Runtime instances: persistent compute for production AI agents on Amazon Bedrock AgentCore

This post was originally published on this site

When you move AI agents from prototype to production, the infrastructure challenges multiply. Your agents need to persist state across multi-step workflows that run for hours or days. They need to coordinate with other agents, share context, and sometimes access GPUs for specialized tasks. Amazon Bedrock AgentCore runtime microVMs provide a fully managed environment for invocations that can run for up to 8 hours and support stateful workflows through managed session storage. Some workloads also benefit from dedicated, larger-capacity environments — for example, when agents need to run continuously for multiple days, access GPUs or the underlying OS, or run multiple collaborating agents on the same host.

Today, I’m happy to announce runtime instances, a new complementary compute option in Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Runtime that gives your agents persistent, managed infrastructure purpose-built for complex agent workloads.

What you get
Runtime instances provides AWS-managed EC2 infrastructure where you deploy multiple agents in a single runtime, each with their own dependencies and artifact types. Your agents can collaborate on the same host within shared sessions that persist for up to 14 days. The service supports GPU acceleration for compute-intensive tasks, session stop/restart to save costs during idle periods, and containerized deployments for teams that want to ship independently. For knowledge that needs to survive beyond a session, runtime instances pairs naturally with Amazon Elastic Block Store (Amazon EBS) and AgentCore Memory, which gives your agents long-term recall across sessions and environments.

Before today, if you wanted to keep your agents running for days or they needed GPU access, or multi-agent coordination, you had to build and manage that infrastructure yourself. You provisioned EC2 instances, configured networking, set up session management, handled scaling, and stitched together monitoring. Runtime instances handles all of that for you while integrating with the same AgentCore APIs, identity controls, and observability you already use with AgentCore Runtime microVMs.

A few things that should make agent developers smile: your agents can call each other as tools within a shared session, iterating autonomously until the job is done. You bring any framework (CrewAI, LangGraph, LlamaIndex, Strands) and any model. Packaging is minimal, a @app.entrypoint decorator and a zip file or container image. And if your workflow spans days, hibernate Monday night and resume Wednesday morning with everything intact.

Runtime microVMs and runtime instances are complementary compute options that you can use independently or together through the same AgentCore runtime APIs. A lightweight orchestrator agent on runtime microVM can coordinate and dispatch work to specialized worker agents running on instances. The orchestrator handles API calls, task routing, and result aggregation using runtime microVM’s fast scaling, while workers on Instances perform compute-intensive tasks like code compilation, security scanning, or GUI automation that require persistent state and direct OS access.

Let me show you how it works
I built two agents for this demo: a code writer agent that generates Python code from natural language descriptions, and a code reviewer agent that analyzes the generated code for bugs, security issues, and style improvements. Both agents share the same file system, so the reviewer can read whatever the writer produces without any data transfer or API calls between them.

Here is the code writer (simplified, no error handling):

writer = Agent(
    model="us.anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929-v1:0",
    system_prompt=(
        "You are a senior Python engineer. "
        "Given a task, return ONLY a single Python code block — no prose."
    ),
)

@app.entrypoint
def handler(event, context):
    task = event.get("task") or event.get("prompt")
    session_id = getattr(context, "session_id", None) or event.get("session_id")
    session_dir = SHARED_DIR / session_id
    session_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)

    code = str(writer(task))
    (session_dir / "code.py").write_text(code)

    return {"agent": "writer", "wrote": str(session_dir / "code.py"), "code": code}

Here is the code reviewer agent (simplified, no error handling):

reviewer = Agent(
    model="us.anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929-v1:0",
    system_prompt=(
        "You are a strict Python code reviewer. "
        "Given code, return 3 bullet points: bugs, style, suggestions."
    ),
)

@app.entrypoint
def handler(event, context):
    session_id = getattr(context, "session_id", None) or event.get("session_id")
    code_path = SHARED_DIR / session_id / "code.py"
    code = code_path.read_text()
    review = str(reviewer(f"Review this code:nn{code}"))

    return {"agent": "reviewer", "read": str(code_path), "review": review}

Each agent is a Python application using Strands Agents with an @app.entrypoint decorator and a model of its choice. I package each one as a zip file. For this demo, I use the AWS Management Console. You can also use the AgentCore CLI, the AWS Command Line Interface (AWS CLI) or infrastructure as code.

Step 1: Create a capacity provider.

A capacity provider defines the EC2 infrastructure your agents run on. In the AgentCore console, I select Runtime in the left navigation, then select the Capacity providers tab and Create capacity provider.

ACI Create Capcity Provider 1

I give it a Name, select Linux (64-bit ARM) as the Operating system, and choose c7g.2xlarge as the Allowed instance types. This gives me 8 vCPUs and 16 GiB of memory, enough for both agents to run comfortably side by side.

Further down, I configure the VPC, subnets, and security groups for network access. Under Storage configuration, I keep the default gp3 volume. Under Service access, I select Create a new service role and let the console create the infrastructure role that manages EC2 instances on my behalf.

I select Create capacity provider and wait a few seconds. The status moves to Active.

ACI Create Capacity Provider 2

ACI Create Capacity Provider 3

Note the capacity provider configuration summary: operating system, instance type, subnets, security group, instance profile, and infrastructure role. Once created, only the description can be edited, so verify your settings before you proceed.

ACI Create Capcity Provider 2

Step 2: Create a runtime and deploy the first agent.

Back on the Runtime page, I select Create runtime. I give it a Name, select Instances as the Compute type, and choose the Capacity provider I created in the previous step.

ACI Create Runtime 1

Under Agent source, I select S3 Source, then Upload to S3. I choose my agent zip file (ACIDemoWriter.zip), set the Language runtime to Python 3.13, and specify agent.py as the Agent entry point. This is the file that contains my @app.entrypoint decorated function. Under Permissions, I select Create default role to let the console provision the IAM role my agent needs.

