RDP [M1026].
Detection: Monitor for user accounts logged into systems associated with RDP (ex: Windows EID 4624 Logon Type 10). Other factors, such as access patterns (ex: multiple systems over a relatively short period of time) and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP [DS0028].
The actors used Ngrok to proxy RDP connections and to perform command and control.
Mitigation: Traffic to known anonymity networks and C2 infrastructure can be blocked through the use of network allow and block lists [M1037].
Detection: Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g., extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure) [DS0029].
The actors downloaded malware and multiple tools to the network, including PsExec, Mimikatz, and Ngrok.
Mitigation: Employ anti-malware to automatically detect and quarantine malicious scripts [M1049].
INCIDENT RESPONSE
If suspected initial access or compromise is detected based on IOCs or TTPs in this CSA, CISA encourages organizations to assume lateral movement by threat actors and investigate connected systems and the DC.
CISA recommends organizations apply the following steps before applying any mitigations, including patching.
Immediately isolate affected systems.
Collect and review relevant logs, data, and artifacts. Take a memory capture of the device(s) and a forensic image capture for detailed analysis.
Consider soliciting support from a third-party incident response organization that can provide subject matter expertise to ensure the actor is eradicated from the network and to avoid residual issues that could enable follow-on exploitation.
CISA and FBI recommend implementing the mitigations below and in Table 1 to improve your organization’s cybersecurity posture on the basis of threat actor behaviors.
Install updated builds to ensure affected VMware Horizon and UAG systems are updated to the latest version.
If updates or workarounds were not promptly applied following VMware’s release of updates for Log4Shell in December 2021, treat those VMware Horizon systems as compromised. Follow the pro-active incident response procedures outlined above prior to applying updates. If no compromise is detected, apply these updates as soon as possible.
Note: Until the update is fully implemented, consider removing vulnerable components from the internet to limit the scope of traffic. While installing the updates, ensure network perimeter access controls are as restrictive as possible.
If upgrading is not immediately feasible, see KB87073 and KB87092 for vendor-provided temporary workarounds. Implement temporary solutions using an account with administrative privileges. Note that these temporary solutions should not be treated as permanent fixes; vulnerable components should be upgraded to the latest build as soon as possible.
Prior to implementing any temporary solution, ensure appropriate backups have been completed.
Verify successful implementation of mitigations by executing the vendor supplied script Horizon_Windows_Log4j_Mitigations.zip without parameters to ensure that no vulnerabilities remain. See KB87073 for details.
Minimize the internet-facing attack surface by hosting essential services on a segregated DMZ, ensuring strict network perimeter access controls, and not hosting internet-facing services that are not essential to business operations. Where possible, implement regularly updated web application firewalls (WAF) in front of public-facing services. WAFs can protect against web-based exploitation using signatures and heuristics that are likely to block or alert on malicious traffic.
Use best practices for identity and access management (IAM) by implementing phishing resistant multifactor authentication (MFA), enforcing use of strong passwords, regularly auditing administrator accounts and permissions, and limiting user access through the principle of least privilege. Disable inactive accounts uniformly across the AD, MFA systems, etc.
If using Windows 10 version 1607 or Windows Server 2016 or later, monitor or disable Windows DefaultAccount, also known as the Default System Managed Account (DSMA).
Audit domain controllers to log successful Kerberos Ticket Granting Service (TGS) requests and ensure the events are monitored for anomalous activity.
Secure accounts.
Enforce the principle of least privilege. Administrator accounts should have the minimum permission necessary to complete their tasks.
Ensure there are unique and distinct administrative accounts for each set of administrative tasks.
Create non-privileged accounts for privileged users and ensure they use the non-privileged accounts for all non-privileged access (e.g., web browsing, email access).
Create a deny list of known compromised credentials and prevent users from using known-compromised passwords.
Secure credentials by restricting where accounts and credentials can be used and by using local device credential protection features.
Use virtualizing solutions on modern hardware and software to ensure credentials are securely stored.
Ensure storage of clear text passwords in LSASS memory is disabled. Note: For Windows 8, this is enabled by default. For more information see Microsoft Security Advisory Update to Improve Credentials Protection and Management.
Consider disabling or limiting NTLM and WDigest Authentication.
Implement Credential Guard for Windows 10 and Server 2016 (refer to Microsoft: Manage Windows Defender Credential Guard for more information). For Windows Server 2012R2, enable Protected Process Light for Local Security Authority (LSA).
Minimize the AD attack surface to reduce malicious ticket-granting activity. Malicious activity such as “Kerberoasting” takes advantage of Kerberos’ TGS and can be used to obtain hashed credentials that threat actors attempt to crack.
VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS
In addition to applying mitigations, CISA and FBI recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. CISA and FBI recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.
To get started:
Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see table 1).
Align your security technologies against the technique.
Test your technologies against the technique.
Analyze your detection and prevention technologies performance.
Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.
