Phishing kits are not new, they are plenty in the wild, and my honeypot collects many samples daily. Usually, a phishing kit will collect credentials and send them to a compromised server (WordPress is generally an excellent target to host this kind of malicious code). Later, I found many kits that (ab)use online services to receive data submitted via HTTP forms[1].
Tag Archives: Security
Old Backdoor, New Obfuscation, (Sat, Mar 18th)
When you’re hunting, sometimes you feel lucky because you spotted something that looks brand new, but sometimes it’s not new or… the code has been changed to bypass existing detections. Here is a perfect example. A few months ago, Juniper discovered[1] a backdoor targeting VMWare ESXi servers, more precisely, the OpenSLP service (%%cve:2019-5544%% and %%cve:2020-3992%%).
Simple Shellcode Dissection, (Thu, Mar 16th)
#StopRansomware: LockBit 3.0
SUMMARY
Note: this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.
Actions to take today to mitigate cyber threats from ransomware:
- Prioritize remediating known exploited vulnerabilities.
- Train users to recognize and report phishing attempts.
- Enable and enforce phishing- resistant multifactor authentication.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Multi-State Information Sharing & Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) are releasing this joint CSA to disseminate known LockBit 3.0 ransomware IOCs and TTPs identified through FBI investigations as recently as March 2023.
The LockBit 3.0 ransomware operations function as a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model and is a continuation of previous versions of the ransomware, LockBit 2.0, and LockBit. Since January 2020, LockBit has functioned as an affiliate-based ransomware variant; affiliates deploying the LockBit RaaS use many varying TTPs and attack a wide range of businesses and critical infrastructure organizations, which can make effective computer network defense and mitigation challenging.
The FBI, CISA, and the MS-ISAC encourage organizations to implement the recommendations in the mitigations section of this CSA to reduce the likelihood and impact of ransomware incidents.
Download the PDF version of this report:
TECHNICAL DETAILS
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 12. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section for a table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise.
CAPABILITIES
LockBit 3.0, also known as “LockBit Black,” is more modular and evasive than its previous versions and shares similarities with Blackmatter and Blackcat ransomware.
LockBit 3.0 is configured upon compilation with many different options that determine the behavior of the ransomware. Upon the actual execution of the ransomware within a victim environment, various arguments can be supplied to further modify the behavior of the ransomware. For example, LockBit 3.0 accepts additional arguments for specific operations in lateral movement and rebooting into Safe Mode (see LockBit Command Line parameters under Indicators of Compromise). If a LockBit affiliate does not have access to passwordless LockBit 3.0 ransomware, then a password argument is mandatory during the execution of the ransomware. LockBit 3.0 affiliates failing to enter the correct password will be unable to execute the ransomware [T1480.001]. The password is a cryptographic key which decodes the LockBit 3.0 executable. By protecting the code in such a manner, LockBit 3.0 hinders malware detection and analysis with the code being unexecutable and unreadable in its encrypted form. Signature-based detections may fail to detect the LockBit 3.0 executable as the executable’s encrypted potion will vary based on the cryptographic key used for encryption while also generating a unique hash. When provided the correct password, LockBit 3.0 will decrypt the main component, continue to decrypt or decompress its code, and execute the ransomware.
LockBit 3.0 will only infect machines that do not have language settings matching a defined exclusion list. However, whether a system language is checked at runtime is determined by a configuration flag originally set at compilation time. Languages on the exclusion list include, but are not limited to, Romanian (Moldova), Arabic (Syria), and Tatar (Russia). If a language from the exclusion list is detected [T1614.001], LockBit 3.0 will stop execution without infecting the system.
INITIAL ACCESS
Affiliates deploying LockBit 3.0 ransomware gain initial access to victim networks via remote desktop protocol (RDP) exploitation [T1133], drive-by compromise [T1189], phishing campaigns [T1566], abuse of valid accounts [T1078], and exploitation of public-facing applications [T1190].
EXECUTION AND INFECTION PROCESS
During the malware routine, if privileges are not sufficient, LockBit 3.0 attempts to escalate to the required privileges [TA0004]. LockBit 3.0 performs functions such as:
- Enumerating system information such as hostname, host configuration, domain information, local drive configuration, remote shares, and mounted external storage devices [T1082]
- Terminating processes and services [T1489]
- Launching commands [TA0002]
- Enabling automatic logon for persistence and privilege escalation [T1547]
- Deleting log files, files in the recycle bin folder, and shadow copies residing on disk [T1485], [T1490]
LockBit 3.0 attempts to spread across a victim network by using a preconfigured list of credentials hardcoded at compilation time or a compromised local account with elevated privileges [T1078]. When compiled, LockBit 3.0 may also enable options for spreading via Group Policy Objects and PsExec using the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol. LockBit 3.0 attempts to encrypt [T1486] data saved to any local or remote device, but skips files associated with core system functions.
After files are encrypted, LockBit 3.0 drops a ransom note with the new filename .README.txt and changes the host’s wallpaper and icons to LockBit 3.0 branding [T1491.001]. If needed, LockBit 3.0 will send encrypted host and bot information to a command and control (C2) server [T1027].
Once completed, LockBit 3.0 may delete itself from the disk [T1070.004] as well as any Group Policy updates that were made, depending on which options were set at compilation time.
EXFILTRATION
LockBit 3.0 affiliates use Stealbit, a custom exfiltration tool used previously with LockBit 2.0 [TA0010]; rclone, an open-source command line cloud storage manager [T1567.002]; and publicly available file sharing services, such as MEGA [T1567.002], to exfiltrate sensitive company data files prior to encryption. While rclone and many publicly available file sharing services are primarily used for legitimate purposes, they can also be used by threat actors to aid in system compromise, network exploration, or data exfiltration. LockBit 3.0 affiliates often use other publicly available file sharing services to exfiltrate data as well [T1567] (see Table 1).
File Sharing Site |
---|
https://www.premiumize[.]com |
https://anonfiles[.]com |
https://www.sendspace[.]com |
https://fex[.]net |
https://transfer[.]sh |
https://send.exploit[.]in |
LEVERAGING FREEWARE AND OPEN-SOURCE TOOLS
LockBit affiliates have been observed using various freeware and open-source tools during their intrusions. These tools are used for a range of activities such as network reconnaissance, remote access and tunneling, credential dumping, and file exfiltration. Use of PowerShell and Batch scripts
are observed across most intrusions, which focus on system discovery, reconnaissance, password/credential hunting, and privilege escalation. Artifacts of professional penetration-testing tools such as Metasploit and Cobalt Strike have also been observed. See Table 2 for a list of legitimate freeware and open-source tools LockBit affiliates have repurposed for ransomware operations:
Tool | Description | MITRE ATT&CK ID |
---|---|---|
Chocolatey | Command-line package manager for Windows. | T1072 |
FileZilla | Cross-platform File Transfer Protocol (FTP) application. | T1071.002 |
Impacket | Collection of Python classes for working with network protocols. | S0357 |
MEGA Ltd MegaSync | Cloud-based synchronization tool. | T1567.002 |
Microsoft Sysinternals ProcDump | Generates crash dumps. Commonly used to dump the contents of Local Security Authority Subsystem Service, LSASS.exe. | T1003.001 |
Microsoft Sysinternals PsExec | Execute a command-line process on a remote machine. | S0029 |
Mimikatz | Extracts credentials from system. | S0002 |
Ngrok | Legitimate remote-access tool abused to bypass victim network protections. | S0508 |
PuTTY Link (Plink) | Can be used to automate Secure Shell (SSH) actions on Windows. | T1572 |
Rclone | Command-line program to manage cloud storage files | S1040 |
SoftPerfect Network Scanner | Performs network scans. | T1046 |
Splashtop | Remote-desktop software. | T1021.001 |
WinSCP | SSH File Transfer Protocol client for Windows. | T1048 |
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
The IOCs and malware characteristics outlined below were derived from field analysis. The following samples are current as of March 2023.