ACI Create Runtime 2

I select Create runtime and wait for the status to become Ready.

I repeat the same process for my code reviewer agent. I create a second runtime, select the same capacity provider, upload my reviewer agent zip file, and wait for it to become Ready. Both agents now share the same underlying EC2 infrastructure.

AgentCore Runtime Instances - Agent ReadyThe console shows me a View invocation code section with ready-to-use Python, TypeScript, and JavaScript snippets to invoke my agent programmatically. But for this demo, I use the built-in test feature. I select Test on the writer agent’s page.

AgentCore Runtime Instances - Show invocation codeStep 3: Invoke agents and observe collaboration.

The Runtime playground opens. At the top, I see three fields: Runtime agent, Endpoint, and Session ID. The console generates a session ID automatically. I take note of it because I will reuse it with the reviewer agent.

In the Input field, I type a JSON payload asking the writer agent to generate code:

{"prompt": "write a fibonacci suite"}

I select Run. After a few seconds, the Output panel shows the agent’s response. The writer agent generated a Python module with two implementations of a Fibonacci sequence (a list-based function and a generator) and wrote it to /tmp/agentcore-session/ca5ec24d-07f5-4eeb-add1-5ba416bf9eb2/code.py. Notice the session ID in the file path. That directory is the shared file system for this session.

AgentCore Runtime Instances - Invoke code writer agent

Step 4: Invoke the reviewer agent in the same session.

Now I switch the Runtime agent dropdown to ACIDemoReviewer. The important part: I paste the same session ID (ca5ec24d-07f5-4eeb-add1-5ba416bf9eb2) in the Session ID field. This is what connects the two agents.

I type a simple prompt:

{"prompt": "review the code"}

I select Run. The reviewer agent reads the file the writer produced from the shared session directory and returns a detailed code review. It finds no critical bugs but suggests adding type hints, input validation, and simplifying the edge case handling.

AgentCore Runtime Instances - Invoke code reviewer agentThe two agents never exchanged messages or called each other’s APIs. They collaborated through the shared file system that runtime instances provide within a session. You can extend this pattern to any number of agents: a test agent that runs the code, a documentation agent that generates README files, a security agent that scans for vulnerabilities, all sharing the same working directory.

Key details
Here are a few things to know as you get started:

  • Supported OS: Linux (ARM64 and x86_64) at launch.
  • Session persistence: Sessions persist for up to 14 days.
  • Runtimes: Python 3.11-14 with native code support. Container images also supported.
  • GPU: Support for GPU-accelerated instance types.
  • Integration: Uses the same AgentCore APIs, identity, observability, and policy controls as AgentCore Runtime.
  • Pricing: Standard EC2 pricing plus a management fee for AgentCore orchestration.
  • Regions: US East (Ohio, N. Virginia), US West (Oregon), Asia Pacific (Mumbai, Singapore, Sydney, Tokyo), and Europe (Frankfurt, Ireland)

To get started, visit the runtime instance in Amazon Bedrock AgentCore documentation and create your first capacity provider.

— seb

22 Seconds to Compromise: How Automated SSH Actors Move From Login to Persistence Before You Can Blink [Guest Diary], (Thu, Aug 6th)

This post was originally published on this site

[This is a Guest Diary by Daryl Jiminez, an ISC intern as part of the SANS.edu BACS program]

Introduction

On May 23, 2026, a threat actor successfully authenticated to my Cowrie SSH honeypot using compromised credentials and, within 22 seconds, injected a backdoor SSH key, changed the root password, attempted to clear host-based access restrictions, and performed automated system reconnaissance. The speed and consistency of the behavior left no room for doubt: this was not a human attacker manually working through a system. This was automated post-exploitation infrastructure executing a pre-scripted playbook the instant it found an open door.

This post documents that intrusion, the broader campaign it belongs to, and what defenders can do about it. The data comes from a self-managed Raspberry Pi 5 honeypot running Cowrie, operating continuously since April 2026 as part of my SANS Internet Storm Center internship. Over the 30-day monitoring period analyzed here, the sensor captured over 112,000 SSH sessions and 72,000+ authentication attempts from 175+ unique malicious source IPs.

The Sensor and Setup

The honeypot runs Cowrie v2.3.0 on a Raspberry Pi 5 with a residential internet connection. Cowrie simulates an SSH server that accepts connections on port 2222 (forwarded from external port 22), logs all attacker activity including commands, file transfers, and credentials, and submits data automatically to ISC DShield. The sensor's logs are archived daily and analyzed for attacker TTPs, campaign patterns, and threat intelligence value.

All data referenced in this post was extracted from raw JSON Cowrie logs using jq queries and cross-referenced against AbuseIPDB, VirusTotal, GreyNoise, ISC DShield, AlienVault OTX, Shodan, and Whois.

The Intrusion: 22 Seconds From Login to Persistence

At 01:06:43 UTC on May 23, 2026, source IP 163.7.8.79 initiated an SSH connection to the honeypot. One second later, the actor successfully authenticated using the credentials root / Aa123123123, a weak password consistent with credentials leaked in past data breaches and commonly cycled through automated attack tools.

What happened next is best understood through the session timeline:

Session Timeline — 163.7.8.79 — May 23, 2026

The SSH key injected into authorized_keys was captured by Cowrie with the following hash:
a8460f446be540410004b1a8db4083773fa46f7fe76fa84219c93daa1669f8f2
The actor also removed the existing .ssh directory and recreated it before injecting the key, a technique used to eliminate existing authorized keys and ensure exclusive backdoor access. Changing the root password immediately after key injection further locks out legitimate administrators. Clearing /etc/hosts.deny removes any host-based access restrictions that might block future connections from the actor's infrastructure.

The entire sequence executed in 22 seconds. There was no hesitation, no exploration, no human decision-making visible in the command pattern. This is automation: a pre-scripted playbook executing the moment authentication succeeded.