CISA and FBI recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.
Actions to take today to mitigate cyber threats from ransomware:
• Install updates for operating systems, software, and firmware as soon as they are released.
• Require phishing-resistant MFA for as many services as possible.
• Train users to recognize and report phishing attempts.
Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) are releasing this joint CSA to provide information on the “Daixin Team,” a cybercrime group that is actively targeting U.S. businesses, predominantly in the Healthcare and Public Health (HPH) Sector, with ransomware and data extortion operations.
This joint CSA provides TTPs and IOCs of Daixin actors obtained from FBI threat response activities and third-party reporting.
Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 591 KB
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 11. See MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise for all referenced tactics and techniques.
Cybercrime actors routinely target HPH Sector organizations with ransomware:
As of October 2022, per FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) data, specifically victim reports across all 16 critical infrastructure sectors, the HPH Sector accounts for 25 percent of ransomware complaints.
According to an IC3 annual report in 2021, 649 ransomware reports were made across 14 critical infrastructure sectors; the HPH Sector accounted for the most reports at 148.
The Daixin Team is a ransomware and data extortion group that has targeted the HPH Sector with ransomware and data extortion operations since at least June 2022. Since then, Daixin Team cybercrime actors have caused ransomware incidents at multiple HPH Sector organizations where they have:
Deployed ransomware to encrypt servers responsible for healthcare services—including electronic health records services, diagnostics services, imaging services, and intranet services, and/or
Exfiltrated personal identifiable information (PII) and patient health information (PHI) and threatened to release the information if a ransom is not paid.
Daixin actors gain initial access to victims through virtual private network (VPN) servers. In one confirmed compromise, the actors likely exploited an unpatched vulnerability in the organization’s VPN server [T1190]. In another confirmed compromise, the actors used previously compromised credentials to access a legacy VPN server [T1078] that did not have multifactor authentication (MFA) enabled. The actors are believed to have acquired the VPN credentials through the use of a phishing email with a malicious attachment [T1598.002].
After obtaining access to the victim’s VPN server, Daixin actors move laterally via Secure Shell (SSH) [T1563.001] and Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) [T1563.002]. Daixin actors have sought to gain privileged account access through credential dumping [T1003] and pass the hash [T1550.002]. The actors have leveraged privileged accounts to gain access to VMware vCenter Server and reset account passwords [T1098] for ESXi servers in the environment. The actors have then used SSH to connect to accessible ESXi servers and deploy ransomware [T1486] on those servers.
According to third-party reporting, the Daixin Team’s ransomware is based on leaked Babuk Locker source code. This third-party reporting as well as FBI analysis show that the ransomware targets ESXi servers and encrypts files located in /vmfs/volumes/ with the following extensions: .vmdk, .vmem, .vswp, .vmsd, .vmx, and .vmsn. A ransom note is also written to /vmfs/volumes/. See Figure 1 for targeted file system path and Figure 2 for targeted file extensions list. Figure 3 and Figure 4 include examples of ransom notes. Note that in the Figure 3 ransom note, Daixin actors misspell “Daixin” as “Daxin.”
Figure 1: Daixin Team – Ransomware Targeted File Path
Figure 2: Daixin Team – Ransomware Targeted File Extensions
Figure 3: Example 1 of Daixin Team Ransomware Note
Figure 4: Example 2 of Daixin Team Ransomware Note
In addition to deploying ransomware, Daixin actors have exfiltrated data [TA0010] from victim systems. In one confirmed compromise, the actors used Rclone—an open-source program to manage files on cloud storage—to exfiltrate data to a dedicated virtual private server (VPS). In another compromise, the actors used Ngrok—a reverse proxy tool for proxying an internal service out onto an Ngrok domain—for data exfiltration [T1567].
MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES
See Table 1 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques included in this advisory.
Table 1: Daixin Actors’ ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise
Reconnaissance
Technique Title
ID
Use
Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Attachment
Daixin actors have encrypted data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources.
INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE
See Table 2 for IOCs obtained from third-party reporting.
Table 2: Daixin Team IOCs – Rclone Associated SHA256 Hashes
FBI, CISA, and HHS urge HPH Sector organizations to implement the following to protect against Daixin and related malicious activity:
Install updates for operating systems, software, and firmware as soon as they are released. Prioritize patching VPN servers, remote access software, virtual machine software, and known exploited vulnerabilities. Consider leveraging a centralized patch management system to automate and expedite the process.
Require phishing-resistant MFA for as many services as possible—particularly for webmail, VPNs, accounts that access critical systems, and privileged accounts that manage backups.
If you use Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), secure and monitor it.
Limit access to resources over internal networks, especially by restricting RDP and using virtual desktop infrastructure. After assessing risks, if RDP is deemed operationally necessary, restrict the originating sources, and require multifactor authentication (MFA) to mitigate credential theft and reuse. If RDP must be available externally, use a virtual private network (VPN), virtual desktop infrastructure, or other means to authenticate and secure the connection before allowing RDP to connect to internal devices. Monitor remote access/RDP logs, enforce account lockouts after a specified number of attempts to block brute force campaigns, log RDP login attempts, and disable unused remote access/RDP ports.