LockBit 3.0 Black Icon

LockBit 3.0 Wallpaper

LockBit Command Line Parameters
LockBit Parameters | Description |
---|---|
-del |
Self-delete. |
-gdel |
Remove LockBit 3.0 group policy changes. |
-gspd |
Spread laterally via group policy. |
-pass (32 character value) |
(Required) Password used to launch LockBit 3.0. |
-path (File or path) |
Only encrypts provided file or folder. |
-psex |
Spread laterally via admin shares. |
-safe |
Reboot host into Safe Mode. |
-wall |
Sets LockBit 3.0 Wallpaper and prints out LockBit 3.0 ransom note. |
Mutual Exclusion Object (Mutex) Created
When executed, LockBit 3.0 will create the mutex, Global,
and check to see if this mutex has already been created to avoid running more than one instance of the ransomware.
UAC Bypass via Elevated COM Interface
LockBit 3.0 is capable of bypassing User Account Control (UAC) to execute code with elevated privileges via elevated Component Object Model (COM) Interface. C:WindowsSystem32dllhost.exe is spawned with high integrity with the command line GUID 3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC.
For example, %SYSTEM32%dllhost.exe/Processid:{3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063- A120244FBEC7}.
Volume Shadow Copy Deletion
LockBit 3.0 uses Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to identify and delete Volume Shadow Copies. LockBit 3.0 uses select * from Win32_ShadowCopy to query for Volume Shadow copies, Win32_ShadowCopy.ID to obtain the ID of the shadow copy, and DeleteInstance to delete any shadow copies.
Registry Artifacts
LockBit 3.0 Icon
Registry Key | Value | Data |
---|---|---|
HKCR. |
(Default) |
|
HKCRDefaultIcon |
(Default) |
C:ProgramData.ico |
LockBit 3.0 Wallpaper
Registry Key | Value | Data |
---|---|---|
HKCUControl PanelDesktopWallPaper |
(Default) |
C:ProgramData.bmp |
Disable Privacy Settings Experience
Registry Key | Value | Data |
---|---|---|
SOFTWAREPoliciesMicrosoftWin dowsOOBE |
DisablePrivacyE xperience |
0 |
Enable Automatic Logon
Registry Key | Value | Data |
---|---|---|
SOFTWAREMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionWinlogon |
AutoAdminLogon |
1 |
|
DefaultUserName |
|
|
DefaultDomainNa me |
|
|
DefaultPassword |
|
Disable and Clear Windows Event Logs
Registry Key | Value | Data |
---|---|---|
HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindows CurrentVersionWINEVTChannels * |
Enabled |
0 |
HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindows CurrentVersionWINEVTChannels * ChannelAccess |
ChannelAccess |
AO:BAG:SYD:(A;;0x1;; ;SY)(A;;0x5;;;BA)(A; ;0x1;;;LA) |
Ransom Locations
LockBit 3.0 File Path Locations |
---|
ADMIN$Temp.exe |
%SystemRoot%Temp.exe |
sysvolscripts.exe (Domain Controller) |
Safe Mode Launch Commands
LockBit 3.0 has a Safe Mode feature to circumvent endpoint antivirus and detection. Depending upon the host operating system, the following command is launched to reboot the system to Safe Mode with Networking:
Operating System | Safe Mode with Networking command |
---|---|
Vista and newer |
bcdedit /set {current} safeboot network |
Pre-Vista |
bootcfg /raw /a /safeboot:network /id 1 |
Operating System | Disable Safe mode reboot |
---|---|
Vista and newer |
bcdedit /deletevalue {current} safeboot |
Pre-Vista |
bootcfg /raw /fastdetect /id 1 |
Group Policy Artifacts
The following are Group Policy Extensible Markup Language (XML) files identified after a LockBit 3.0 infection:
NetworkShares.xml |
---|
<NetShare clsid="{2888C5E7-94FC-4739-90AA-2C1536D68BC0}" |
Services.xml stops and disables services on the Active Directory (AD) hosts.
Services.xml |
---|
<NTService clsid="{AB6F0B67-341F-4e51-92F9-005FBFBA1A43}"
<NTService clsid="{AB6F0B67-341F-4e51-92F9-005FBFBA1A43}"
<NTService clsid="{AB6F0B67-341F-4e51-92F9-005FBFBA1A43}"
<NTService clsid="{AB6F0B67-341F-4e51-92F9-005FBFBA1A43}"
<NTService clsid="{AB6F0B67-341F-4e51-92F9-005FBFBA1A43}"
<NTService clsid="{AB6F0B67-341F-4e51-92F9-005FBFBA1A43}"
<NTService clsid="{AB6F0B67-341F-4e51-92F9-005FBFBA1A43}"
<NTService clsid="{AB6F0B67-341F-4e51-92F9-005FBFBA1A43}"
<NTService clsid="{AB6F0B67-341F-4e51-92F9-005FBFBA1A43}"
<NTService clsid="{AB6F0B67-341F-4e51-92F9-005FBFBA1A43}"
<NTService clsid="{AB6F0B67-341F-4e51-92F9-005FBFBA1A43}"
<NTService clsid="{AB6F0B67-341F-4e51-92F9-005FBFBA1A43}"
<NTService clsid="{AB6F0B67-341F-4e51-92F9-005FBFBA1A43}"
<NTService clsid="{AB6F0B67-341F-4e51-92F9-005FBFBA1A43}"
<NTService clsid="{AB6F0B67-341F-4e51-92F9-005FBFBA1A43}"
<NTService clsid="{AB6F0B67-341F-4e51-92F9-005FBFBA1A43}"
<NTService clsid="{AB6F0B67-341F-4e51-92F9-005FBFBA1A43}"
|
Registry.pol
The following registry configuration changes values for the Group Policy refresh time, disable SmartScreen, and disable Windows Defender.
Registry Key | Registry Value | Value type | Data |
---|---|---|---|
HKLMSOFTWAREPoliciesMicrosoftWindow sSystem |
GroupPolicyRefresh TimeDC |
REG_D WORD |
1 |
HKLMSOFTWAREPoliciesMicrosoftWindow sSystem |
GroupPolicyRefresh TimeOffsetDC |
REG_D WORD |
1 |
HKLMSOFTWAREPoliciesMicrosoftWindow sSystem |
GroupPolicyRefresh Time |
REG_D WORD |
1 |
HKLMSOFTWAREPoliciesMicrosoftWindow sSystem |
GroupPolicyRefresh TimeOffset |
REG_D WORD |
1 |
HKLMSOFTWAREPoliciesMicrosoftWindow sSystem |
EnableSmartScreen |
REG_D WORD |
0 |
HKLMSOFTWAREPoliciesMicrosoftWindow sSystem |
**del.ShellSmartSc reenLevel |
REG_S Z |
|
HKLMSOFTWAREPoliciesMicrosoftWindow s Defender |
DisableAntiSpyware |
REG_D WORD |
1 |
HKLMSOFTWAREPoliciesMicrosoftWindow s Defender |
DisableRoutinelyTa kingAction |
REG_D WORD |
1 |
HKLMSOFTWAREPoliciesMicrosoftWindow s DefenderReal-Time Protection |
DisableRealtimeMon itoring |
REG_D WORD |
1 |
HKLMSOFTWAREPoliciesMicrosoftWindow s DefenderReal-Time Protection |
DisableBehaviorMon itoring |
REG_D WORD |
1 |
HKLMSOFTWAREPoliciesMicrosoftWindow s DefenderSpynet |
SubmitSamplesConse nt |
REG_D WORD |
2 |
HKLMSOFTWAREPoliciesMicrosoftWindow s DefenderSpynet |
SpynetReporting |
REG_D WORD |
0 |
HKLMSOFTWAREPoliciesMicrosoftWindow sFirewallDomainProfile |
EnableFirewall |
REG_D WORD |
0 |
HKLMSOFTWAREPoliciesMicrosoftWindow sFirewallStandardProfile |
EnableFirewall |
REG_D WORD |
0 |
Force GPUpdate
Once new group policies are added, a PowerShell command using Group Policy update (GPUpdate) applies the new group policy changes to all computers on the AD domain.