The Attacker Kept Coming Back

After reviewing the full May 23 logs, I found that 163.7.8.79 returned to the sensor multiple times throughout the day, reconnecting approximately every few minutes and executing the same automated command sequence on each successful session. The consistency across sessions, identical command order, identical timing patterns, identical SSH key material, confirms this is not a human operator adapting to findings but an automated tool running a fixed exploitation script.

When I queried the logs for all successful authentications on May 23, I found 21 successful logins from 21 different source IPs within a single 24-hour period. The logins were clustered heavily between 01:00 and 02:30 UTC, suggesting coordinated wave-based scanning rather than independent actors discovering the honeypot randomly. A sample of the credentials used shows the breadth of the wordlists being deployed:

The presence of 'minecraft / 12345' is particularly noteworthy. Someone compiled a wordlist that includes gaming server default credentials, indicating active scanning for Minecraft or similar game server installations, not just generic Linux systems.

The Campaign Is Not Isolated and Has Not Stopped

To understand whether this was a one-time event or part of a sustained campaign, I cross-referenced the full list of IPs my sensor had observed over 30+ days of operation against a compiled list of IPs associated with the mdrfckr SSH campaign, a persistent automated SSH scanning operation that has been documented across multiple honeypot operators worldwide.

The result: 93 IPs from the mdrfckr campaign list were still actively hitting my sensor weeks after first being documented. This is not a historical observation. These actors did not stop. The campaign has been running continuously throughout the monitoring period.

Additionally, analysis of the top connecting IPs by session volume revealed a coordinated subnet cluster:

80.94.92.184    — high volume connections
80.94.92.186    — high volume connections
80.94.92.171    — high volume connections

Three IPs from the same /24 subnet hitting the sensor simultaneously is not coincidence. This is coordinated scanning infrastructure, either a botnet or a distributed scanning platform, operating multiple nodes from the same network block to maximize coverage while distributing the load.

Threat Intelligence on 163.7.8.79

Cross-referencing the primary actor IP across multiple threat intelligence platforms confirmed its malicious reputation:
AbuseIPDB: 100% confidence of abuse, over 5,700 reported incidents primarily related to SSH brute-force attacks, with recent reports confirming continued active scanning activity.
VirusTotal: Multiple security vendors classify the IP as malicious or suspicious.
GreyNoise: Identified as part of internet-wide SSH brute-force and reconnaissance scanning activity, confirming this is not a targeted attack but systematic exploitation of any reachable vulnerable host.
Whois: The IP is associated with Byteplus infrastructure (AS150436), a cloud hosting provider, consistent with the pattern of actors using cloud resources to scale automated attack campaigns.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

T1078 — Valid Accounts: Actor authenticated using compromised credentials from a wordlist.
T1098 — Account Manipulation: Malicious SSH key injected into authorized_keys to establish persistent access.
T1059 — Command Execution: Multiple shell commands executed immediately following authentication.
T1562 — Impair Defenses: /etc/hosts.deny cleared and processes terminated to remove access restrictions.

Why This Matters

The 22-second compromise window is the most important takeaway from this observation. In the time it takes a human to notice an alert, review it, and begin investigation, a fully automated actor has already established a persistent backdoor, locked out legitimate administrators, and completed system reconnaissance. On a real system with no monitoring, the attack would be invisible until the damage was done.

The credential root / Aa123123123 is not sophisticated. It follows a simple pattern: a common word plus repeating numbers plus a capital letter. Millions of systems remain accessible with credentials exactly like this, whether because they were provisioned with weak defaults, never hardened, or left unchanged after initial setup. The actors hitting your honeypot are not targeting you specifically. They are sweeping the internet for anyone who left a door unlocked.

The sustained nature of this campaign, 93 returning IPs still active weeks after first documented observation, reinforces that these actors are not deterred by a single failed attempt. They keep scanning. They keep trying. The math works in their favor when millions of internet-connected systems are in scope.

Who Benefits From This Information

System administrators who are responsible for any internet-exposed Linux system. If your system is reachable on port 22 with password authentication enabled, you are in scope for this campaign right now.
Security operations teams monitoring SSH authentication events. The behavioral signatures documented here, automated command sequences executing within seconds of authentication, consistent credential patterns, recurring source IPs, are detectable with proper log monitoring and should be included in detection rule sets.

Threat intelligence analysts tracking automated SSH campaigns. The mdrfckr campaign correlation data and the coordinated subnet cluster observations contribute to the shared picture of this ongoing threat.

Recommendations (MITRE Mitigations)

M1027 — Password Policies: Enforce strong passwords across all accounts. The credentials used in this campaign, including Aa123123123, follow predictable patterns that password complexity requirements would eliminate. Eliminate default credentials entirely.
M1036 — Account Use Policies: Implement rate limiting and account lockout for SSH authentication failures. Tools like fail2ban can automatically block IPs after repeated failed attempts, dramatically reducing the attack surface for automated scanners.
M1042 — Disable or Remove Feature: Disable SSH password authentication entirely and require public key authentication only. This single configuration change renders the entire credential stuffing attack class ineffective regardless of wordlist quality or campaign scale.
M1030 — Network Segmentation: Restrict SSH access to trusted IP ranges or VPN connections only. Internet-exposed SSH on port 22 is an open invitation to this class of automated attack.
M1047 — Audit: Monitor authentication logs continuously. The behavioral pattern of automated post-exploitation, rapid command sequences executing within seconds of login, is highly detectable with proper alerting in place.

Indicators of Compromise

IP: 163.7.8.79 (Byteplus, AS150436) — primary actor
Credentials: root / Aa123123123
SSH Key Hash: a8460f446be540410004b1a8db4083773fa46f7fe76fa84219c93daa1669f8f2
Associated Campaign: mdrfckr SSH campaign (93 confirmed overlapping IPs)

Conclusion

Automated SSH credential stuffing is not a sophisticated attack. It requires no novel exploits, no zero-days, and no targeted intelligence. It requires only an internet-connected system with weak credentials and no rate limiting. The 22-second compromise timeline documented here shows that the window between successful authentication and full backdoor establishment is too short for human response alone. Detection and prevention must be configured before the attack arrives, not after.