Ensure devices are properly configured and that security features are enabled. Disable ports and protocols that are not being used for business purposes (e.g., RDP Transmission Control Protocol Port 3389).
Turn off SSH and other network device management interfaces such as Telnet, Winbox, and HTTP for wide area networks (WANs) and secure with strong passwords and encryption when enabled.
Implement and enforce multi-layer network segmentation with the most critical communications and data resting on the most secure and reliable layer.
Limit access to data by deploying public key infrastructure and digital certificates to authenticate connections with the network, Internet of Things (IoT) medical devices, and the electronic health record system, as well as to ensure data packages are not manipulated while in transit from man-in-the-middle attacks.
Use standard user accounts on internal systems instead of administrative accounts, which allow for overarching administrative system privileges and do not ensure least privilege.
Secure PII/PHI at collection points and encrypt the data at rest and in transit by using technologies such as Transport Layer Security (TPS). Only store personal patient data on internal systems that are protected by firewalls, and ensure extensive backups are available if data is ever compromised.
Protect stored data by masking the permanent account number (PAN) when it is displayed and rendering it unreadable when it is stored—through cryptography, for example.
Secure the collection, storage, and processing practices for PII and PHI, per regulations such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). Implementing HIPAA security measures can prevent the introduction of malware on the system.
Use monitoring tools to observe whether IoT devices are behaving erratically due to a compromise.
Create and regularly review internal policies that regulate the collection, storage, access, and monitoring of PII/PHI.
In addition, the FBI, CISA, and HHS urge all organizations, including HPH Sector organizations, to apply the following recommendations to prepare for, mitigate/prevent, and respond to ransomware incidents.
Preparing for Ransomware
Maintain offline (i.e., physically disconnected) backups of data, and regularly test backup and restoration. These practices safeguard an organization’s continuity of operations or at least minimize potential downtime from a ransomware incident and protect against data losses.
Ensure all backup data is encrypted, immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted), and covers the entire organization’s data infrastructure.
Create, maintain, and exercise a basic cyber incident response plan and associated communications plan that includes response procedures for a ransomware incident.
Organizations should also ensure their incident response and communications plans include response and notification procedures for data breach incidents. Ensure the notification procedures adhere to applicable state laws.
Refer to applicable state data breach laws and consult legal counsel when necessary.
For breaches involving electronic health information, you may need to notify the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or the Department of Health and Human Services, and—in some cases—the media. Refer to the FTC’s Health Breach Notification Rule and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ Breach Notification Rule for more information.
Restrict Server Message Block (SMB) Protocol within the network to only access servers that are necessary and remove or disable outdated versions of SMB (i.e., SMB version 1). Threat actors use SMB to propagate malware across organizations.
Review the security posture of third-party vendors and those interconnected with your organization. Ensure all connections between third-party vendors and outside software or hardware are monitored and reviewed for suspicious activity.
Implement listing policies for applications and remote access that only allow systems to execute known and permitted programs.
Open document readers in protected viewing modes to help prevent active content from running.
Implement user training program and phishing exercises to raise awareness among users about the risks of visiting suspicious websites, clicking on suspicious links, and opening suspicious attachments. Reinforce the appropriate user response to phishing and spearphishing emails.
Require administrator credentials to install software.
Audit user accounts with administrative or elevated privileges and configure access controls with least privilege in mind.
Install and regularly update antivirus and antimalware software on all hosts.
Only use secure networks and avoid using public Wi-Fi networks. Consider installing and using a VPN.
Consider adding an email banner to messages coming from outside your organizations.
Disable hyperlinks in received emails.
Responding to Ransomware Incidents
If a ransomware incident occurs at your organization:
Follow your organization’s Ransomware Response Checklist (see Preparing for Ransomware section).
Scan backups. If possible, scan backup data with an antivirus program to check that it is free of malware. This should be performed using an isolated, trusted system to avoid exposing backups to potential compromise.
Follow the notification requirements as outlined in your cyber incident response plan.
Note: FBI, CISA, and HHS strongly discourage paying ransoms as doing so does not guarantee files and records will be recovered. Furthermore, payment may also embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities.
REFERENCES
Stopransomware.gov is a whole-of-government approach that gives one central location for ransomware resources and alerts.
Resource to mitigate a ransomware attack: CISA-Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Joint Ransomware Guide.