Force GPUpdate Powershell Command |
---|
powershell Get-ADComputer -filter * -Searchbase ‘%s’ | Foreach-Object { Invoke- GPUpdate -computer $_.name -force -RandomDelayInMinutes 0} |
Services Killed
vss | sql | svc$ |
memtas | mepocs | msexchange |
sophos | veeam | backup |
GxVss | GxBlr | GxFWD |
GxCVD | GxCIMgr |
Processes Killed
sql | oracle | ocssd |
dbsnmp | synctime | agntsvc |
isqlplussvc | xfssvccon | mydesktopservice |
ocautoupds | encsvc | firefox |
tbirdconfig | mydesktopqos | ocomm |
dbeng50 | sqbcoreservice | excel |
infopath | msaccess | mspu |
onenote | outlook | powerpnt |
steam | thebat | thunderbird |
visio | winword | wordpad |
notepad |
LockBit 3.0 Ransom Note
~~~ LockBit 3.0 the world’s fastest and most stable ransomware from 2019~~~
>>>>> Your data is stolen and encrypted.
If you don’t pay the ransom, the data will be published on our TOR darknet sites. Keep in mind that once your data appears on our leak site, it could be bought by your competitors at any second, so don’t hesitate for a long time. The sooner you pay the ransom, the sooner your company will be safe.
Network Connections
If configured, Lockbit 3.0 will send two HTTP POST requests to one of the C2servers. Information about the victim host and bot are encrypted with an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) key and encoded in Base64.
Example of HTTP POST request POST /?7F6Da=u5a0TdP0&Aojq=&NtN1W=OuoaovMvrVJSmPNaA5&fckp9=FCYyT6b7kdyeEXywS8I8 HTTP/1.1 Accept: */* Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br Content-Type: text/plain User-Agent: Safari/537.36 Host: Connection: Keep-Alive LIWy=RJ51lB5GM&a4OuN=&LoSyE3=8SZ1hdlhzld4&DHnd99T=rTx9xGlInO6X0zWW&2D6=Bokz&T1guL=MtRZsFCRMKyBmfmqI& 6SF3g=JPDt9lfJIQ&wQadZP= Xni=AboZOXwUw&2rQnM4=94L&0b=ZfKv7c&NO1d=M2kJlyus&AgbDTb=xwSpba&8sr=EndL4n0HVZjxPR& m4ZhTTH=sBVnPY&xZDiygN=cU1pAwKEztU&=5q55aFIAfTVQWTEm&4sXwVWcyhy=l68FrIdBESIvfCkvYl Example of information found in encrypted data { "bot_version":"X", "bot_id":"X", "bot_company":"X", "host_hostname":"X", "host_user":"X", "host_os":"X", "host_domain":"X", "host_arch":"X", "host_lang":"X", "disks_info":[ { "disk_name":"X", "disk_size":"XXXX", "free_size":"XXXXX" } |
User Agent Strings
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1) |
AppleWebKit/587.38 (KHTML, like Gecko) |
Chrome/91.0.4472.77 |
Safari/537.36 | Edge/91.0.864.37 | Firefox/89.0 |
Gecko/20100101 |
MITRE ATT&CK TECHNIQUES
See Table 3 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory. For assistance with mapping to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA’s Decider Tool and Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Guide.
Initial Access | ||
---|---|---|
Technique Title | ID | Use |
Valid Accounts | T1078 | LockBit 3.0 actors obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining initial access. |
Exploit External Remote Services | T1133 | LockBit 3.0 actors exploit RDP to gain access to victim networks. |
Drive-by Compromise | T1189 | LockBit 3.0 actors gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. |
Exploit Public-Facing Application | T1190 | LockBit 3.0 actors exploit vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems to gain access to victims’ systems. |
Phishing | T1566 | LockBit 3.0 actors use phishing and spearphishing to gain access to victims’ networks. |
Execution | ||
Technique Title | ID | Use |
Execution | TA0002 | LockBit 3.0 launches commands during its execution. |
Software Deployment Tools | T1072 | LockBit 3.0 uses Chocolatey, a command- line package manager for Windows. |
Persistence | ||
Technique Title | ID | Use |
Valid Accounts | T1078 | LockBit 3.0 uses a compromised user account to maintain persistence on the target network. |
Boot or Logo Autostart Execution | T1547 | LockBit 3.0 enables automatic logon for persistence. |
Privilege Escalation | ||
Technique Title | ID | Use |
Privilege Escalation | TA0004 | Lockbit 3.0 will attempt to escalate to the required privileges if current account privileges are insufficient. |
Boot or Logo Autostart Execution | T1547 | LockBit 3.0 enables automatic logon for privilege escalation. |
Defense Evasion | ||
Technique Title | ID | Use |
Obfuscated Files or Information | T1027 | LockBit 3.0 will send encrypted host and bot information to its C2 servers. |
Indicator Removal: File Deletion | T1070.004 | LockBit 3.0 will delete itself from the disk. |
Execution Guardrails: Environmental Keying | T1480.001 | LockBit 3.0 will only decrypt the main component or continue to decrypt and/or decompress data if the correct password is entered. |
Credential Access | ||
Technique Title | ID | Use |
OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory | T1003.001 | LockBit 3.0 uses Microsoft Sysinternals ProDump to dump the contents of LSASS.exe. |
Discovery | ||
Technique Title | ID | Use |
Network Service Discovery | T1046 | LockBit 3.0 uses SoftPerfect Network Scanner to scan target networks. |
System Information Discovery | T1082 | LockBit 3.0 will enumerate system information to include hostname, host configuration, domain information, local drive configuration, remote shares, and mounted external storage devices. |
System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery | T1614.001 | LockBit 3.0 will not infect machines with language settings that match a defined exclusion list. |
Lateral Movement | ||
Technique Title | ID | Use |
Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol | T1021.001 | LockBit 3.0 uses Splashtop remote- desktop software to facilitate lateral movement. |
Command and Control | ||
Technique Title | ID | Use |
Application Layer Protocol: File Transfer Protocols | T1071.002 | LockBit 3.0 uses FileZilla for C2. |
Protocol Tunnel | T1572 | LockBit 3.0 uses Plink to automate SSH actions on Windows. |
Exfiltration | ||
Technique Title | ID | Use |
Exfiltration | TA0010 | LockBit 3.0 uses Stealbit, a custom exfiltration tool first used with LockBit 2.0, to steal data from a target network. |
Exfiltration Over Web Service | T1567 | LockBit 3.0 uses publicly available file sharing services to exfiltrate a target’s data. |
Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage | T1567.002 | LockBit 3.0 actors use (1) rclone, an open source command line cloud storage manager to exfiltrate and (2) MEGA, a publicly available file sharing service for data exfiltration. |
Impact | ||
Technique Title | ID | Use |
Data Destruction | T1485 | LockBit 3.0 deletes log files and empties the recycle bin. |
Data Encrypted for Impact | T1486 | LockBit 3.0 encrypts data on target systems to interrupt availability to system and network resources. |
Service Stop | T1489 | LockBit 3.0 terminates processes and services. |
Inhibit System Recovery | T1490 | LockBit 3.0 deletes volume shadow copies residing on disk. |
Defacement: Internal Defacement | T1491.001 | LockBit 3.0 changes the host system’s wallpaper and icons to the LockBit 3.0 wallpaper and icons, respectively. |
MITIGATIONS
The FBI, CISA, and the MS-ISAC recommend organizations implement the mitigations below to improve your organization’s cybersecurity posture on the basis of LockBit 3.0’s activity. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful TTPs. Visit CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.