The campaign documented here has not stopped. The same infrastructure continues to scan, the same credential lists continue to be deployed, and the same post-exploitation playbook continues to execute the instant a weak system is found. The defenders who have hardened their SSH configuration are invisible to this campaign. The ones who have not are being hit right now.

[1] ISC DShield: https://isc.sans.edu/ipinfo/163.7.8.79
[2] AbuseIPDB: https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/163.7.8.79
[3] VirusTotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/ip-address/163.7.8.79
[4] GreyNoise: https://viz.greynoise.io/ip/163.7.8.79
[5] AlienVault OTX: https://otx.alienvault.com/indicator/ip/163.7.8.79
[6] Whois: https://whois.domaintools.com/163.7.8.79
[7] MITRE ATT&CK T1078: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/
[8] MITRE ATT&CK T1098: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
[9] MITRE ATT&CK T1059: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/
[10] MITRE ATT&CK T1562: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/
[11] fail2ban: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fail2ban
[12] https://www.sans.edu/cyber-security-programs/bachelors-degree/

Note: This blog post was produced with the assistance of Claude (Anthropic) as a writing and organizational tool. All analysis, log data, threat intelligence findings, and conclusions are my own.

———–
Guy Bruneau IPSS Inc.
My GitHub Page
Twitter: GuyBruneau
gbruneau at isc dot sans dot edu

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.

Don't Revoke That Token Yet: Inside the keyv/cacheable npm Worm, (Wed, Aug 5th)

This post was originally published on this site

When you learn that a compromised package executed on one of your build hosts, muscle memory takes over: revoke the npm token, rotate the GitHub PAT, cycle the cloud keys. That reflex has been correct in almost every supply-chain incident I have worked. In the keyv/cacheable compromise that has been unfolding since yesterday, it is the one thing you should not do first — because revoking the stolen token is exactly what arms the payload.

Let me back up.

What happened

On August 4, 2026, an attacker took over the maintainer account behind the widely used keyv and cacheable npm namespaces — caching libraries that sit near the bottom of a very large number of dependency trees — and published trojanized releases. Socket's Threat Research team, which did the primary analysis, places the first malicious release, keyv@6.0.0, at 09:35 UTC. The poisoned versions ship a preinstall hook:

"scripts": { "preinstall": "node setup.mjs" }

setup.mjs downloads a standalone Bun runtime, runs an obfuscated second stage (Math_Symbol.js, ~728 KB), and harvests whatever it can reach: AWS instance metadata, cloud keys, Vault tokens, Kubernetes service-account tokens, GitHub Actions secrets, npm tokens, plus a generic regex sweep for private keys and bearer tokens on disk. Then — and this is why the campaign grew from roughly ten packages to several hundred within hours — it uses the stolen npm token to inject the same hook into other packages the compromised identity can publish, recomputes the integrity hashes, and republishes. It is a worm. The public IOC lists now cover more than 440 packages across two thousand-plus versions, and they are still moving.

Two properties make this one worth a closer look than the average typosquat.

It does not need npm install

Most teams scope this kind of incident to "who ran npm install in the exposure window." That misses half the population. The source repository also received IDE and agent autostart hooks — a SessionStart entry in .claude/settings.json and a folderOpen task in .vscode/tasks.json — that run the loader when the cloned folder is simply opened. No install, nothing built.

Sit with who that includes. It includes the security engineer who cloned the repository to investigate the incident after reading about it. It includes the AI coding agent that opened the directory to "take a look." I do not think we have seen AI-agent configuration files used as a first-class supply-chain execution vector at this scale before, and it is worth internalizing: a checked-out repository is now an execution surface, and .claude/.cursor/, and .vscode/ are part of it.

It punishes remediation

Here is the part that should change how you respond. Alongside the credential theft, the payload installs a host-level dead-man's switch. It writes the stolen GitHub token and an attacker-supplied handler command to ~/.config/gh-token-monitor/, then persists itself as a macOS LaunchAgent or a Linux systemd user service with loginctl enable-linger so it survives logout. The systemd unit describes itself, helpfully, as a "GitHub Token Validity Monitor," so at a glance it reads like a developer convenience.

A watcher script polls the GitHub API with the stolen token every 60 seconds. While the token works, nothing happens. The moment the token stops working — an HTTP 4xx, which is precisely what your revocation produces — it evals the remote-supplied handler string, then deletes its own state and exits. It is single-shot and self-clearing, and it also self-destructs after a 24-hour TTL.

What is in the handler? Public analysis cannot say, because it is attacker-controlled text pulled at runtime and can be changed remotely. It could be data destruction, re-implant, or nothing at all. That is the whole problem: the risk is not that the trap does something specific and known — it is that you cannot assess it, and it fires at the exact moment your team believes it is containing the incident and starts to relax.

One consequence is counterintuitive but load-bearing: isolating the host from the network is safe. With no connectivity there is no HTTP response, so there is no 4xx, so the switch does not fire — and exfiltration stops at the same time. Isolate first. Do not power off; volatile memory is evidence.

Why the usual checks miss it

  • "The signature was valid." keyv@6.0.0 shipped with a passing SLSA attestation. Provenance attests to build integrity, not source integrity — the legitimate workflow faithfully built already-trojanized code.
  • "The diff was clean." The library itself was not modified. The malice lives in package.json and two added files. A dist/ comparison shows nothing.
  • "We don't use keyv." You almost certainly do, transitively. The common path is eslint → file-entry-cache → flat-cache → keyv. Very few victims installed any of these directly.
  • "Nobody ran npm install." See the second section.