Ongoing Threat Alerts and Sector alerts are produced by the Health Sector Cybersecurity Coordination Center (HC3) and can be found at hhs.gov/HC3
For additional best practices for Healthcare cybersecurity issues see the HHS 405(d) Aligning Health Care Industry Security Approaches at 405d.hhs.gov
REPORTING
The FBI is seeking any information that can be shared, to include boundary logs showing communication to and from foreign IP addresses, a sample ransom note, communications with Daixin Group actors, Bitcoin wallet information, decryptor files, and/or a benign sample of an encrypted file. Regardless of whether you or your organization have decided to pay the ransom, the FBI, CISA, and HHS urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents to a local FBI Field Office, or CISA at cisa.gov/report.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
FBI, CISA, and HHS would like to thank CrowdStrike and the Health Information Sharing and Analysis Center (Health-ISAC) for their contributions to this CSA.
DISCLAIMER
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. FBI, CISA, and HHS do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by FBI, CISA, or HHS.
This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) provides the top Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) used since 2020 by People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber actors as assessed by the National Security Agency (NSA), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). PRC state-sponsored cyber actors continue to exploit known vulnerabilities to actively target U.S. and allied networks as well as software and hardware companies to steal intellectual property and develop access into sensitive networks.
This joint CSA builds on previous NSA, CISA, and FBI reporting to inform federal and state, local, tribal and territorial (SLTT) government; critical infrastructure, including the Defense Industrial Base Sector; and private sector organizations about notable trends and persistent tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).
NSA, CISA, and FBI urge U.S. and allied governments, critical infrastructure, and private sector organizations to apply the recommendations listed in the Mitigations section and Appendix A to increase their defensive posture and reduce the threat of compromise from PRC state-sponsored malicious cyber actors.
Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 409 KB
Technical Details
NSA, CISA, and FBI continue to assess PRC state-sponsored cyber activities as being one of the largest and most dynamic threats to U.S. government and civilian networks. PRC state-sponsored cyber actors continue to target government and critical infrastructure networks with an increasing array of new and adaptive techniques—some of which pose a significant risk to Information Technology Sector organizations (including telecommunications providers), Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Sector organizations, and other critical infrastructure organizations.
PRC state-sponsored cyber actors continue to exploit known vulnerabilities and use publicly available tools to target networks of interest. NSA, CISA, and FBI assess PRC state-sponsored cyber actors have actively targeted U.S. and allied networks as well as software and hardware companies to steal intellectual property and develop access into sensitive networks. See Table 1 for the top used CVEs.
Table I: Top CVEs most used by Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors since 2020
Vendor
CVE
Vulnerability Type
Apache Log4j
CVE-2021-44228
Remote Code Execution
Pulse Connect Secure
CVE-2019-11510
Arbitrary File Read
GitLab CE/EE
CVE-2021-22205
Remote Code Execution
Atlassian
CVE-2022-26134
Remote Code Execution
Microsoft Exchange
CVE-2021-26855
Remote Code Execution
F5 Big-IP
CVE-2020-5902
Remote Code Execution
VMware vCenter Server
CVE-2021-22005
Arbitrary File Upload
Citrix ADC
CVE-2019-19781
Path Traversal
Cisco Hyperflex
CVE-2021-1497
Command Line Execution
Buffalo WSR
CVE-2021-20090
Relative Path Traversal
Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center
CVE-2021-26084
Remote Code Execution
Hikvision Webserver
CVE-2021-36260
Command Injection
Sitecore XP
CVE-2021-42237
Remote Code Execution
F5 Big-IP
CVE-2022-1388
Remote Code Execution
Apache
CVE-2022-24112
Authentication Bypass by Spoofing
ZOHO
CVE-2021-40539
Remote Code Execution
Microsoft
CVE-2021-26857
Remote Code Execution
Microsoft
CVE-2021-26858
Remote Code Execution
Microsoft
CVE-2021-27065
Remote Code Execution
Apache HTTP Server
CVE-2021-41773
Path Traversal
These state-sponsored actors continue to use virtual private networks (VPNs) to obfuscate their activities and target web-facing applications to establish initial access. Many of the CVEs indicated in Table 1 allow the actors to surreptitiously gain unauthorized access into sensitive networks, after which they seek to establish persistence and move laterally to other internally connected networks. For additional information on PRC state-sponsored cyber actors targeting network devices, please see People’s Republic of China State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Exploit Network Providers and Devices.
Mitigations
NSA, CISA, and FBI urge organizations to apply the recommendations below and those listed in Appendix A.
Update and patch systems as soon as possible. Prioritize patching vulnerabilities identified in this CSA and other known exploited vulnerabilities.
Utilize phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication whenever possible. Require all accounts with password logins to have strong, unique passwords, and change passwords immediately if there are indications that a password may have been compromised.
Block obsolete or unused protocols at the network edge.
Upgrade or replace end-of-life devices.
Move toward the Zero Trust security model.
Enable robust logging of Internet-facing systems and monitor the logs for anomalous activity.
Appendix A
Table II: Apache CVE-2021-44228
Apache CVE-2021-44228 CVSS 3.0: 10 (Critical)
Vulnerability Description
Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against malicious actor controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. A malicious actor who can control log messages or log message parameters could execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects.