- Implement a recovery plan to maintain and retain multiple copies of sensitive or proprietary data and servers [CPG 7.3] in a physically separate, segmented, and secure location (e.g., hard drive, storage device, the cloud).
- Require all accounts with password logins (e.g., service account, admin accounts, and domain admin accounts) to comply with National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) standards for developing and managing password policies [CPG 3.4].
- Use longer passwords consisting of at least 8 characters and no more than 64 characters in length [CPG 1.4]
- Store passwords in hashed format using industry-recognized password managers
- Add password user “salts” to shared login credentials
- Avoid reusing passwords
- Implement multiple failed login attempt account lockouts [CPG 1.1]
- Disable password “hints”
- Refrain from requiring password changes more frequently than once per year. Note: NIST guidance suggests favoring longer passwords instead of requiring regular and frequent password resets. Frequent password resets are more likely to result in users developing password “patterns” cyber criminals can easily decipher.
- Require administrator credentials to install software
- Require phishing-resistant multifactor authentication [CPG 1.3] for all services to the extent possible, particularly for webmail, virtual private networks, and accounts that access critical systems.
- Keep all operating systems, software, and firmware up to date. Timely patching is one of the most efficient and cost-effective steps an organization can take to minimize its exposure to cybersecurity threats.
- Segment networks [CPG 8.1] to prevent the spread of ransomware. Network segmentation can help prevent the spread of ransomware by controlling traffic flows between—and access to—various subnetworks and by restricting adversary lateral movement.
- Identify, detect, and investigate abnormal activity and potential traversal of the indicated ransomware with a networking monitoring tool. To aid in detecting the ransomware, implement a tool that logs and reports all network traffic, including lateral movement activity on a network [CPG 5.1]. Endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools are particularly useful for detecting lateral connections as they have insight into common and uncommon network connections for each host.
- Install, regularly update, and enable real time detection for antivirus software on all hosts.
- Review domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories for new and/or unrecognized accounts.
- Audit user accounts with administrative privileges and configure access controls according to the principle of least privilege [CPG 1.5].
- Disable unused ports.
- Consider adding an email banner to emails [CPG 8.3] received from outside your organization.
- Disable hyperlinks in received emails.
- Implement time-based access for accounts set at the admin level and higher. For example, the Just-in-Time (JIT) access method provisions privileged access when needed and can support enforcement of the principle of least privilege (as well as the Zero Trust model). This is a process where a network-wide policy is set in place to automatically disable admin accounts at the Active Directory level when the account is not in direct need. Individual users may submit their requests through an automated process that grants them access to a specified system for a set timeframe when they need to support the completion of a certain task.
- Disable command-line and scripting activities and permissions. Privilege escalation and lateral movement often depend on software utilities running from the command line. If threat actors are not able to run these tools, they will have difficulty escalating privileges and/or moving laterally.
- Maintain offline backups of data, and regularly maintain backup and restoration [CPG 7.3]. By instituting this practice, the organization ensures they will not be severely interrupted, and/or only have irretrievable data.
- Ensure all backup data is encrypted, immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted), and covers the entire organization’s data infrastructure [CPG 3.3].
VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS
In addition to applying mitigations, the FBI, CISA, and the MS-ISAC recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. The FBI, CISA, and the MS-ISAC authoring agencies recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.
To get started:
- Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Table 3).
- Align your security technologies against the technique.
- Test your technologies against the technique.
- Analyze your detection and prevention technologies performance.
- Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
- Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.
The FBI, CISA, and the MS-ISAC recommend continually testing your security program at scale and in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.
RESOURCES
- Stopransomware.gov is a whole-of-government approach that gives one central location for ransomware resources and alerts.
- Resource to mitigate a ransomware attack: CISA-Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Joint Ransomware Guide.
- No-cost cyber hygiene services: Cyber Hygiene Services and Ransomware Readiness Assessment.
REPORTING
The FBI is seeking any information that can be legally shared, including:
- Boundary logs showing communication to and from foreign IP addresses
- Sample ransom note
- Communications with LockBit 3.0 actors
- Bitcoin wallet information
- Decryptor files
- Benign sample of an encrypted file
The FBI, CISA, and MS-ISAC do not encourage paying ransom, as payment does not guarantee victim files will be recovered. Furthermore, payment may also embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. Regardless of whether you or your organization have decided to pay the ransom, the FBI and CISA urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents to a local FBI Field Office or CISA at report@cisa.gov. State, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) government entities can also report to the MS-ISAC (SOC@cisecurity.org or 866-787-4722).
DISCLAIMER
The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. The FBI, CISA, and the MS-ISAC do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the FBI, CISA, or the MS-ISAC.
Infocon: green
IPFS phishing and the need for correctly set HTTP security headers, (Wed, Mar 15th)
In the last couple of weeks, I’ve noticed a small spike in the number of phishing messages that carried links to fake HTML login pages hosted on the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) – an interesting web-based decentralized/peer-to-peer data storage system. Unfortunately, pretty much any type of internet-connected data storage solution is used to host malicious content by threat actors these days, and the IPFS is no exception. In fact, it seems to have been used to host phishing pages since at least the beginning of 2022[1].
Microsoft March 2023 Patch Tuesday, (Tue, Mar 14th)
Threat Actors Exploit Progress Telerik Vulnerability in U.S. Government IIS Server
SUMMARY
From November 2022 through early January 2023, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and authoring organizations identified the presence of indicators of compromise (IOCs) at a federal civilian executive branch (FCEB) agency. Analysts determined that multiple cyber threat actors, including an APT actor, were able to exploit a .NET deserialization vulnerability (CVE-2019-18935) in Progress Telerik user interface (UI) for ASP.NET AJAX, located in the agency’s Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) web server. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability allows for remote code execution. According to Progress Software, Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX builds before R1 2020 (2020.1.114) are vulnerable to this exploit.[1]
Actions to take today to mitigate malicious cyber activity:
- Implement a patch management solution to ensure compliance with the latest security patches.
- Validate output from patch management and vulnerability scanning against running services to check for discrepancies and account for all services.
- Limit service accounts to the minimum permissions necessary to run services.
CISA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) to provide IT infrastructure defenders with tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), IOCs, and methods to detect and protect against similar exploitation.
Download the PDF version of this report:
For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see
TECHNICAL DETAILS
Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 12. See the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques section for a table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques with corresponding detection and mitigation recommendations.
Overview
CISA and authoring organizations assess that, beginning as late as November 2022, threat actors successfully exploited a .NET deserialization vulnerability (CVE-2019-18935) in an instance of Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX Q2 2013 SP1 (version 2013.2.717) running on an FCEB agency’s Microsoft IIS server. This exploit, which results in interactive access with the web server, enabled the threat actors to successfully execute remote code on the vulnerable web server. Though the agency’s vulnerability scanner had the appropriate plugin for CVE-2019-18935, it failed to detect the vulnerability due to the Telerik UI software being installed in a file path it does not typically scan. This may be the case for many software installations, as file paths widely vary depending on the organization and installation method.