What to actually do

The order matters more than the individual steps:

  1. Isolate the host from the network. Safe, for the reason above. Do not shut it down.
  2. Preserve evidence before you delete anything — the watcher self-clears in ~24 hours. Copy ~/.config/gh-token-monitor/{handler,token,started_at}, the payloads, the plist/unit, and record hashes. Do not execute the handler; treat it as inert text. started_at bounds your exposure window.
  3. Eradicate: kill the watcher, unload the LaunchAgent / disable the systemd unit, drop loginctl linger, remove the files and the .claude/.vscode hooks, and clear the package caches.
  4. Rotate — now, and only now. npm token first, to stop propagation; then GitHub, cloud, Vault, Kubernetes, CI secrets, and anything that was sitting in a file, because there was a regex sweep. Revoke, do not merely rotate.
  5. Audit what was done in your name: repositories freshly described "Shai-Hulud: Here We Go Again," unexpected npm publishes under your accounts, and credential use in your cloud logs during the started_at window.

CI runners and any host with confirmed execution should be rebuilt, not cleaned. Arbitrary code ran; the list of known artifacts is not a completeness guarantee.

A small tool to help with the triage

Enumerating this by hand across a fleet is tedious, and the moving IOC list makes a hardcoded grep obsolete within hours. I wrote a scanner to help with the triage: it checks lockfiles and node_modules for the compromised name/version set (with the transitive chain, so "we don't use keyv" gets answered on the spot), flags the host persistence and the dead-man's switch, and prints the response order above so nobody rotates before cleaning.

It is built to be easy to trust during exactly this kind of incident: one auditable file you can read in fifteen minutes, zero dependencies, zero egress (it never phones home; --update is the only network call and it is explicit), and read-only. It runs offline. It is MIT-licensed and open source, and — disclosure — it comes out of my work at Securest8; the IOC data is not mine but the public research of Socket, Wiz, and Kodem, credited in the repository.

If you only take the tool, take the response order with it. The scanner finds the problem; the order in which you touch credentials is what keeps a bad day from getting worse.

Bottom line

The novel part of this campaign is not the credential theft — it is the two design choices around it: an execution path that does not require installing anything, and a switch that turns your remediation reflex into the trigger. Scope the second vector, isolate before you revoke, and clean the host before you touch a single token.

References

– Socket, "Popular npm Packages in the keyv and Cacheable Namespaces Compromised in Active Supply Chain Attack," August 4, 2026. https://socket.dev/blog/popular-npm-packages-in-the-keyv-and-cacheable-namespaces-compromised-in-active-supply-chain
– Wiz Research, public IOC feed (keyv/cacheable). https://github.com/wiz-sec-public/wiz-research-iocs/blob/main/reports/keyv-packages.csv
– Wiz, "keyv and cacheable npm supply chain attack." https://www.wiz.io/blog/keyv-and-cacheable-npm-supply-chain-attack
– Kodem Security, keyv supply-chain attack IOCs and first-hour runbook. https://www.kodemsecurity.com/resources/keyv-supply-chain-attack-shai-hulud-npm-worm-affected-versions-iocs-and-first-hour-response-runbook

Renato Marinho
LinkedIn|Twitter

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.

Botnet Hunting for Vulnerabilities in Diagnostic Tools, (Tue, Aug 4th)

This post was originally published on this site

This morning, I noticed specific sources "hunting" for vulnerabilities in URLs that I haven't noticed before. All of these URLs appear to be associated with diagnostic tools:

URL Count Vulnerability
/ 1 (simple recon for index page)
/apply.cgi 20 CVE-2024-12856 Four-Faith router command injection
/cgi-bin/adv_ping.cgi 20 ?
/cgi-bin/diagnostic.cgi 20 CVE-2013-7179 Seowon Intech WiMAX SWU-9100 mobile route
/cgi-bin/DiagnosticsMsg.cgi 20 ?
/cgi-bin/ping.cgi 20  
/cgi-bin/system_mgr.cgi 20  
/cgi-bin/traceroute.cgi 20  
/diag_ping.cgi 20 CVE-2020-8949 (maybe.. slightly different URL) Gocloud devices
/goform/diagTool 20 CVE-2024-48419 (maybe..) Edimax Routers
/goform/ping 20  
/ping_test.cgi 20  
/sys_diag.html 20  

The naming of these URLs points to diagnostic tools. I was unable to find any specific vulnerabilities associated with many of the URLs, but the table above reflects those I found. But diagnostic tools often suffer from file inclusion and code execution vulnerabilities.

These tools will often call operating system commands directly, without properly separating user-provided arguments. Here is a sample vulnerability in a ping utility:

response = os.system("ping -c 1 -w2 " + hostname )

The above example is in Python. But most (all?) languages have something equivalent to "os.system" (often called "exec", "shell_exec", "process" …) Often, proper input validation and output encoding are used to prevent this vulnerability, but, in my opinion, there is a better approach that should always be used in addition to input validation, and I do not see it used much.

As with many other vulnerabilities, the root cause of command injection is the concatenation of user data and commands. Mixing control plane and data plane has been an issue since blue boxing and continues today with prompt injection. The real fix is to avoid this comingling of data and commands and instead properly separate them. Prepared statements in SQL are probably the best-known approach following this principle.

For OS command execution, we do have a very similar solution. The "system" command in your language will typically call the standard C function "exec" [1]. This family of function implements some meant to pass command line arguments: execv ("exec vector"). In addition to the command, it accepts an array of command-line arguments that are then passed to the command, properly separating the command from the arguments.

Python implements execv as part of the subprocess module:

response = subprocess.run("ping", "-c", 1, "-w", 2, hostname )

Using "subprocess.run" eliminates the possibility of command injection in this example.

For example, if you are using "google.com; ls" as a hostname, you get:

ping: cannot resolve google.com; ls: Unknown host

The entire string "google.com; ls" was used as a hostname, and the ";" no longer acted as a separator. Give it a try with other command injection strings, and you will see similar results.

