Tag Archives: SANS

What's My (File)Name?, (Mon, Jul 7th)

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Modern malware implements a lot of anti-debugging and anti-analysis features. Today, when a malware is spread in the wild, there are chances that it will be automatically sent into a automatic analysis pipe, and a sandbox. To analyze a sample in a sandbox, it must be "copied" into the sandbox and executed. This can happen manually or automatically. When people start the analysis of a suspicious file, they usually call it "sample.exe", "malware.exe" or "suspicious.exe". It's not always a good idea because it's can be detected by the malware and make it aware that "I'm being analyzed".

Quick Password Brute Forcing Evolution Statistics, (Tue, Jun 24th)

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We have collected SSH and telnet honeypot data in various forms for about 10 years. Yesterday's diaries, and looking at some new usernames attempted earlier today, made me wonder if botnets just add new usernames or remove old ones from their lists. So I pulled some data from our database to test this hypothesis. I didn't spend a lot of time on this, and this could use a more detailed analysis. But here is a preliminary result:

Scans for Ichano AtHome IP Cameras, (Mon, Jun 23rd)

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Ichano's "AtHome Camera" is a bit of a different approach to home surveillance cameras [1]. Instead of a hardware camera solution, this product is a software solution that turns existing devices like computers and tablets into webcams. The software implements features we know from similar IP camera devices. It enabled streaming of images and remote access to features like motion detection and alerting.

Quasar RAT Delivered Through Bat Files, (Wed, Jun 11th)

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RAT's are popular malware. They are many of them in the wild, Quasar[1] being one of them. The malware has been active for a long time and new campaigns come regularly back on stage. I spotted an interesting .bat file (Windows script) that attracted my attention because it is very well obfuscated. This file is a second stage that is downloaded and launched from a simple script:

Be Careful With Fake Zoom Client Downloads, (Thu, Jun 5th)

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Collaborative tools are really popular these days. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, many people switched to remote work positions and we need to collaborate with our colleagues or customers every day. Tools like Microsoft Teams, Zoom, WebEx, (name your best solution), … became popular and must be regularly updated.Yesterday, I received an interesting email with a fake Zoom meeting invitation:

vBulletin Exploits (CVE-2025-48827, CVE-2025-48828), (Tue, Jun 3rd)

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Last week, Ryan Dewhurst disclosed an interesting and easily exploitable vulnerability in vBulltin. These days, bulletin boards are not quite as popular as they used to be, but they are still being used, and vBulletin is one of the most common commercially supported platforms to create a bulletin board. The vulnerability is remarkable as it exemplifies some common issues with patching and keeping your software up to date.

Simple SSH Backdoor, (Mon, Jun 2nd)

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For most system and network administrators, the free SSH client Putty has been their best friend for years! This tool was also (ab)used by attackers that deployed a trojanized version[1]. Microsoft had the good idea to include OpenSSH (beta version) in Windows 10 Fall Creators Update. One year later, it became a default component with Windows 10 version 1803. I remember the join of type for the first time "ssh" or "scp" in a cmd.exe! SSH is a very powerful tool that can be used in multiple ways, and it was de-facto categorized as a "LOLBIN"[2].