In addition to CVE-2019-18935, this version (2013.2.717) of Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX contains the following known vulnerabilities: CVE-2017-11357, CVE-2017-11317, and CVE-2017-9248. Analysis suggests that cyber threat actors exploited CVE-2019-18935 in conjunction with either CVE-2017-11357 or CVE-2017-11317. Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) Advisory 2020-004 assesses that exploitation of CVE-2019-18935 is only possible with knowledge of Telerik RadAsyncUpload encryption keys.[2] Threat actors can obtain these keys through either prior knowledge or exploitation of vulnerabilities—CVE-2017-11357 or CVE-2017-11317—present in older, unpatched versions of Telerik released between 2007 and 2017. Forensic evidence is not available to definitively confirm exploitation of either CVE-2017-11357 or CVE-2017-11317.
Threat Actor Activity
CISA and authoring organizations observed multiple cyber threat actors, including an APT actor—hereafter referred to as Threat Actor 1 (TA1)—and known cybercriminal actor XE Group—hereafter referred to as Threat Actor 2 (TA2)—conducting reconnaissance and scanning activities [T1595.002] that correlate to the successful exploitation of CVE-2019-18935 in the agency’s IIS server running Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX [T1190].
When exploiting the vulnerability, the threat actors uploaded malicious dynamic-link library (DLL) files (some masqueraded as portable network graphics [PNG] files) [T1105] to the C:WindowsTemp
directory. The malicious files were then executed from the C:WindowsTemp
directory via the w3wp.exe
process—a legitimate process that runs on IIS servers. This process is routine for handling requests sent to web servers and delivering content. The review of antivirus logs identified that some DLL files were created [T1055.001] and detected as early as August 2021.
CISA and authoring organizations confirmed that some malicious files dropped on the IIS server are consistent with a previously reported file naming convention that threat actors commonly use when exploiting CVE-2019-18935.[3] The threat actors name the files in the Unix Epoch time format and use the date and time as recorded on the target system. The file naming convention follows the pattern [10 digits].[7 digits].dll
(e.g., a file created on October 31, 2022, could be 1667203023.5321205.dll
).
The names of some of the PNG files were misleading. For example, file 1596835329.5015914.png
, which decodes to August 7, 2020, 21:22:09 UTC, first appeared on October 13, 2022, but the file system shows a creation date of August 7, 2020. The uncorrelated Unix Epoch time format may indicate that the threat actors used the timestomping [T1070.006] technique. This file naming convention is a primary IOC used by the threat actors.
In many cases, malicious artifacts were not available for analysis because the threat actors’ malware—that looks for and removes files with the .dll file extension—removed files [T1070.004] from the C:WindowsTemp
directory. Through full packet data capture analysis and reverse engineering of malicious DLL files, no indications of additional malicious activity or sub-processes were found executed by the w3wp.exe
process. CISA observed error messages being sent to the threat actors’ command and control (C2) server when permission restraints prevented the service account from executing the malicious DLLs and writing new files.
Network activity analysis was consistent with the artifacts provided for review. Analysts did not observe evidence of privilege escalation or lateral movement.
Threat Actor 1
CISA and authoring organizations observed TA1 exploiting CVE-2019-18935 for system enumeration beginning in August 2022. The vulnerability allows a threat actor to upload malicious DLLs on a target system and execute them by abusing a legitimate process, e.g., the w3wp.exe
process. In this instance, TA1 was able to upload malicious DLL files to the C:WindowsTemp directory and then achieve remote code execution, executing the DLL files via the w3wp.exe process.
At least nine DLL files used for discovery [TA0007], C2 [TA0011], and defense evasion [TA0005]. All of the analyzed samples have network parameters, including host name, domain name, Domain Name System (DNS) server Internet Protocol (IP) address and machine name, Network Basic Input/Output System (NetBIOS) ID, adapter information, IP address, subnet, gateway IP, and Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) server [T1016]. All analyzed samples communicate this collected data to a C2 server at IP address 137.184.130[.]162
or 45.77.212[.]12
. The C2 traffic to these IP addresses uses a non-application layer protocol [T1095] by leveraging Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) clear text (i.e., unencrypted) over port 443. Analysis also identified that:
- Some of the analyzed samples can load additional libraries; enumerate the system, processes, files, directories [T1083]; and write files.
- Other analyzed samples can delete DLL files ending with the
.dll
extension in theC:WindowsTemp
directory on the server. TA1 may use this capability to hide additional malicious activity on the network.
CISA, in coordination with the authoring organizations, identified and observed the following threat actor IPs and timestamps associated with this activity:
IP Address |
First Identified |
Last Identified |
137.184.130[.]162 |
09/26/2022 |
10/08/2022 |
45.77.212[.]12 |
10/07/2022 |
11/25/2022 |
104.225.129[.]102 |
10/10/2022 |
11/16/2022 |
149.28.85[.]24 |
10/12/2022 |
10/17/2022 |
185.186.245[.]72 |
10/18/2022 |
10/18/2022 |
193.8.172[.]113 |
09/25/2022 |
09/25/2022 |
193.8.172[.]13 |
09/25/2022 |
10/17/2022 |
216.120.201[.]12 |
10/13/2022 |
11/10/2022 |
5.34.178[.]246 |
09/25/2022 |
09/25/2022 |
79.133.124[.]242 |
09/25/2022 |
09/25/2022 |
92.38.169[.]193 |
09/27/2022 |
10/08/2022 |
92.38.176[.]109 |
09/12/2022 |
09/25/2022 |
92.38.176[.]130 |
09/25/2022 |
10/07/2022 |
Threat Actor 2
TA2—identified as likely the cybercriminal actor XE Group—often includes xe[word]
nomenclature in original filenames and registered domains. Volexity lists this naming convention and other observed TTPs as common for this threat actor group.[4]
As early as August 2021, CISA and authoring organizations observed TA2 delivering malicious PNG files that, following analysis, were masqueraded DLL files to avoid detection [T1036.005]. Similar to TA1, TA2 exploited CVE-2019-18935 and was able to upload at least three unique DLL files into the C:WindowsTemp
directory that TA2 executed via the w3wp.exe
process. These DLL files drop and execute reverse (remote) shell utilities for unencrypted communication with C2 IP addresses associated with the malicious domains listed in Table 2. Note: At the time of analysis, the domains resolved to the listed IP addresses.
IP Address |
Resolving Domains |
---|---|
184.168.104[.]171 |
xework[.]com xegroups[.]com hivnd[.]com |
144.96.103[.]245 |
xework[.]com |
Analysis of DLL files determined the files listed in Table 3 were dropped, decoded, and attempted to connect to the respective malicious domains. Embedded payloads dropped by the DLL files were observed using the command line utility certutil[.]exe
and writing new files as xesvrs[.]exe
to invoke reverse shell utilities execution.
Filename |
Description |
---|---|
XEReverseShell.exe |
DLL files (masqueraded as PNG files) located in the When executed, the reverse shell utility attempts to connect to Note: It is likely the threat actors changed the file extension from .dll to .png to avoid detection. |
Multi-OS_ReverseShell.exe |
Reverse shell utility decoded from the base64 encoded file When executed, it will attempt to connect to |
SortVistaCompat |
Base64 encoded payload dropped from |
When the TA2 malware is executed a DLL file drops an executable (XEReverseShell.exe
) that attempts to pull a C2 IP address and port number from xework[.]com
or xegroups[.]com
.
- If no port or IP address is found, the program will exit.
- If a port and IP address are found, the program will establish a listener and wait for further commands.
If communication is established between the TA2 malware and the C2:
- The malware will identify the operating system (Windows or Linux) and create the appropriate shell (cmd or bash), sending system information back to the C2.
- The C2 server may send the command
xesetshell
, causing the malware to connect to the server and download a file called small.txt—a base64-encoded webshell that the malware decodes and places in theC:WindowsTemp
directory. - The C2 server may send the command
xequit
, causing the malware to sleep for a period of time determined by the threat actors.