Recommended Mitigations
Apply patches provided by vendor and perform required system updates.
This vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis, which may result in further changes to the information provided. In Pulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure (PCS) 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4, an unauthenticated remote malicious actor could send a specially crafted URI to perform an arbitrary file reading vulnerability.
Recommended Mitigations
Apply patches provided by vendor and perform required system updates.
Detection Methods
Use CISA’s “Check Your Pulse” Tool.
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions
Pulse Connect Secure (PCS) 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4
Table IV: GitLab CVE-2021-22205
GitLab CVE-2021-22205 CVSS 3.0: 10 (Critical)
Vulnerability Description
An issue has been discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions starting from 11.9. GitLab was not properly validating image files passed to a file parser, which resulted in a remote command execution.
Recommended Mitigations
Update to 12.10.3, 13.9.6, and 13.8.8 for GitLab.
Hotpatch is available via GitLab.
Detection Methods
Investigate logfiles.
Check GitLab Workhorse.
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions
Gitlab CE/EE.
Table V: Atlassian CVE-2022-26134
Atlassian CVE-2022-26134 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical)
Vulnerability Description
In affected versions of Confluence Server and Data Center, an OGNL injection vulnerability exists that could allow an unauthenticated malicious actor to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance. The affected versions are from 1.3.0 before 7.4.17, 7.13.0 before 7.13.7, 7.14.0 before 7.14.3, 7.15.0 before 7.15.2, 7.16.0 before 7.16.4, 7.17.0 before 7.17.4, and 7.18.0 before 7.18.1.
Recommended Mitigations
Immediately block all Internet traffic to and from affected products AND apply the update per vendor instructions.
Ensure Internet-facing servers are up-to-date and have secure compliance practices.
All supported versions of Confluence Server and Data Center
Confluence Server and Data Center versions after 1.3.0
Table VI: Microsoft CVE-2021-26855
Microsoft CVE-2021-26855 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical)
Vulnerability Description
Microsoft has released security updates for Windows Exchange Server. To exploit these vulnerabilities, an authenticated malicious actor could send malicious requests to an affected server. A malicious actor who successfully exploited these vulnerabilities would execute arbitrary code and compromise the affected systems. If successfully exploited, these vulnerabilities could allow an adversary to obtain access to sensitive information, bypass security restrictions, cause a denial of service conditions, and/or perform unauthorized actions on the affected Exchange server, which could aid in further malicious activity.
Recommended Mitigations
Apply the appropriate Microsoft Security Update.
Microsoft Exchange Server 2013 Cumulative Update 23 (KB5000871)
Microsoft Exchange Server 2016 Cumulative Update 18 (KB5000871)
Microsoft Exchange Server 2016 Cumulative Update 19 (KB5000871)
Microsoft Exchange Server 2019 Cumulative Update 7 (KB5000871)
Microsoft Exchange Server 2019 Cumulative Update 8 (KB5000871)
Restrict untrusted connections.
Detection Methods
Analyze Exchange product logs for evidence of exploitation.
Scan for known webshells.
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions
Microsoft Exchange 2013, 2016, and 2019.
Table VII: F5 CVE-2020-5902
F5 CVE-2020-5902 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical)
Vulnerability Description
In BIG-IP versions 15.0.0-15.1.0.3, 14.1.0-14.1.2.5, 13.1.0-13.1.3.3, 12.1.0-12.1.5.1, and 11.6.1-11.6.5.1, the Traffic Management User Interface (TMUI), also referred to as the Configuration utility, has a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in undisclosed pages.
The vCenter Server contains an arbitrary file upload vulnerability in the Analytics service. A malicious actor with network access to port 443 on vCenter Server may exploit this issue to execute code on vCenter Server by uploading a specially crafted file.
Recommended Mitigations
Apply Vendor Updates.
Detection Methods
N/A
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions
VMware Cloud Foundation
VMware VCenter Server
Table IX: Citrix CVE-2019-19781
Citrix CVE-2019-19781 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical)
Vulnerability Description
This vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis, which may result in further changes to the information provided. An issue was discovered in Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Gateway 10.5, 11.1, 12.0, 12.1, and 13.0. They allow Directory Traversal.
Multiple vulnerabilities in the web-based management interface of Cisco HyperFlex HX could allow an unauthenticated, remote malicious actor to perform a command injection against an affected device. For more information about these vulnerabilities, see the Technical details section of this advisory.
A path traversal vulnerability in the web interfaces of Buffalo WSR-2533DHPL2 firmware version <= 1.02 and WSR-2533DHP3 firmware version <= 1.24 could allow unauthenticated remote malicious actors to bypass authentication.
Recommended Mitigations
Update firmware to latest available version.