There are a few cases where "execv" is not sufficient. Some operating system commands may execute additional commands passed on the command line. For example, tcpdump offers the "-z" option to execute a "postrotate command". But these cases are rare, and if you are running into them, you are back to proper input validation to use these specific command line options. In most cases, users cannot specify the command-line option itself but only the parameter; using the "execv" API will help.

A while ago, I also made a brief video with more details on preventing OS command injection: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7QDO3pZbum8. It also covers some of the issues around Windows, which implements different APIs.

 

[1] https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man3/exec.3.html


Johannes B. Ullrich, Ph.D. , Dean of Research, SANS.edu
Twitter|

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.

AWS Weekly Roundup: Price reduction of GPT models in Bedrock, CloudWatch managed collectors for Prometheus metrics, and more (August 3, 2026)

This post was originally published on this site

Last week I had the joy of participating in Amazon’s “Bring Your Kids to Work Day” with my 7 year old son. We commuted together into the New York City office, his first real rush hour train ride, and spent the day exploring how Amazon uses AI, machine learning, and robotics to deliver packages to customers all over the world. Watching his eyes light up as he saw robots navigating a fulfillment center reminded me why so many of us got into technology in the first place. There’s nothing quite like seeing that sense of wonder when something complex clicks.

That same energy carried into the week’s launches. We’ve got updates across AI pricing, observability, multicloud networking, and data management. Let’s dive in.

Headlines
Amazon Bedrock announces up to 80% lower prices for OpenAI GPT‑5.6 models – If you’re using OpenAI’s GPT‑5.6 family through Amazon Bedrock, your costs just dropped significantly. Effective July 30, on-demand inference prices for GPT‑5.6 Luna are reduced by 80%, while GPT‑5.6 Terra prices are reduced by 20%. Luna now costs $0.20 per million input tokens and $1.20 per million output tokens, making it one of the most affordable frontier-class models available. These price reductions apply automatically — no action required on your part. Read more

Last week’s launches
Here are some launches and updates from this past week that caught my attention:

  • Amazon CloudWatch announces managed Prometheus collectors – Amazon CloudWatch now supports collecting Prometheus metrics from your AWS infrastructure using fully managed collectors, enabling you to monitor Amazon EKS, Amazon EC2, Amazon ECS, Amazon MSK, and Amazon OpenSearch Service workloads without deploying or managing any agents. If you’ve been maintaining your own Prometheus scraping infrastructure, this removes a significant operational burden. Read more
  • AWS Interconnect — multicloud connectivity with Oracle Cloud Infrastructure is now generally available – AWS Interconnect is the first purpose-built multicloud connectivity product of its kind, allowing you to quickly provision resilient, scalable private connections between AWS and other cloud providers. With this GA launch for Oracle Cloud Infrastructure (OCI), you can establish private cross-cloud networking without traversing the public internet, making it easier to run multicloud architectures with the security and performance your workloads demand. Read more
  • AWS IAM Identity Center extends multi-Region support to Identity Center directory – You can now replicate IAM Identity Center from your primary AWS Region to additional Regions when using the Identity Center directory as your identity source. If IAM Identity Center is affected by a disruption in the primary Region, your users continue to have access to their AWS accounts using provisioned entitlements in additional Regions. This feature was previously available only for instances connected to external identity providers. Read more
  • Amazon S3 Tables now supports the Variant data type for Apache Iceberg V3 – Amazon S3 Tables adds support for the Variant data type, introduced in the Apache Iceberg V3 table format specification. Variant provides a high-performance, native solution for managing semi-structured data within your data lake — think IoT sensor data, application logs, and other schema-flexible payloads — without resorting to JSON blobs. Read more

Other AWS news
Here are some additional posts and resources that you might find interesting:

Upcoming AWS events
Check your calendar and sign up for upcoming AWS events:

  • AWS Summits – AWS Summits are free events that bring the cloud and AI community together to connect, learn, and explore the latest technologies. Browse the full calendar to find a Summit near you in the second half of 2026.
  • AWS Community Days – Community-led conferences where content is planned, sourced, and delivered by community leaders.

Join the AWS Builder Center to connect with builders, share solutions, and access content that supports your development. Browse here for upcoming AWS-led in-person and virtual events and developer-focused events.


That’s all for this week. Check back next Monday for another Weekly Roundup!

Atomic MacOS (AMOS) stealer infection, (Sun, Aug 2nd)

This post was originally published on this site

Introduction

This diary provides indicators from an Atomic MacOS (AMOS) stealer infection that I generated in my lab on July 31st, 2026.  This was distributed through a web page from getmacouscloud[.]com with instructions to paste text into a macOS Terminal window, supposedly for "macOS toolkit," but instead the text is a command to retrieve and install AMOS stealer malware.

Of note, I ran the text in the Terminal window twice, because I wanted to make sure I retrieved copies of files in the host's /tmp directory before entering the user account password.  This is why the initial infection traffic is repeated, and also likely why there are two different directories with the AMOS stealer malware persistent on my infected lab host.

Images from the Infection


Shown above: Website with instructions to copy and paste text into a Terminal window, supposedly for a "macOS toolkit" but actually for malware.


Shown above: The malicious text pasted into a Terminal Window on a macOS host.


Shown above: Files from my infected host's /tmp directory, showing data stolen and other info for AMOS stealer.


Shown above: Examples of AMOS stealer persistent on my infected macOS host.


Shown above: Traffic from the AMOS stealer infection filtered in Wireshark.