The two files xesmartshell.tmp
and SortVistaCompat
have the capability to drop an Active Server Pages (ASPX) webshell—a base64 encoded text file small.txt
decoded [T1140] as small.aspx
[T1505.003]—to enumerate drives; to send, receive, and delete files; and to execute incoming commands. The webshell contains an interface for easily browsing files, directories, or drives on the system, and allows the user to upload or download files to any directory. No webshells were observed to be dropped on the target system, likely due to the abused service account having restrictive write permissions.
For more information on the DLLs, binaries, and webshell, see CISA MAR-10413062-1.v1 Telerik Vulnerability in U.S. Government IIS Server.
MITRE ATT&CK TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES
See Table 4 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory. For assistance with mapping to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA’s Decider Tool and Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Guide.
Reconnaissance |
||
---|---|---|
ID |
Use |
|
Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning |
Actors were observed conducting active scanning activity for vulnerable devices and specific ports. |
|
Initial Access |
||
Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
Exploit Public-Facing Application |
Actors exploited a known vulnerability in the Microsoft IIS server. |
|
Persistence |
||
Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
Server Software Component: Web Shell |
TA2’s malware dropped an ASPX webshell to enumerate drives; send, receive, and delete files; and execute commands. |
|
Defense Evasion |
||
Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location |
Actors leveraged the legitimate |
|
Process Injection: DLL Injection |
Actors loaded newly created DLLs into a running |
|
Indicator Removal: File Deletion |
TA1’s malware deleted files with “.dll” from the |
|
Indicator Removal: Timestomp |
Actors modified file time attributes to insert misleading creation dates. |
|
Decode Files |
The base64 encoded text file |
|
Discovery |
||
Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
File and Directory Discovery |
Actors enumerated the IIS server via OS fingerprinting, executed Windows processes, and collected network information. TA1’s malware enumerates systems, processes, files, and directories. |
|
System Network Configuration Discovery |
TA1’s malware gathers network parameters, including host name, domain name, DNS servers, NetBIOS ID, adapter information, IP address, subnet, gateway IP, and DHCP server. |
|
Command and Control |
||
Technique Title |
ID |
Use |
Ingress Tool Transfer |
TA1 and TA2 uploaded malicious DLL files (some masqueraded as PNG files) to the |
|
Non-Application Layer Protocol |
Actors used a non-application layer protocol (TCP) for |
DETECTION METHODS
CISA and authoring organizations recommend that organizations review the steps listed in this section and Table 4: Identified ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise to detect similar activity on IIS servers.
Yara Rule
CISA developed the following YARA rule from the base proof-of-concept code for CVE-2019-18935.[5] Note: Authoring organizations do not guarantee all malicious DLL files (if identified) will use the same code provided in this YARA rule.
rule CISA_10424018_01 {
meta:
Author = "CISA Code & Media Analysis"
Incident = "10424018"
Date = "2023-02-07"
Last_Modified = "20230216_1500"
Actor = "n/a"
Family = "n/a"
Capabilities = "n/a"
Malware_Type = "n/a"
Tool_Type = "n/a"
Description = "Detects open-source exploit samples"
SHA256 = "n/a"
strings:
$s0 = { 3D 20 7B 20 22 63 6D 22 2C 20 22 64 2E 65 22 2C }
$s1 = { 20 22 78 22 2C 20 22 65 22 20 7D 3B }
$s2 = { 52 65 76 65 72 73 65 53 68 65 6C 6C 28 29 }
$s3 = { 54 65 6C 65 72 69 6B 20 55 49 }
$s4 = { 66 69 6C 65 6E 61 6D 65 5F 6C 6F 63 61 6C }
$s5 = { 66 69 6C 65 6E 61 6D 65 5F 72 65 6D 6F 74 65 }
$s6 = { 41 55 43 69 70 68 65 72 2E 65 6E 63 72 79 70 74 }
$s7 = { 31 32 31 66 61 65 37 38 31 36 35 62 61 33 64 34 }
$s8 = { 43 6F 6E 6E 65 63 74 53 74 61 67 69 6E 67 53 65 72 76 65 72 28 29 }
$s9 = { 53 74 61 67 69 6E 67 53 65 72 76 65 72 53 6F 63 6B 65 74 }
$s10 = { 2A 62 75 66 66 65 72 20 3D 20 28 75 6E 73 69 67 6E 65 }
$s11 = { 28 2A 29 28 29 29 62 75 66 66 65 72 3B 0A 20 20 20 20 66 75 6E 63 28 29 3B }
$s12 = { 75 70 6C 6F 61 64 28 70 61 79 6C 6F 61 64 28 54 65 6D 70 54 61 72 67 65 74 }
$s13 = { 36 32 36 31 36 66 33 37 37 35 36 66 32 66 }
condition:
($s0 and $s1 and $s2) or ($s3 and $s4 and $s5 and $s6 and $s7) or ($s8 and $s9 and $s10 and $s11) or ($s12 and $s13)
}
Log Collection, Retention, and Analysis
CISA, FBI, and MS-ISAC recommend that organizations utilize a centralized log collection and monitoring capability, as well as implement or increase logging and forensic data retention. Longer retention policies improve the availability of data for forensic analysis and aid thorough identification of incident scope.
- Centralized log collection and monitoring allows for the discovery of webshell and other exploit activity. For example, organizations should monitor for external connections made from the IIS server to unknown external IP addresses. Logging may also be available—if enabled at the router or firewall—for any outbound connections initiated with PowerShell.
- Access- and security-focused firewall (e.g., Web Application Firewall [WAF]) logs can be collected and stored for use in both detection and forensic analysis activities. Organizations should use a WAF to guard against publicly known web application vulnerabilities, in addition to guarding against common web application attacks.
Creation of Malicious DLLs
CISA, FBI, and MS-ISAC recommend that organizations use process monitoring—which provides visibility into file system and application process activity—to detect suspicious executable files running from the C:WindowsTemp
directory. Process monitoring via Windows Event Code 4688 will detect the legitimate w3wp.exe
process running suspicious DLL files and other anomalous child processes. Note: Enabling this event may inundate security event logging. Use centralized log collection to prevent log rollover, increase log retention and archiving, and/or enable command line event logging.
Forensic analysis commonly identified the threat actors taking the following steps:
- Create one of the DLL files (
C:WindowsTemp1665890187.8690152.dll
) by processw3wp.exe
PID 6484. - Load the newly created DLL into a currently running IIS process,
w3wp.exe
PID 6484. - Make a TCP connection using
w3wp.exe
PID 6484 to45.77.212[.]12
over port 443. - Invoke
C:WindowsSystem32vcruntime140.dll
(Windows C runtime library) to execute payload.
Steps 1 and 2 occur every time a malicious DLL file is created. In some cases, an ASP .NET temp file was created, but this may have indicated benign IIS server activity. Note: The Process ID (PID) used in this example is unique to this investigation and is not universal. IP address 45.77.212[.]12
correlates to TA1, but the pattern can be used as general practice to identify similar activity.
Additional Searching for IIS Servers
The following information was derived from artifact analysis and is provided to equip IT infrastructure defenders searching for similar activity on an IIS server. Several artifacts can be referenced to assist in determining if CVE-2019-18935 has been successfully exploited.
File Type: DLL
Location: – %SystemDrive%WindowsTemp
When this CVE is exploited, it uploads malicious DLL files to the C:WindowsTemp
directory. The malicious DLL file naming convention translates to the exact time the file was uploaded to the server.
The time is represented in a series of digits, known as Unix Epoch time. The files observed during this investigation contained two sets of digits separated by a period (.) before the DLL extension (.dll). Example: 1667206973.2270932.dll
Nearly all recovered files contain a series of 10 digits to the left of the period (.) and seven digits to the right. However, one file contained only five digits in the second set, which should be taken into consideration when writing regex patterns to search for the existence of these files. Example Regex: d{10}.d{1,8}.dll
These numbers can be copied and translated from digits into readable language with the month, day, year, hour, minute, and seconds displayed.