Detection Methods
N/A
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions
Buffalo Wsr-2533Dhpl2-Bk Firmware
Buffalo Wsr-2533Dhp3-Bk Firmware
Table XII: Atlassian CVE-2021-26084
Atlassian CVE-2021-26084 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical)
Vulnerability Description
In affected versions of Confluence Server and Data Center, an OGNL injection vulnerability exists that would allow an unauthenticated malicious actor to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance. The affected versions are before version 6.13.23 and from version 6.14.0 before 7.4.11, version 7.5.0 before 7.11.6, and version 7.12.0 before 7.12.5.
Recommended Mitigations
Update confluence version to 6.13.23, 7.4.11, 7.11.6, 7.12.5, and 7.13.0.
Avoid using end-of-life devices.
Use Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS).
Detection Methods
N/A
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions
Atlassian Confluence
Atlassian Confluence Server
Atlassian Data Center
Atlassian Jira Data Center
Table XIII: Hikvision CVE-2021-36260
Hikvision CVE-2021-36260 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical)
Vulnerability Description
This vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis, which may result in further changes to the information provided. A command injection vulnerability exists in the web server of some Hikvision products. Due to the insufficient input validation, a malicious actor can exploit the vulnerability to launch a command injection by sending some messages with malicious commands.
Recommended Mitigations
Apply the latest firmware updates.
Detection Methods
N/A
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions
Various Hikvision Firmware to include Ds, Ids, and Ptz
Sitecore XP 7.5 Initial Release to Sitecore XP 8.2 Update-7 is vulnerable to an insecure deserialization attack where it is possible to achieve remote command execution on the machine. No authentication or special configuration is required to exploit this vulnerability.
Recommended Mitigations
Update to latest version.
Delete the Report.ashx file from /sitecore/shell/ClientBin/Reporting/Report.ashx.
Sitecore Experience Platform 8.0, 8.0 Service Pack 1, and 8.0 Update 1-Update 7
Sitecore Experience Platform 8.0 Service Pack 1
Sitecore Experience Platform 8.1, and Update 1-Update 3
Sitecore Experience Platform 8.2, and Update 1-Update 7
Table XV: F5 CVE-2022-1388
F5 CVE-2022-1388 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical)
Vulnerability Description
This vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis, which may result in further changes to the information provided. On F5 BIG-IP 16.1.x versions prior to 16.1.2.2, 15.1.x versions prior to 15.1.5.1, 14.1.x versions prior to 14.1.4.6, 13.1.x versions prior to 13.1.5, and all 12.1.x and 11.6.x versions, undisclosed requests may bypass iControl REST authentication. Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.
Recommended Mitigations
Block iControl REST access through the self IP address.
Block iControl REST access through the management interface.
Modify the BIG-IP httpd configuration.
Detection Methods
N/A
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions
Big IP versions:
16.1.0-16.1.2
15.1.0-15.1.5
14.1.0-14.1.4
13.1.0-13.1.4
12.1.0-12.1.6
11.6.1-11.6.5
Table XVI: Apache CVE-2022-24112
Apache CVE-2022-24112 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical)
Vulnerability Description
A malicious actor can abuse the batch-requests plugin to send requests to bypass the IP restriction of Admin API. A default configuration of Apache APISIX (with default API key) is vulnerable to remote code execution. When the admin key was changed or the port of Admin API was changed to a port different from the data panel, the impact is lower. But there is still a risk to bypass the IP restriction of Apache APISIX’s data panel. There is a check in the batch-requests plugin which overrides the client IP with its real remote IP. But due to a bug in the code, this check can be bypassed.
Recommended Mitigations
In affected versions of Apache APISIX, you can avoid this risk by explicitly commenting out batch-requests in the conf/config.yaml and conf/config-default.yaml files and restarting Apache APISIX.
Update to 2.10.4 or 2.12.1.
Detection Methods
N/A
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions
Apache APISIX between 1.3 and 2.12.1 (excluding 2.12.1)
LTS versions of Apache APISIX between 2.10.0 and 2.10.4
Table XVII: ZOHO CVE-2021-40539
ZOHO CVE-2021-40539 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical)
Vulnerability Description
Zoho ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus version 6113 and prior is vulnerable to REST API authentication bypass with resultant remote code execution.
Microsoft Exchange Server remote code execution vulnerability. This CVE ID differs from CVE-2021-26412, CVE-2021-26854, CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065, and CVE-2021-27078.
Recommended Mitigations
Update to support latest version.
Install Microsoft security patch.
Use Microsoft Exchange On-Premises Mitigation Tool.
Detection Methods
Run Exchange script: https://github.com/microsoft/CSS-Exchange/tree/main/Security.
Hashes can be found here: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/#scan-log.
Vulnerable Technologies and Versions
Microsoft Exchange Servers
Table XIX: Microsoft CVE-2021-26858
Microsoft CVE-2021-26858 CVSS 3.0: 7.8 (High)
Vulnerability Description
Microsoft Exchange Server remote code execution vulnerability. This CVE ID differs from CVE-2021-26412, CVE-2021-26854, CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065, and CVE-2021-27078.
