Apple released the next version of its operating system, patching 85 different vulnerabilities across all of them. None of the vulnerabilities are currently being exploited. The last three macOS "generations" are covered, as are the last two versions of iOS/iPadOS. For tvOS, watchOS, and visionOS, only the current version received patches. This update also includes the recently released Background Security Improvements. Some older watchOS versions received updates, but these updates do not address any security issues.

I have written about how to use IP KVMs securely, and recently, researchers at Eclypsium published yet another report on IP KVM vulnerabilities. But there is another issue I haven't mentioned yet with IP KVMs: rogue IP KVMs. IP KVMs are often used by criminals. For example, North Koreans used KVMs to connect remotely to laptops sent to them by their employers. The laptops were located in the US, and the North Korean workers used IP KVMs to remotely connect to them. IP KVMs could also be used to access office PCs, either to enable undetected "work from home" or by threat actors who use them to gain remote access after installing the device on site.

So, I've been slow to get on the Claude Code/OpenCode/Codex/OpenClaw bandwagon, but I had some time last week so I asked Claude to review (/security-review) some of my python scripts. He found more than I'd like to admit, so I checked in a bunch of updates. In reviewing his suggestions, he was right, I made some stupid mistakes, some of which have been sitting in there for a long time. It was nothing earth-shattering and it took almost no time for Claude, it took longer for me to read through the updates he wanted to make, figure out what he was seeing, and decide whether to accept them or tweak them. Here are a few of them.

This activity was found and reported by BACS student Adam Thorman as part of one of his assignments which I posted his final paper [1] last week. This activity appeared to only have occurred on the 19 Feb 2026 where at least 2 sensors detected on the same day by DShield sensor in the cowrie logs an echo command that included: "MAGIC_PAYLOAD_KILLER_HERE_OR_LEAVE_EMPTY_iranbot_was_here". My DShield sensor captured activity from source IP 64.89.161.198 between 30 Jan – 22 Feb 2026 that included portscans, a successful login via Telnet (TCP/23) and web access that included all the activity listed below captured by the DShield sensor (cowrie, webhoneypot & iptables logs).

A very popular target of attackers scanning our honeypots is "phpmyadmin". phpMyAdmin is a script first released in the late 90s, before many security concepts had been discovered. It's rich history of vulnerabilities made it a favorite target. Its alternative, "adminer", began appearing about a decade later (https://www.adminer.org). One of its main "selling" points was simplicity. Adminer is just a single PHP file. It requires no configuration. Copy it to your server, and you are ready to go. "adminer" has a much better security record and claims to prioritize security in its development.

On Wednesday, a phishing message made its way into our handler inbox that contained a fairly typical low-quality lure, but turned out to be quite interesting in the end nonetheless. That is because the accompanying credential stealing web page was dynamically constructed using React and used a legitimate e-mail service for credential collection.

[This is a Guest Diary by Joseph Gruen, an ISC intern as part of the SANS.edu BACS program]

And another XWorm[1] wave in the wild! This malware family is not new and heavily spread but delivery techniques always evolve and deserve to be described to show you how threat actors can be imaginative! This time, we are facing another piece of multi-technology malware.

CrushFTP is a Java-based open source file transfer system. It is offered for multiple operating systems. If you run a CrushFTP instance, you may remember that the software has had some serious vulnerabilities: CVE-2024-4040 (the template-injection flaw that let unauthenticated attackers escape the VFS sandbox and achieve RCE), CVE-2025-31161 (the auth-bypass that handed over the crushadmin account on a silver platter), and the July 2025 zero-day CVE-2025-54309 that was actively exploited in the wild.

In 2010, OWASP added "Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards" to its Top 10 list and merged it into "Sensitive Data Exposure" in 2013 [owasp1] [owasp2]. Open redirects are often overlooked, and their impact is not always well understood. At first, it does not look like a big deal. The user is receiving a 3xx status code and is being redirected to another URL. That target URL should handle all authentication and access control, regardless of where the data originated.