Log Type: IIS
Location: – %SystemDrive%inetpublogsLogFiles
When investigating IIS logs, specific fields were searched for and captured during the time of each connection.
If the Unix Epoch time signature has been translated from a DLL filename, specific logs can be searched based on that time. However, if the Unix Epoch time signature has not been translated, the following will still work, but may take longer for the query to run.
The four most important fields to identify this traffic are noted in the following table. These descriptions are sourced directly from Microsoft.[6]
General Name |
Field Name |
Description |
Method |
cs-method |
Requested action; for example, a GET method |
URI Stem |
cs-uri-stem |
Universal Resource Identifier (URI), or target, of the action |
URI Query |
cs-uri-query |
The query, if any, that the client was trying to perform; A URI query is necessary only for dynamic pages. |
Protocol Status |
sc-status |
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) or File Transfer Protocol (FTP) status code |
Note: Depending on how logs are collected and stored, the field names may not be an exact match; this should be taken into consideration when constructing queries.
When ingesting logs into security information and event management (SIEM), the final field names did not use a hyphen (-) but used an underscore (_).
Example: cs_method instead of cs-method
Artifacts:
Field Name |
Artifact |
---|---|
cs-method |
POST |
>cs-uri-stem |
/Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd |
cs-uri-query |
type=rau |
sc-status |
200 and 302 |
When reviewing logs, two IIS events were observed with the same timestamp each time this CVE-2019-18935 was exploited. Both events contained the same information in the cs-method, cs-uri-stem, and cs-uri-query. One event had a sc-status of 200 and the other had a sc-status of 302.
Log Type: Windows Event Application Logs
Location: -%SystemDrive%WindowsSystem32winevtlogsApplication.evtx
Kroll Artifact Parser and Extractor (KAPE), a forensic artifact collector and parser, was used to extract the Windows event logs from a backup image of the compromised IIS server. All field names refer to the labels provided via KAPE exports. The strings are of value and can be used to locate other artifacts if different tools are used. Note: The payload data in the following table has been shortened to only necessary strings to obscure and protect victim information.
EventID |
Payload |
---|---|
1309 |
3005, An unhandled exception has occurred[*redacted*]w3wp.exe[*redacted*]InvalidCastException, Unable to cast object of type ‘System.Configuration.Install.AssemblyInstaller’ to type ‘Telerik.Web.UI.IAsyncUploadConfiguration’.n at Telerik.Web.UI.AsyncUploadHandler.GetConfiguration(String rawData)n at Telerik.Web.UI.AsyncUploadHandler.EnsureSetup()n at Telerik.Web.UI.AsyncUploadHandler.ProcessRequest(HttpContext context)n at Telerik.Web.UI.HandlerRouter.ProcessHandler(String handlerKey, HttpContext context)n at Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.ProcessRequest(HttpContext context)n at System.Web.HttpApplication.CallHandlerExecutionStep.System.Web.HttpApplication.IExecutionStep.Execute()n at System.Web.HttpApplication.ExecuteStepImpl(IExecutionStep step)n at System.Web.HttpApplication.ExecuteStep(IExecutionStep step, Boolean& completedSynchronously)nn, [*redacted*]/Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd?type=rau, /Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd, [*redacted*], False, [*redacted*], 15, [*redacted*], False, at Telerik.Web.UI.AsyncUploadHandler.GetConfiguration(String rawData)n at Telerik.Web.UI.AsyncUploadHandler.EnsureSetup()n at Telerik.Web.UI.AsyncUploadHandler.ProcessRequest(HttpContext context)n at Telerik.Web.UI.HandlerRouter.ProcessHandler(String handlerKey, HttpContext context)n at Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.ProcessRequest(HttpContext context)n at System.Web.HttpApplication.CallHandlerExecutionStep.System.Web.HttpApplication.IExecutionStep.Execute()n at System.Web.HttpApplication.ExecuteStepImpl(IExecutionStep step)n at System.Web.HttpApplication.ExecuteStep(IExecutionStep step, Boolean& completedSynchronously)n”,”Binary”:””}} |
Authoring organizations recommend looking for the following key strings in the payload:
w3wp.exe
: This is the parent process that executes the code inside the malicious DLLs.System.Configuration.Install.AssemblyInstaller
: Figure 1 is from the creator’s GitHub repo,[7] where the string can be observed in the code. As presented by Bishop Fox and proven during authoring organizations’ investigation of IIS server logs, an exception does not mean that the exploit failed, but more likely that it executed successfully.[3]

If a Werfault crash report was written, Windows event application logs may contain evidence of this— even if the DLLs have been removed from the system as part of a cleanup effort by the threat actors.
EventID |
ExecutableInfo |
MapDescription |
Payload |
---|---|---|---|
1000 |
w3wp.exe |1664175639.65719.dll |c:windowssystem32inetsrvw3wp.exe |C:WindowsTemp1664175639.65719.dll |
Application Error |
{“EventData”:{“Data”:”w3wp.exe, 8.5.9600.16384, 5215df96, 1664175639.65719.dll, 0.0.0.0, 63314d94, c00000fd, 00000000000016f8, 1708, 01d8d0a5f84af443, c:windowssystem32inetsrvw3wp.exe, C:WindowsTemp1664175639.65719.dll, eed89eeb-3d68-11ed-817c-005056990ed7″,”Binary”:””}} |
1001 |
w3wp.exe |1664175639.65719.dll |C:ProgramDataMicrosoftWindowsWERReportQueueAppCrash_w3wp.exe |C:ProgramDataMicrosoftWindowsWERReportQueueAppCrash_w3wp.exe |C:ProgramDataMicrosoftWindowsWERReportQueueAppCrash_w3wp.exe |
Application Crash |
{“EventData”:{“Data”:”0, APPCRASH, Not available, 0, w3wp.exe, 8.5.9600.16384, 5215df96, 1664175639.65719.dll, 0.0.0.0, 63314d94, c00000fd, 00000000000016f8, nC:WindowsTempWERE3F6.tmp.appcompat.txtnC:WindowsTempWERE639.tmp.WERInternalMetadata.xmlnC:ProgramDataMicrosoftWindowsWERReportQueueAppCrash_w3wp.exe_d538da447d49df5862c37684118d0c25c2eff_9e3fd63b_cab_0c3ee656memory.hdmpnC:ProgramDataMicrosoftWindowsWERReportQueueAppCrash_w3wp.exe_d538da447d49df5862c37684118d0c25c2eff_9e3fd63b_cab_0c3ee656triagedump.dmp, C:ProgramDataMicrosoftWindowsWERReportQueueAppCrash_w3wp.exe_d538da447d49df5862c37684118d0c25c2eff_9e3fd63b_cab_0c3ee656, 0, eed89eeb-3d68-11ed-817c-005056990ed7, 4″,”Binary”:””}} |
The EventID field maps to Windows EventIDs for an easy filter. Users can leverage the Windows EventIDs to find malicious DLL with the Unix Epoch time-based name inside the C:WindowsTemp directory.
Depending how log analysis is performed, various filters can be determined. However, if regex is available, the example listed in Table 8 above can be reused to match the Unix Epoch timestamp convention to assist in filtering.
Additional Analysis
When evidence of malicious DLLs is found, reverse engineering will need to be conducted to fully understand what actions occur as the malicious files could do nearly anything. Leveraging Windows security event logs, as well as Windows PowerShell logs, may provide insight into what actions the DLLs are taking. CISA and authoring organizations recommend the following process:
- Convert any discovered malicious DLL timestamps to readable format.
- Export the Windows security event and PowerShell logs from the device.