Recommended Mitigations
Update to support latest version.
Install Microsoft security patch.
Use Microsoft Exchange On-Premises Mitigation Tool.
Microsoft Exchange Server remote code execution vulnerability. This CVE ID differs from CVE-2021-26412, CVE-2021-26854, CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065, and CVE-2021-27078.
Recommended Mitigations
Update to support latest version.
Install Microsoft security patch.
Use Microsoft Exchange On-Premises Mitigation Tool.
This vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis, which may result in further changes to the information provided. A flaw was found in a change made to path normalization in Apache HTTP Server 2.4.49. A malicious actor could use a path traversal attack to map URLs to files outside the directories configured by Alias-like directives. If files outside of these directories are not protected by the usual default configuration “require all denied,” these requests can succeed. Enabling CGI scripts for these aliased paths could allow for remote code execution. This issue is known to be exploited in the wild. This issue only affects Apache 2.4.49 and not earlier versions. The fix in Apache HTTP Server 2.4.50 is incomplete (see CVE-2021-42013).
In November 2013, we announced AWS CloudTrail to track user activity and API usage. AWS CloudTrail enables auditing, security monitoring, and operational troubleshooting. CloudTrail records user activity and API calls across AWS services as events. CloudTrail events help you answer the questions of “who did what, where, and when?”.
Recently we have improved the ability for you to simplify your auditing and security analysis by using AWS CloudTrail Lake. CloudTrail Lake is a managed data lake for capturing, storing, accessing, and analyzing user and API activity on AWS for audit, security, and operational purposes. You can aggregate and immutably store your activity events, and run SQL-based queries for search and analysis.
We have heard your feedback that aggregating activity information from diverse applications across hybrid environments is complex and costly, but important for a comprehensive picture of your organization’s security and compliance posture.
Today we are announcing support of ingestion for activity events from non-AWS sources using CloudTrail Lake, making it a single location of immutable user and API activity events for auditing and security investigations. Now you can consolidate, immutably store, search, and analyze activity events from AWS and non-AWS sources, such as in-house or SaaS applications, in one place.
Using the new PutAuditEvents API in CloudTrail Lake, you can centralize user activity information from disparate sources into CloudTrail Lake, enabling you to analyze, troubleshoot and diagnose issues using this data. CloudTrail Lake records all events in standardized schema, making it easier for users to consume this information to comprehensively and quickly respond to security incidents or audit requests.
CloudTrail Lake is also integrated with selected AWS Partners, such as Cloud Storage Security, Clumio, CrowdStrike, CyberArk, GitHub, Kong Inc, LaunchDarkly, MontyCloud, Netskope, Nordcloud, Okta, One Identity, Shoreline.io, Snyk, and Wiz, allowing you to easily enable audit logging through the CloudTrail console.
Getting Started to Integrate External Sources You can start to ingest activity events from your own data sources or partner applications by choosing Integrations under the Lake menu in the AWS CloudTrail console.
To create a new integration, choose Add integration and enter your channel name. You can choose the partner application source from which you want to get events. If you’re integrating with events from your own applications hosted on-premises or in the cloud, choose My custom integration.
For Event delivery location, you can choose destinations for your events from this integration. This allows your application or partners to deliver events to your event data store of CloudTrail Lake. An event data store can retain your activity events for a week to up to seven years. Then you can run queries on the event data store.
Choose either Use existing event data stores or Create new event data store—to receive events from integrations. To learn more about event data store, see Create an event data store in the AWS documentation.
You can also set up the permissions policy for the channel resource created with this integration. The information required for the policy is dependent on the integration type of each partner applications.
There are two types of integrations: direct and solution. With direct integrations, the partner calls the PutAuditEvents API to deliver events to the event data store for your AWS account. In this case, you need to provide External ID, the unique account identifier provided by the partner. You can see a link to partner website for the step-by-step guide. With solution integrations, the application runs in your AWS account and the application calls the PutAuditEvents API to deliver events to the event data store for your AWS account.
To find the Integration type for your partner, choose the Available sources tab from the integrations page.
After creating an integration, you will need to provide this Channel ARN to the source or partner application. Until these steps are finished, the status will remain as incomplete. Once CloudTrail Lake starts receiving events for the integrated partner or application, the status field will be updated to reflect the current state.
To ingest your application’s activity events into your integration, call the PutAuditEvents API to add the payload of events. Be sure that there is no sensitive or personally identifying information in the event payload before ingesting it into CloudTrail Lake.
You can make a JSON array of event objects, which includes a required user-generated ID from the event, the required payload of the event as the value of EventData, and an optional checksum to help validate the integrity of the event after ingestion into CloudTrail Lake.
On the Editor tab in the CloudTrail Lake, write your own queries for a new integrated event data store to check delivered events.