Indicators of Compromise

Traffic leading to the getmacouscloud[.]com page on Friday 2026-07-31:

  • hxxps[:]//macostruecloud[.]xyz/?h=2f9548d041648a8030c040ae0e1e530b&z=304
  • macspheres[.]com – HTTPS traffic
  • hxxps[:]//getmacouscloud[.]com/?FSSbmnNdviEDE5S?io=16vwsb0rgIiPNIgM

URL from the base64 text provided by getmacouscloud[.]com for the initial download:

  • hxxps[:]//render65[.]com/curl/f5509695dd98a9732378e5256d6235415d64d92194459bb08525c7ce5991a0c9

URLs from extracted from the payload returned from the initial download:

  • hxxps[:]//grove-89[.]com/api/metrics/run?event=pasted
  • hxxps[:]//render65[.]com/2kqYRM0DCrnyJgoS4gVLl_FHJRRdTUhGCbjyuYwpZ6c/m1/update

AMOS stealer C2 traffic – HTTP POST requests over TCP port 80:

  • hxxp[:]/188.166.78[.]138/api/metrics/run?event=started&stage=boot
  • hxxp[:]/188.166.78[.]138/api/metrics/run?event=stage&stage=init_session
  • hxxp[:]/188.166.78[.]138/api/metrics/run?event=stage&stage=messengers
  • hxxp[:]/188.166.78[.]138/api/metrics/run?event=stage&stage=credentials
  • hxxp[:]/188.166.78[.]138/api/metrics/run?event=stage&stage=browsers
  • hxxp[:]/188.166.78[.]138/api/metrics/run?event=stage&stage=wallets
  • hxxp[:]/188.166.78[.]138/contact
  • hxxp[:]/188.166.78[.]138/api/metrics/run?event=stage&stage=resolve_auth
  • hxxp[:]/188.166.78[.]138/api/metrics/run?event=stage&stage=local_data
  • hxxp[:]/188.166.78[.]138/api/join/
  • hxxp[:]/188.166.78[.]138/api/bots/device-info
  • hxxp[:]/188.166.78[.]138/api/tasks/ack
  • hxxp[:]/188.166.78[.]138/api/feed/register

AMOS stealer C2 traffic – examples of HTTP GET requests over TCP port 80:

  • hxxp[:]/188.166.78[.]138/api/tasks/r3dqbX7fptIT-gXz–D_nw?v=2.1
  • hxxp[:]/188.166.78[.]138/api/feed/items/49359f77ebb4ffd9a95568d27a8ff3e7

SHA-256 hash: b9ec3261d633c289e51c5fa8842af4350efe68446df39cb995de82e0941d0f3c

  • File size: 1,973 bytes
  • File type: Paul Falstad's zsh script text executable, ASCII text
  • File description: Initial file retrieved by malicious text in Terminal window

SHA-256 hash: 13b868b3ea8b492e7fbab1ca04535c53d0930650185b5a082cd59c1974689cd5

  • File size: 1,227 bytes
  • File type: Paul Falstad's zsh script text executable, ASCII text, with very long lines (315)
  • File description: Script extracted from a gzip-compressed file from base64 text in the above file

SHA-256 hash: 9f25ec533cb23d020e568fb771500d7776b1300f07119ad9d0876f4329ce22ab

  • File size: 297,952 bytes
  • File location: /tmp/helper
  • File type: Mach-O universal binary with 2 architectures: x86_64 & arm64

SHA-256 hash: 0a03cf18de28017c0ea591dffc380a6b41fedd2acc3a39e901e58d9188c01836

  • File size: 438,656 bytes
  • File location: /Users/[username]/Library/Application Support/.com.apple.accountsd/AccountsHelper
  • File type: Mach-O universal binary with 2 architectures: x86_64 & arm64

SHA-256 hash: 01a0d5332b09bb299f7784bf0d0c43c4199269ed6a0712377279eeb999847d20

  • File size: 503,152 bytes
  • File location: /Users/[username]/Library/Application Support/.com.apple.metadata.mds/mdworker_shared
  • File type: Mach-O universal binary with 2 architectures: x86_64 & arm64


Bradley Duncan
brad [at] malware-traffic-analysis.net

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.

zipdump.py: Metadata Encoding, (Fri, Jul 31st)

This post was originally published on this site

I was asked for help with a problem similar to the following.

Here is a ZIP file, analyzed with zipdump.py:

The filename you see, is in Simplified Chinese:

zipdump.py relies on the zipfile or pyzipper Python modules to parse the given ZIP file, and have the metadata (filenames and comments) decoded correctly.

If this ZIP file would be corrupt or malformed, so that it can not be parsed by these Python modules, then you can still try to use zipdump -f option to locate individual ZIP records:

As I don't know which encoding has been used for the metadata (filenames and comments), I display the filename as a Python byte string and not as a string. If the filename is simple ASCII, it will be readable (like the extension .vir here), but if it is utf-8, for example Simplified Chinese, then you'll just see hexadecimal values.

And that is why I added a new option: –metadata_encoding. With this new option, you can specify a codec, that will be used to convert bytes into strings when option -f is used. Like this:

So here I use codec utf-8, because the filename is encoded in utf-8. How do I know this? Well, in the ZIP specification, the metadata is either ASCII (CP437 to be precise) or UTF-8 encoded. So when you check the flags, you'll know which encoding to use:

 

Flag 0x0800 means that encoding utf-8 is used. I've also added a feature that decodes the flag bits into readable text, as can be seen in the screenshot above.

If you specify another codec, like latin, for this specific ZIP file, the filenames will be decoded incorrectly:

Option –metadata_encoding can also be used when you don't use option -f, however, module pyzipper does not support this (there's a PR) and in module zipfile the flags take precedence.

 

Didier Stevens
Senior handler
blog.DidierStevens.com

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.

Reconnaissance First: An SSH Bot That Sizes Up Your Hardware Before Deploying a Miner [Guest Diary], (Thu, Jul 30th)

This post was originally published on this site

[This is a Guest Diary by Adam Cann, an ISC intern as part of the SANS.edu BACS program]

Introduction

Most of what an internet-facing SSH honeypot records is noise. Endless password guessing, and bots that log in, immediately pull down a payload, and move on. On 27 June 2026 my honeypot caught something quieter, and to me more interesting. A bot logged in as root, ran a careful survey of the machine's hardware, and then disconnected without downloading or running anything at all. No malware, no persistence, no second stage.

