The last update to the DShield SIEM [4] was in Sep 2025 which contained some minor tweaks. This update currently is using ELK stack version 8.19.15, contains some additional dashboards and new logs.
Tag Archives: SANS
Microsoft Patch Tuesday July 2026 – The AI Acopolypse is Here , (Tue, Jul 14th)
This patch Tuesday includes a staggering 622 vulnerabilities, not including another 427 vulnerabilities in Chromium, affecting Microsoft's Edge browser. 62 of the vulnerabilities are rated critical. One was disclosed before today, and two have already been exploited.
Someone Is Scanning for Your MCP Servers and AI Assistant Credentials, (Mon, Jul 13th)
"Comment stuffing" in an HTML phishing attachment as a mechanism for evading AI-based detection?, (Fri, Jul 10th)
Anyone who deals with phishing messages caught by basic security filters knows that most phishing samples tend to blend into one another, since only a small set of techniques and approaches keeps reappearing in them. That is precisely why it is worth pausing on the occasional message that does something a little out of the ordinary.
_HELP_ME_ESCAPE_FROM_BELARUS_PLEASE_ [Guest Diary], (Tue, Jul 7th)
[This is a Guest Diary by Jason Callahan, an ISC intern as part of the SANS.edu BACS program]
Every so often a honeypot hit comes along that is less about the exploit and more about the intent behind it. While reviewing DShield logs I ran into a scanning bot that caught my eye: a URI string that appeared to be a plea for help.
On 2026-06-06 my DShield honeypot logged back-to-back HTTP requests from the same source IP hitting two different ports with both carrying an identical, oddly formatted request path:

The request path itself /?_HELP_ME_ESCAPE_FROM_BELARUS_PLEASE_ is not a known exploit path, it appeared to be a plain-text message in the URL. Searching my logs for that particular string returned around a dozen similar HTTP requests over a 2 months period. These came from various IPs from around the globe with no discernible pattern which pointed to a self-propagating bot rather than a single attacker.
Further research showed that this bot was first reported to ISC in May 2026. The number of reports peaked shortly after the first report before a sharp drop and has remained steady since. [1]

I was unable to locate much more information about this bot other than a reddit thread on r/selfhosted describing the same requests hitting a Traefik reverse proxy. According to that thread, the user emailed the address embedded in the User-Agent and received a reply pointing to a page on a free web-hosting service. The page is a static HTML document with no scripts and it lays out what the bot is & why it exists.
The author, who identifies himself only as “Alex,” claims to be based in Belarus and writes that the bot is intentionally limited: no exploits, no command-and-control, no persistence. In his words, paraphrased and summarized from the page:
• The bot scans random IP addresses for open HTTP ports (80, 8000, 8080) and SSH ports (22, 2222).
• If it finds an open HTTP port it sends a single request (GET, CONNECT, or HEAD)
• If it finds an open SSH port it attempts a brute force with a small, fixed list of default credential pairs (admin:admin, root:root, etc.)
• It runs fully autonomously with no C2 channel; discovered IP/credential pairs are reported back to a loader only.
• It does not establish persistence, typically running from /tmp, and it is designed to self-terminate roughly six months after release.
• The stated purpose is to draw attention to conditions in Belarus. They describe it as a “performance piece,” saying they are not seeking funding and only asking for non-financial help leaving the country (job leads, advice, connections).
Disregarding the origin and supposed intent of the bot, this is a straightforward scan-and-brute-force bot and it should be treated like any other hitting a honeypot. The HTTP request is reconnaissance/fingerprinting that tells the operator a host is alive and reachable on that port. The risk is on the SSH side: any host reachable on TCP 22/2222 that still uses a default or weak credential pair is exposed, regardless of the creator’s stated intentions.
I want to give some healthy skepticism here rather than take the linked page at face value. I have no way to verify the age, location, or motive claimed on that page, whether the page itself is the full extent of the bot's behavior, or whether the “self-terminate after six months” and “no persistence” claims hold up under closer reverse engineering. Sob stories and appeals to sympathy are also a known social-engineering lever, and a URI designed to make analysts pause and read a web page rather than immediately blocklist an IP is an effective way to buy a scanner some goodwill. None of that changes the defensive posture: treat it as an untrusted, credential-guessing scanner.
[1] https://isc.sans.edu/weblogs/urlhistory.html?url=Lz9fSEVMUF9NRV9FU0NBUEVfRlJPTV9CRUxBUlVTX1BMRUFTRV8=
[2] https://isc.sans.edu/honeypot.html
[3] https://www.sans.edu/cyber-security-programs/bachelors-degree/
Disclosure: Claude was used for grammar and polish checks. No further use of generative A.I. was used in the creation of this post.
———–
Guy Bruneau IPSS Inc.
My GitHub Page
Twitter: GuyBruneau
gbruneau at isc dot sans dot edu
(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.
My Stack Simulator, (Wed, Jul 8th)
The stack is a memory region where a program stores temporary data – like local variables and return addresses. Think of the stack as a pile of plates in your kitchen: you can only add a new plate to the top, and you can only take one away from the top too. Programs use this same "last in, first out" principle to keep track of what they're doing. Every time a function is called, the program pushes a new plate onto the stack containing things like local variables and the address to return to once the function finishes. When the function is done, that plate is popped off the top, and execution resumes exactly where it left off. This simple mechanism is what allows programs to call functions within functions within functions, and always find their way back – but it's also precisely why a stack that grows too large, or gets overwritten with unexpected data, becomes a favorite target for attackers looking to hijack a program's execution flow.
More Odd DNS Records: NIMLOC, (Tue, Jul 7th)
Yesterday, I talked about NAPTR records and how they are related to RCS. But there is another "odd" record that shows up in my DNS logs. This one isn't new, but I don't think I ever covered it: NIMLOC. At least that is what Zeek calls it. But let's see what it is all about.
RCS and DNS: The NAPTR Record, (Mon, Jul 6th)
Over the last year, with recent updates to iOS and Android, RCS (Rich Communication Services) has become an increasingly used protocol [1]. RCS is supposed to eventually replace SMS, and in addition to richer formatting, provides added (but optional) security. RCS messages may be end-to-end encrypted and digitally signed. Unlike SMS, which was "bolted on" to existing voice-focused phone standards. The SMS standard was based on old-fashioned pagers and allowed for limited clear-text communications. RCS is built from the ground up around modern IP-based network infrastructure and behaves more like IP chat services (think iMessage, WhatsApp…). RCS defines the message format, while protocols like SIP are used to establish connections and transport messages.
Why Ask Credentials If There Are Secret Codes?, (Wed, Jul 1st)
This morning, an interesting phishing email hit my mailbox. It targets Metamask[1], a cryptocurrency wallet, available as a browser extension and a mobile app, that lets users store, send, and receive crypto money. It’s pretty popular, so a juicy target for criminals. In February, I already mentioned a campaign against them[2].