You can make your own integration query, like getting all principals across AWS and external resources that have made API calls after a particular date:
SELECT userIdentity.principalId FROM $AWS_EVENT_DATA_STORE_ID
WHERE eventTime > '2022-09-24 00:00:00'
UNION ALL
SELECT eventData.userIdentity.principalId FROM $PARTNER_EVENT_DATA_STORE_ID
WHRERE eventData.eventTime > '2022-09-24 00:00:00'
Launch Partners You can see the list of our launch partners to support a CloudTrail Lake integration option in the Available applications tab. Here are blog posts and announcements from our partners who collaborated on this launch (some will be added in the next few days).
Now Available AWS CloudTrail Lake now supports ingesting activity events from external sources in all AWS Regions where CloudTrail Lake is available today. To learn more, see the AWS documentation and each partner’s getting started guides.
If you are interested in becoming an AWS CloudTrail Partner, you can contact your usual partner contacts.
Setting up a DShield honeypot is well guided by the installation script [1]. After several minutes of following the instructions and adding some custom details, the honeypot is up and running. What's needed after that is to expose the honeypot to the internet. I recently decided to update my home router and thought it was a great opportunity to dig into using pfSense [2]. To expose the honeypot using the pfsense, there are two main options to consider for NAT rules [3]:
Today, we are launching a new reference architecture and a set of reference implementations for enterprise-grade deployment pipelines. A deployment pipeline automates the building, testing, and deploying of applications or infrastructures into your AWS environments. When you deploy your workloads to the cloud, having deployment pipelines is key to gaining agility and lowering time to market.
When I talk with you at conferences or on social media, I frequently hear that our documentation and tutorials are good resources to get started with a new service or a new concept. However, when you want to scale your usage or when you have complex or enterprise-grade use cases, you often lack resources to dive deeper.
We used the best practices and lessons learned at Amazon and with hundreds of customer projects to create this deployment pipeline reference architecture and implementations. They go well beyond the typical “Hello World” example: They document how to architect and how to implement complex deployment pipelines with multiple environments, multiple AWS accounts, multiple Regions, manual approval, automated testing, automated code analysis, etc. When you want to increase the speed at which you deliver software to your customers through DevOps and continuous delivery, this new reference architecture shows you how to combine AWS services to work together. They document the mandatory and optional components of the architecture.
Having an architecture document and diagram is great, but having an implementation is even better. Each pipeline type in the reference architecture has at least one reference implementation. One of the reference implementations uses an AWS Cloud Development Kit (AWS CDK) application to deploy the reference architecture on your accounts. It is a good starting point to study or customize the reference architecture to fit your specific requirements.
Let’s Deploy a Reference Implementation The new deployment pipeline reference architecture demonstrates how to build a pipeline to deploy a Java containerized application and a database. It comes with two reference implementations. We are working on additional pipeline types to deploy Amazon EC2 AMIs, manage a fleet of accounts, and manage dynamic configuration for your applications.
The sample application is developed with SpringBoot. It runs on top of Corretto, the Amazon-provided distribution of the OpenJDK. The application is packaged with the CDK and is deployed on AWS Fargate. But the application is not important here; you can substitute your own application. The important parts are the infrastructure components and the pipeline to deploy an application. For this pipeline type, we provide two reference implementations. One deploys the application using Amazon CodeCatalyst, the new service that we announced at re:Invent 2022, and one uses AWS CodePipeline. This is the one I choose to deploy for this blog post.
The pipeline starts building the applications with AWS CodeBuild. It runs the unit tests and also runs Amazon CodeGuru to review code quality and security. Finally, it runs Trivy to detect additional security concerns, such as known vulnerabilities in the application dependencies. When the build is successful, the pipeline deploys the application in three environments: beta, gamma, and production. It deploys the application in the beta environment in a single Region. The pipeline runs end-to-end tests in the beta environment. All the tests must succeed before the deployment continues to the gamma environment. The gamma environment uses two Regions to host the application. After deployment in the gamma environment, the deployment into production is subject to manual approval. Finally, the pipeline deploys the application in the production environment in six Regions, with three waves of deployments made of two Regions each.
I need four AWS accounts to deploy this reference implementation: one to deploy the pipeline and tooling and one for each environment (beta, gamma, and production). At a high level, there are two deployment steps: first, I bootstrap the CDK for all four accounts, and then I create the pipeline itself in the toolchain account. You must plan for 2-3 hours of your time to prepare your accounts, create the pipeline, and go through a first deployment.
Once the pipeline is created, it builds, tests, and deploys the sample application from its source in AWS CodeCommit. You can commit and push changes to the application source code and see it going through the pipeline steps again.
Available Now The deployment pipeline reference architecture and its reference implementations are available today, free of charge. If you decide to deploy a reference implementation, we will charge you for the resources it creates on your accounts. You can use the provided AWS CDK code and the detailed instructions to deploy this pipeline on your AWS accounts. Try them today!
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