At first glance that looks like a failed or pointless attack. It is not. The bot was doing something deliberate: grading the target before deciding whether to send a payload on it. This post walks through what it collected, why the pattern points to cryptomining, and why a session that drops nothing still deserves a defender's attention.

The Sensor and The Session

My honeypot is a DShield sensor built on a Raspberry Pi 4, running the Cowrie SSH honeypot on an internet-facing address. Cowrie presents a convincing fake Linux shell, accepts logins with weak passwords, and records every command an attacker runs along with connection metadata such as the source IP and the SSH client fingerprint.

The session itself was brief. A bot from 91.92.40.13 connected to the SSH service, logged in as root with the password 123123 on the first attempt, ran two commands, and disconnected after about eight seconds. Two details stood out right away: the SSH client identified itself as a Go program (SSH-2.0-Go) rather than a normal client, and the whole visit lasted only seconds. Both point to automation, not a person at a keyboard.


Figure 1. The recon session, condensed. The bot inventories the hardware and checks for root, then leaves without dropping a file.

What The Bot Collected

Instead of the usual download-and-run one-liner, this bot ran a hardware survey. It gathered the operating system and kernel version, the CPU architecture, the number of CPU cores, and the CPU model. It then used lspci to look for a graphics card, searching specifically for NVIDIA. It read system uptime, listed recent logins with last, and printed everything as labeled fields (UNAME, ARCH, CPUS, CPU_MODEL, GPU, LAST). That labeled format is exactly how an automated bot packages a victim's specifications so it can parse them and make a decision.

A second command then checked whether the machine has more than 1 GB of RAM, reading /proc/meminfo and comparing against 1,048,576 KB. It ran that check through sudo -S, feeding the same password back in to test whether it could elevate to full root privileges without a prompt.

The tell is the combination. A denial-of-service botnet does not care about your graphics card. Counting CPU cores, reading the CPU model, hunting specifically for an NVIDIA GPU, and gating on a minimum amount of RAM is the profile of cryptomining or resource-hijacking triage. Miners are only worth deploying on machines with enough compute, so this operator measures the machine first and, presumably, only delivers a miner to hosts that clear the bar. The sudo step tells the bot whether it can take full control before it commits.


Figure 2. The recon-first model. The attacker grades the host, then decides whether a payload is worth delivering

Two Very Different Bots, One Weak Password

This is a good place to show why client fingerprinting matters. Earlier in the same month my honeypot logged a completely different SSH campaign: a loader that logs in, downloads an ELF binary from an attacker server using a curl, wget, and /dev/tcp fallback chain, and joins a denial-of-service botnet. It rotated through several source IPs and command-and-control servers, but its HASSH client fingerprint stayed constant, which let me tie the instances together as one campaign. The mining recon bot has a different client and a different HASSH, which tells me it is a separate actor, not the same campaign changing tactics.


Table 1. Two distinct actors seen on the same honeypot, separated by their client fingerprints.

What Is The Damage?

The question this session answers is simple: when a login runs only discovery commands and leaves without dropping anything, is it harmless? The answer is no. A recon-only session is often the first half of a two-stage attack. The operator grades the host now and returns with a tailored payload later, or hands the target to a second tool. Treating no-payload sessions as background noise means missing the casing that precedes the break-in.

This matters because defenders and honeypot operators naturally prioritize sessions that drop files, since those are obviously malicious. Sessions that only look around are easy to dismiss. This example shows that discovery activity can be a valuable early warning, and that a client fingerprint like HASSH can connect quiet reconnaissance to a later, louder payload even when the attacker changes IP addresses.

Who benefits from knowing this? SOC analysts triaging SSH activity, honeypot and DShield sensor operators, and administrators of any internet-facing Linux or cloud host. Anyone running a system with a weak or default SSH password is a candidate for exactly this kind of grading, and the mitigations below are the same ones that stop the noisier attacks too.

How To Protect Against It

Use strong passwords. The entire attack starts with a guessable root password. Long, unique credentials stop it at the front door.
Disable root SSH login and prefer keys. Set PermitRootLogin no and use key-based authentication. This also defeats the sudo -S password-reuse trick.
Rate-limit logins. fail2ban or equivalent blocks an address after repeated attempts.
Limit exposure. Do not expose SSH to the whole internet. Restrict it to a VPN or known addresses where possible.
Alert on bulk hardware discovery. A login that reads CPU model, hunts for an NVIDIA GPU, and checks /proc/meminfo against a size threshold is unusual and worth flagging. Pivot on the HASSH to find related sessions.
Watch for the follow-up. If a host passes this grading, a later session may deliver a miner. Monitor for sustained CPU or GPU usage and unexpected connections to mining pools.

Indicators

Source IP: 91.92.40.13 (VirusTotal: 11 malicious, 5 suspicious; ASN 197170 TechTies Inc., 91.92.40.0/24, Netherlands)
SSH client: SSH-2.0-Go
HASSH: 2ec37a7cc8daf20b10e1ad6221061ca5
Credentials used: root / 123123
Behavior: bulk hardware survey (CPU cores and model, NVIDIA GPU search, uptime, last), a /proc/meminfo check for more than 1 GB RAM, and a sudo -S privilege test

Conclusion

The most memorable activity in a honeypot is not always the session that drops malware. This one dropped nothing, and that was the point. It logged in, priced out the hardware, checked whether it could get root, and left, almost certainly to decide whether the machine was worth mining on. For defenders, the lesson is to give recon-only sessions the same curiosity the attacker gave your hardware, and to use client fingerprints to connect the quiet grading to the loud payload that may follow.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fail2ban
[2] https://github.com/DShield-ISC/dshield
[3] https://www.sans.edu/cyber-security-programs/bachelors-degree/

———–
Guy Bruneau IPSS Inc.
My GitHub Page
Twitter: GuyBruneau
gbruneau at isc dot sans dot edu

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.