Tag Archives: SANS

AutoIT3 Compiled Scripts Dropping Shellcodes, (Fri, Dec 5th)

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AutoIT3[1] is a powerful language that helps to built nice applications for Windows environments, mainly to automate tasks. If it looks pretty old, the latest version was released last September and it remains popular amongst developers, for the good… or the bad! Malware written in AutoIt3 has existed since the late 2000s, when attackers realized that the language was easy to learn (close to basic) but can also compiled into standalone PE files! From a malware point of view, such executables make an extended use of packed data, making them more stealthy.

Nation-State Attack or Compromised Government? [Guest Diary], (Thu, Dec 4th)

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[This is a Guest Diary by Jackie Nguyen, an ISC intern as part of the SANS.edu BACS program]

The ISC internship didn't just teach me about security, it changed how I thought about threats entirely. There's something intriguing about watching live attacks materialize on your DShield Honeypot, knowing that somewhere across the world, an attacker just made a move. And the feedback loop of writing detailed attack observations, then having experienced analysts critique and refine your analysis? That's where real learning happens. One attack observation in particular stands out as a perfect example of what makes this internship so powerful. Let me show you what I discovered!

The Beginning…

On November 10, 2025, my honeypot captured very interesting activity that really demonstrates how evolved modern threat actors are getting. What initially appeared to be a simple, but successful SSH brute force attempt quickly revealed itself as something far more concerning, a deployment of an advanced trojan designed for long-term persistence and evasion.

What happened?

Suspicious activity was detected when the IP address 103[.]148[.]195[.]161 successfully SSH’d into my honeypot using the credentials username “root” and password “linux”. The bad actor maintained access to the honeypot for 1 minute and 45 seconds but ultimately ran no commands. Instead, the attacker uploaded a single file, a trojan binary named “sshd” designed to evade security detections by pretending to be the OpenSSH daemon. It was an Executable and Linkable Format (ELF) binary (7a9da7d10aa80b0f9e2e3f9e518030c86026a636e0b6de35905e15dd4c8e3e2d) that was classified as malicious by VirusTotal and Hybrid-Analysis.

We won’t be able to see what the Trojan did on my honeypot at this time, however, I found the hash on Hybrid-Analysis and got a good idea of what the trojan does.

A screenshot of the cowrie output using Jesse La Grew’s cowrieprocessor [4]

Trojan File Analysis

MITRE ATT&CK MAPPING

•    T1078 – Valid Accounts
•    T1110.001 – Brute Force
•    T1204.002 – User Execution
•    T1036.005 – Masquerading
•    T1554 – Compromise Client Software Binary
•    T1548.001 – Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
•    T1027 – Obfuscated Files or Information
•    T1497 – Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
•    T1480 – Execution Guardrails
•    T1003.008 – OS Credential Dumping

Prevent Similar Attacks

1.    Disable Password Authentication and utilize SSH keys instead
2.    IP Allowlisting
3.    IDS/IPS/EDR
4.    Threat Hunting
5.    MFA

What does this show?

This really shows how much effort sophisticated attackers would put in for long-term persistence and advanced evasion. Attacks from a government IP address doesn’t always mean it’s the government; it more than likely would mean that they were compromised. If you think about it logically, why would a nation-state threat actor use their actual government IP address to execute attacks?

Importance?

It’s important when working on a high performing security team to not attribute attacks to the wrong threat actor. Politically, this may cause problems, especially if the company you’re working for has a large media presence. Problems including wrongful retaliation and political tension could arise from making this mistake.

This attack also shows how threat actors use legitimate processes to blend in with normal ones. We must remember that the goal of this attacker is most likely long-term so they will do everything they can to evade your defenses.

Actionable Intelligence for Defenders

Threat hunting is a critical part of any security program and having concrete Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) like file hashes, malicious IP addresses, and more would give teams actionable intelligence to use immediately. This observation also helps defenders understand what to look for. Brief sessions without commands can be just as dangerous as those with suspicious activity.

Key Takeaways

This attack really shows how threat actors are getting more sophisticated. By uploading a legitimate looking trojan instead of running commands, the attacker could have avoided the typical red flags most monitoring tools look for. The use of a government IP address also teaches us an important lesson not to immediately jump to conclusions solely based on IP block owner since it might have been compromised. For analysts out there, what seems to be a quiet session can sometimes be the most dangerous.

[1] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/7a9da7d10aa80b0f9e2e3f9e518030c86026a636e0b6de35905e15dd4c8e3e2d/detection
[2 ]https://www.abuseipdb.com/whois/103.148.195.161
[3] https://hybridanalysis.com/sample/7a9da7d10aa80b0f9e2e3f9e518030c86026a636e0b6de35905e15dd4c8e3e2d/6542c8b6abeb51c5ee0bbf2a
[4] https://github.com/jslagrew/cowrieprocessor
[5] https://www.sans.edu/cyber-security-programs/bachelors-degree/

———–
Guy Bruneau IPSS Inc.
My GitHub Page
Twitter: GuyBruneau
gbruneau at isc dot sans dot edu

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.

Attempts to Bypass CDNs, (Wed, Dec 3rd)

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Currently, in order to provide basic DDoS protection and filter aggressive bots, some form of Content Delivery Network (CDN) is usually the simplest and most cost-effective way to protect a web application. In a typical setup, DNS is used to point clients to the CDN, and the CDN will then forward the request to the actual web server. There are a number of companies offering services like this, and cloud providers will usually have solutions like this as well.

Use of CSS stuffing as an obfuscation technique?, (Fri, Nov 21st)

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From time to time, it can be instructive to look at generic phishing messages that are delivered to one’s inbox or that are caught by basic spam filters. Although one usually doesn’t find much of interest, sometimes these little excursions into what should be a run-of-the-mill collection of basic, commonly used phishing techniques can lead one to find something new and unusual. This was the case with one of the messages delivered to our handler inbox yesterday…

Unicode: It is more than funny domain names., (Wed, Nov 12th)

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When people discuss the security implications of Unicode, International Domain Names (IDNs) are often highlighted as a risk. However, while visible and often talked about, IDNs are probably not what you should really worry about when it comes to Unicode. There are several issues that impact application security beyond confusing domain names.

XWiki SolrSearch Exploit Attempts (CVE-2025-24893) with link to Chicago Gangs/Rappers, (Mon, Nov 3rd)

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XWiki describes itself as "The Advanced Open-Source Enterprise Wiki" and considers itself an alternative to Confluence and MediaWiki. In February, XWiki released an advisory (and patch) for an arbitrary remote code execution vulnerability. Affected was the SolrSearch component, which any user, even with minimal "Guest" privileges, can use. The advisory included PoC code, so it is a bit odd that it took so long for the vulnerability to be widely exploited.

Scans for Port 8530/8531 (TCP). Likely related to WSUS Vulnerability CVE-2025-59287, (Sun, Nov 2nd)

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Sensors reporting firewall logs detected a significant increase in scans for port 8530/TCP and 8531/TCP over the course of last week. Some of these reports originate from Shadowserver, and likely other researchers, but there are also some that do not correspond to known research-related IP addresses.