- Default path: %SystemDrive%WindowsSystem32winevtlogsWindows PowerShell
- Default path: %SystemDrive%WindowsSystem32winevtlogsSecurity.evtx
- Filter based on identified timestamps.
- Search for new processes created via
w3wp.exe
in Windows security event logs (e.g., Windows EventID 4688 New Process created). - Search for new PIDs from identified events. Investigate to determine if they spawned any other processes.
- Example: CMD.EXE launching PowerShell or running other commands such as nslookup or netstat. Note: This is not an exhaustive list.
- Search for EventID 600 in PowerShell logs.
Trellix XDR Platform Searching
If Trellix XDR Platform is deployed in an environment and a standard HX triage audit is completed in a timely manner of the suspected use of CVE-2019-18935, an organization can search for file write events from known web processes. This will identify the executables written by the web server process. CISA and authoring organizations specifically recommend searching for the following field value pair:
Field |
Value Begins With |
---|---|
TextAtLowestOffset |
MZ |
MITIGATIONS
Note: These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Visit CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.
Manage Vulnerabilities and Configurations
- Upgrade all instances of Telerik UI ASP.NET AJAX to the latest version after appropriate testing. Keep all software up to date and prioritize patching to known exploited vulnerabilities (KEVs). [CPG 5.1]
- Prioritize remediation of vulnerabilities on internet-facing systems. For additional guidance, see CISA Insights – Remediate Vulnerabilities for Internet-Accessible Systems. [CPG 5.1]
- Implement a patch management solution to ensure compliance with the latest security patches. A patch management solution that inventories all software running in addition to vulnerability scanning is recommended.
- Ensure vulnerability scanners are configured to scan a comprehensive scope of devices and locations. For example, as noted in the Technical Details section, the victim organization had the appropriate plugin for CVE-2019-18935, but the vulnerability went undetected due to the Telerik UI software being installed in a file path not typically scanned. To identify unpatched instances of software vulnerabilities, organizations using vulnerability scanners should be aware that all installations may not be considered “typical” and may require full file scans of web applications.
- Note: Vulnerability scanners may have limitations in detecting vulnerabilities, such as only being able to identify Windows Installer-installed applications, which was the case with this agency’s vulnerability scanner. The Telerik UI software was installed via a continuous integration (CI) and continuous delivery (CD) pipeline rather than the Windows Installer. This highlights the importance of using a comprehensive approach for vulnerability scanning that considers all potential installation methods and file paths.
- Validate output from patch management and vulnerability scanning solutions against running services to check for discrepancies and account for all services.
Segment Networks Based on Function
- Implement network segmentation to separate network segments based on role and functionality. Proper network segmentation significantly reduces the ability for threat actor lateral movement by controlling traffic flows between—and access to—various subnetworks. (See CISA’s Layering Network Security Through Segmentation infographic and the National Security Agency’s Segment Networks and Deploy Application-Aware Defenses.) [CPG 8.1]
- Isolate similar systems and implement micro-segmentation with granular access and policy restrictions to modernize cybersecurity and adopt zero trust principles for both network perimeter and internal devices. Logical and physical segmentation are critical to limiting and preventing lateral movement, privilege escalation, and exfiltration. Utilize access control lists (ACLs), hardened firewalls, and network monitoring devices to regulate, monitor, and audit cross-segment access and data transfers.
Other Best Practice Mitigation Recommendations
- Implement phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA) for as many services possible—particularly for webmail, virtual private networks (VPNs), accounts that access critical systems, and privileged accounts that manage backups.
- MFA can still be leveraged for secure access using a jump server—an asset placed between the external and internal networks that serves as an intermediary for access—to facilitate connections if assets do not have the capability to support MFA implementation.
- For additional guidance on secure MFA configurations, visit cisa.gov/mfa. [CPG 1.3]
- Monitor and analyze activity logs generated from Microsoft IIS and remote PowerShell. Collect access and security focused logs (IDS/IDPS, firewall, DLP, VPN) and ensure logs are securely stored for a specified duration informed by risk or pertinent regulatory guidance. [CPG 3.1, 3.2]
- Evaluate user permissions and maintain separate user accounts for all actions and activities not associated with the administrator role, e.g., for business email, web browsing, etc. All privileges should be reevaluated on a recurring basis to validate continued need for a given set of permissions. [CPG 1.5]
- Limit service accounts to the minimum permissions necessary to run services. CISA observed numerous error messages in network logs indicative of failed attempts to write files to additional directories or move laterally.
- Maintain a robust asset management policy through comprehensive documentation of assets, tracking current version information to maintain awareness of outdated software, and mapping assets to business and critical functions.
- Determine the need and functionality of assets that require public internet exposure. [CPG 2.3]
VALIDATE SECURITY CONTROLS
In addition to applying mitigations, CISA, FBI, and MS-ISAC recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. CISA and co-sealers recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.
To get started:
- Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Table 4).
- Align your security technologies against the selected technique.
- Test your technologies against the technique.
- Analyze your detection and prevention technologies’ performance.
- Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
- Tune your security program—including people, processes, and technologies—based on the data generated by this process.
CISA, FBI, and MS-ISAC recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.
RESOURCES
REFERENCES
[1] Telerik: Exploiting .NET JavaScriptSerializer Deserialization (CVE-2019-18935)
[2] ACSC Advisory 2020-004
[3] Bishop Fox CVE-2019-18935: Remote Code Execution via Insecure Deserialization in Telerik UI
[4] Volexity Threat Research: XE Group
[5] GitHub: Proof-of-Concept Exploit for CVE-2019-18935
[6] Microsoft: Configure Logging in IIS
[7] GitHub: CVE-2019-18935
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) contributed to this CSA.
Please share your thoughts. We recently updated our anonymous Product Feedback Survey and we’d welcome your feedback.
Incoming Silicon Valley Bank Related Scams, (Mon, Mar 13th)
Any big news story tends to attract its set of scams. We have seen this happening for disasters, political events, and wars. So it isn't a big surprise that last week's failure of Silicon Valley Bank is starting to get some traction.
If you see any scams (phishing, malware…): Please let us know via our contact page or email (handlers – at – isc.sans.edu )
The failure of Silicon Valley Bank has some particularly enticing properties for scammers:
- It involves a lot of money
- Urgency: Many companies and individuals employed by companies have questions about how to pay urgent bills. Will my employer be able to make payroll? Is there anything I need to do right now?
- Uncertainty: For many, it isn't clear how to communicate with SVB, what website to use, or what emails to expect (or where they will come from?)
All this is bound to result in some simple but also targeted scams.
You should expect some targeted scams if it is known that you or the company you work for banks with SVB. Most of the time, this information is more or less public. Expect not just email but also SMS or phone call scams.
Some of the legitimate offers may be indistinguishable from scams. People may offer loans or legal services to affected companies. As with natural disasters in the past, we also see law firms setting up dedicated pages to attract clients for an eventual lawsuit.
We do already see a little race to register SVB related domains:
Not all of these are outright scams, just try to make a more or less honest buck off the crisis. Here are some of the registrations related to the bank:
login-svb.com (currently "parked")
svbbailout.com
svbcertificates.com
svbclaim.com
svbcollapse.com
svbdeposits.com
svbhelp.com
svblawsuit.com
And many more…
Trying to go over some of the domains now to see what they contain and will update this story.
—
Johannes B. Ullrich, Ph.D. , Dean of Research, SANS.edu
Twitter|
(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
AsynRAT Trojan – Bill Payment (Pago de la factura), (Sun, Mar 12th)
This week the mail server quarantined this file FautraPago392023.gz. I did find it a bit strange after I extracted (gunzip) the file, there was no .exe extension associated with this file. The source and destination addresses are both blank without an actual email address.